Narrative:

I was captain on this flight, receiving my initial captain line check. My first officer was a normal line first officer. The lca was in the jump seat. Everything was going normally until descent. I was flying the aircraft via the autoplt. We were given a crossing restr of 11000 ft at benet intersection. Since I was under check ride pressure, I wanted to start down early, so I used vertical speed mode in a 300 FPM descent, so as to arrive early at benet. As we got closer to benet, I increased our descent to 500 FPM. I was using the FMC and a 3:1 ratio to calculate our descent. The FMC was slow and I lost situational awareness. Both the first officer and I realized we were high, so I disengaged the autoplt and began a maximum energy descent, turned on the seatbelt sign, and asked the first officer to call ATC for altitude relief. The controller told us he had traffic and needed us to be out of 15000 ft in 1 min. He told the controller we were out of 15300 ft now. We crossed benet at 6000-7000 ft high. I have never done that before. The controller told us to call him and a pilot deviation would be filed. This incident was my fault. I was worried about my 5 week old son who was in poor health and was admitted to the hospital that day. He was in intensive care for 4 days. I should have canceled my line check. He is better now. Needless to say, I was unsuccessful on my line check. In 15 yrs of airline flying, I had never busted a check ride. In the future, I won't fly if major problems occur at home. Supplemental information from acn 471892: causal factors of this pilot deviation were a new captain (1 yr of service as a captain) and a line check airman (standards capts) conducting the captain's 1 yr required FAA line check. The captain was extremely nervous due to the check ride. ZLA issued a pilot's discretion descent from FL290 to FL240. Instead of the captain waiting and then doing an idle power descent, he elected to start down immediately using a 300 FPM rate and the vertical speed function of the MCP. Although not unusual, most pilots that are experienced in EFIS operations elect to stay in the VNAV mode. This provides more FMC/EFIS visual clues as to the progress of the descent. The line check captain briefly left the cockpit for physiological reasons. At that time, the PF admitted to me that he had started his descent too early, but didn't want to be rushed later. I asked the captain if he had planned to stay in vertical speed down to 11000 ft. He said 'yes, for now.' apparently, after the incident he told me that he was trying to understand why we didn't have a green arc and a 'top of descent' point marked on our HSI's. I made a calculation of our descent progress and we were still ok (outside a point where a 3 NM/10000 ft idle descent would be needed). We had a routine cabin call at this time and I was reviewing sna's ATIS. These distrs led me to not notice that we were now inside a descent point for benet and the FMC CDU legs page had dumped our crossing altitude. (Discussion later revealed that this may have been because of the prolonged 300-500 FPM vertical speed descent.) finally, now only 15 NM or so from benet and descending through FL190 we all realized we would not make the restr. The captain tried very hard to make the crossing (speed brakes, idle power 4000-6000 FPM descent). We called the center. The lady (after the captain explained the reasons for the mistake) said that no further action would be needed, or taken. I contributed to this by allowing myself to be taken out of the loop for ATIS and a cabin call. The check captain was talking a lot -- I think to help the PF captain feel less nervous. I should have advocated more regarding the descent. I think if the check airman wasn't in the jump seat, our communications would have been more effective.