Narrative:

The sequence of events that prompt me to submit this NASA report start with the contacting of ZDC for an arrival into newark, nj. We were on the robbinsville one arrival at FL350. Captain was flying the aircraft and the first officer was handling the radios. The aircraft was FMS equipped and the autoplt was engaged. We were given a descent to FL190. Captain set the altitude on the mode control panel, announced the input to the first officer and I acknowledged all in accordance with company policy. Captain then programmed the FMS to make the descent. During the descent, somewhere around FL210, we were given a further descent to cross holey intersection at 11000 ft and to expect holding at holey because of traffic saturation at newark. The phl altimeter setting was 30.15. At this time captain set 15000 ft in the altitude window and the first officer acknowledged the setting. Approaching holey intersection, it became apparent to the controller that we would not make the 11000 ft at holey and asked us 'if we would try to make 11000 ft at holey.' at this time captain set 11000 ft in the altitude window, the first officer acknowledged and captain programmed the FMS. Also, during the last part of the descent, captain was trying to slow the aircraft to 210 KTS to meet the holding airspeed restr for the holding pattern at holey. We told the controller that we would be unable to slow and make the crossing restr at holey. Some words were exchanged between the controller and us that prompted captain to get his phone number so he could call him when we were on the ground. He gave us the number and cleared us to hold at robbinsville in the published holding pattern. We held for about 15 mins and continued for the approach and landing at newark. When captain contacted the supervisor for that sector to discuss the exchange of words we had with the controller, he advised captain that the controller had initially cleared us to cross holey at 11000 ft and he was trying to be tactful with us to prompt us to get down. Captain assured the supervisor that we had been cleared to cross holey at 15000 ft and would he please check the tapes. He agreed to this and captain was to call him the next morning for the information. When captain spoke with him the next morning, he assured captain that we were given a clearance to cross holey at 11000 ft and the first officer acknowledged that clearance. Captain was so positive in his mind that we had a clearance to 15000 ft that this information shocked him. Captain then apologized for our operational error and we discussed how to improve the performance on both sides so this error would not be repeated. Controller advised me that no action would be taken toward the first officer and captain and the conversation ended on a positive note. How did it happen: discussion between captain and the first officer leads us to believe that we somehow got the altimeter setting of 30.15 intermixed with the altitude clearance and set and acknowledged 15000 ft. To correct the situation: I cannot fault our company procedures because they are the best in the industry and we applied them accordingly. We just entered the wrong information. I can find fault with the archaic way in which we conduct our information exchange with the controllers. With the increase of traffic, especially in the northeast sector, comes a much larger increase in radio xmissions which leads to an increase in operrors. Instead of allocating the aviation fund to cover the national budget deficit, upgrade the system where a clearance can be received through either ACARS or directly to the FMS thus greatly reducing radio xmissions. The technology is there but not the leadership.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DSNDING B757-200 FAILS TO MAKE ITS ALT XING RESTR.

Narrative: THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS THAT PROMPT ME TO SUBMIT THIS NASA RPT START WITH THE CONTACTING OF ZDC FOR AN ARR INTO NEWARK, NJ. WE WERE ON THE ROBBINSVILLE ONE ARR AT FL350. CAPT WAS FLYING THE ACFT AND THE FO WAS HANDLING THE RADIOS. THE ACFT WAS FMS EQUIPPED AND THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. WE WERE GIVEN A DSCNT TO FL190. CAPT SET THE ALT ON THE MODE CTL PANEL, ANNOUNCED THE INPUT TO THE FO AND I ACKNOWLEDGED ALL IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY POLICY. CAPT THEN PROGRAMMED THE FMS TO MAKE THE DSCNT. DURING THE DSCNT, SOMEWHERE AROUND FL210, WE WERE GIVEN A FURTHER DSCNT TO CROSS HOLEY INTXN AT 11000 FT AND TO EXPECT HOLDING AT HOLEY BECAUSE OF TFC SATURATION AT NEWARK. THE PHL ALTIMETER SETTING WAS 30.15. AT THIS TIME CAPT SET 15000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW AND THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED THE SETTING. APCHING HOLEY INTXN, IT BECAME APPARENT TO THE CTLR THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE THE 11000 FT AT HOLEY AND ASKED US 'IF WE WOULD TRY TO MAKE 11000 FT AT HOLEY.' AT THIS TIME CAPT SET 11000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW, THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED AND CAPT PROGRAMMED THE FMS. ALSO, DURING THE LAST PART OF THE DSCNT, CAPT WAS TRYING TO SLOW THE ACFT TO 210 KTS TO MEET THE HOLDING AIRSPD RESTR FOR THE HOLDING PATTERN AT HOLEY. WE TOLD THE CTLR THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO SLOW AND MAKE THE XING RESTR AT HOLEY. SOME WORDS WERE EXCHANGED BTWN THE CTLR AND US THAT PROMPTED CAPT TO GET HIS PHONE NUMBER SO HE COULD CALL HIM WHEN WE WERE ON THE GND. HE GAVE US THE NUMBER AND CLRED US TO HOLD AT ROBBINSVILLE IN THE PUBLISHED HOLDING PATTERN. WE HELD FOR ABOUT 15 MINS AND CONTINUED FOR THE APCH AND LNDG AT NEWARK. WHEN CAPT CONTACTED THE SUPVR FOR THAT SECTOR TO DISCUSS THE EXCHANGE OF WORDS WE HAD WITH THE CTLR, HE ADVISED CAPT THAT THE CTLR HAD INITIALLY CLRED US TO CROSS HOLEY AT 11000 FT AND HE WAS TRYING TO BE TACTFUL WITH US TO PROMPT US TO GET DOWN. CAPT ASSURED THE SUPVR THAT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CROSS HOLEY AT 15000 FT AND WOULD HE PLEASE CHK THE TAPES. HE AGREED TO THIS AND CAPT WAS TO CALL HIM THE NEXT MORNING FOR THE INFO. WHEN CAPT SPOKE WITH HIM THE NEXT MORNING, HE ASSURED CAPT THAT WE WERE GIVEN A CLRNC TO CROSS HOLEY AT 11000 FT AND THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED THAT CLRNC. CAPT WAS SO POSITIVE IN HIS MIND THAT WE HAD A CLRNC TO 15000 FT THAT THIS INFO SHOCKED HIM. CAPT THEN APOLOGIZED FOR OUR OPERROR AND WE DISCUSSED HOW TO IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE ON BOTH SIDES SO THIS ERROR WOULD NOT BE REPEATED. CTLR ADVISED ME THAT NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN TOWARD THE FO AND CAPT AND THE CONVERSATION ENDED ON A POSITIVE NOTE. HOW DID IT HAPPEN: DISCUSSION BTWN CAPT AND THE FO LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT WE SOMEHOW GOT THE ALTIMETER SETTING OF 30.15 INTERMIXED WITH THE ALT CLRNC AND SET AND ACKNOWLEDGED 15000 FT. TO CORRECT THE SIT: I CANNOT FAULT OUR COMPANY PROCS BECAUSE THEY ARE THE BEST IN THE INDUSTRY AND WE APPLIED THEM ACCORDINGLY. WE JUST ENTERED THE WRONG INFO. I CAN FIND FAULT WITH THE ARCHAIC WAY IN WHICH WE CONDUCT OUR INFO EXCHANGE WITH THE CTLRS. WITH THE INCREASE OF TFC, ESPECIALLY IN THE NE SECTOR, COMES A MUCH LARGER INCREASE IN RADIO XMISSIONS WHICH LEADS TO AN INCREASE IN OPERRORS. INSTEAD OF ALLOCATING THE AVIATION FUND TO COVER THE NATIONAL BUDGET DEFICIT, UPGRADE THE SYS WHERE A CLRNC CAN BE RECEIVED THROUGH EITHER ACARS OR DIRECTLY TO THE FMS THUS GREATLY REDUCING RADIO XMISSIONS. THE TECHNOLOGY IS THERE BUT NOT THE LEADERSHIP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.