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DSNDING B757-200 PIC, ON AN ANNUAL LINE CHK, FAILS TO MAKE AN ALT XING RESTR AT BENET INTXN WITH ZLA, CA.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT ON THIS FLT, RECEIVING MY INITIAL CAPT LINE CHK. MY FO WAS A NORMAL LINE FO. THE LCA WAS IN THE JUMP SEAT. EVERYTHING WAS GOING NORMALLY UNTIL DSCNT. I WAS FLYING THE ACFT VIA THE AUTOPLT. WE WERE GIVEN A XING RESTR OF 11000 FT AT BENET INTXN. SINCE I WAS UNDER CHK RIDE PRESSURE, I WANTED TO START DOWN EARLY, SO I USED VERT SPD MODE IN A 300 FPM DSCNT, SO AS TO ARRIVE EARLY AT BENET. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO BENET, I INCREASED OUR DSCNT TO 500 FPM. I WAS USING THE FMC AND A 3:1 RATIO TO CALCULATE OUR DSCNT. THE FMC WAS SLOW AND I LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. BOTH THE FO AND I REALIZED WE WERE HIGH, SO I DISENGAGED THE AUTOPLT AND BEGAN A MAX ENERGY DSCNT, TURNED ON THE SEATBELT SIGN, AND ASKED THE FO TO CALL ATC FOR ALT RELIEF. THE CTLR TOLD US HE HAD TFC AND NEEDED US TO BE OUT OF 15000 FT IN 1 MIN. HE TOLD THE CTLR WE WERE OUT OF 15300 FT NOW. WE CROSSED BENET AT 6000-7000 FT HIGH. I HAVE NEVER DONE THAT BEFORE. THE CTLR TOLD US TO CALL HIM AND A PLTDEV WOULD BE FILED. THIS INCIDENT WAS MY FAULT. I WAS WORRIED ABOUT MY 5 WK OLD SON WHO WAS IN POOR HEALTH AND WAS ADMITTED TO THE HOSPITAL THAT DAY. HE WAS IN INTENSIVE CARE FOR 4 DAYS. I SHOULD HAVE CANCELED MY LINE CHK. HE IS BETTER NOW. NEEDLESS TO SAY, I WAS UNSUCCESSFUL ON MY LINE CHK. IN 15 YRS OF AIRLINE FLYING, I HAD NEVER BUSTED A CHK RIDE. IN THE FUTURE, I WON'T FLY IF MAJOR PROBS OCCUR AT HOME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 471892: CAUSAL FACTORS OF THIS PLTDEV WERE A NEW CAPT (1 YR OF SVC AS A CAPT) AND A LINE CHK AIRMAN (STANDARDS CAPTS) CONDUCTING THE CAPT'S 1 YR REQUIRED FAA LINE CHK. THE CAPT WAS EXTREMELY NERVOUS DUE TO THE CHK RIDE. ZLA ISSUED A PLT'S DISCRETION DSCNT FROM FL290 TO FL240. INSTEAD OF THE CAPT WAITING AND THEN DOING AN IDLE PWR DSCNT, HE ELECTED TO START DOWN IMMEDIATELY USING A 300 FPM RATE AND THE VERT SPD FUNCTION OF THE MCP. ALTHOUGH NOT UNUSUAL, MOST PLTS THAT ARE EXPERIENCED IN EFIS OPS ELECT TO STAY IN THE VNAV MODE. THIS PROVIDES MORE FMC/EFIS VISUAL CLUES AS TO THE PROGRESS OF THE DSCNT. THE LINE CHK CAPT BRIEFLY LEFT THE COCKPIT FOR PHYSIOLOGICAL REASONS. AT THAT TIME, THE PF ADMITTED TO ME THAT HE HAD STARTED HIS DSCNT TOO EARLY, BUT DIDN'T WANT TO BE RUSHED LATER. I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE HAD PLANNED TO STAY IN VERT SPD DOWN TO 11000 FT. HE SAID 'YES, FOR NOW.' APPARENTLY, AFTER THE INCIDENT HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE DIDN'T HAVE A GREEN ARC AND A 'TOP OF DSCNT' POINT MARKED ON OUR HSI'S. I MADE A CALCULATION OF OUR DSCNT PROGRESS AND WE WERE STILL OK (OUTSIDE A POINT WHERE A 3 NM/10000 FT IDLE DSCNT WOULD BE NEEDED). WE HAD A ROUTINE CABIN CALL AT THIS TIME AND I WAS REVIEWING SNA'S ATIS. THESE DISTRS LED ME TO NOT NOTICE THAT WE WERE NOW INSIDE A DSCNT POINT FOR BENET AND THE FMC CDU LEGS PAGE HAD DUMPED OUR XING ALT. (DISCUSSION LATER REVEALED THAT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN BECAUSE OF THE PROLONGED 300-500 FPM VERT SPD DSCNT.) FINALLY, NOW ONLY 15 NM OR SO FROM BENET AND DSNDING THROUGH FL190 WE ALL REALIZED WE WOULD NOT MAKE THE RESTR. THE CAPT TRIED VERY HARD TO MAKE THE XING (SPD BRAKES, IDLE PWR 4000-6000 FPM DSCNT). WE CALLED THE CTR. THE LADY (AFTER THE CAPT EXPLAINED THE REASONS FOR THE MISTAKE) SAID THAT NO FURTHER ACTION WOULD BE NEEDED, OR TAKEN. I CONTRIBUTED TO THIS BY ALLOWING MYSELF TO BE TAKEN OUT OF THE LOOP FOR ATIS AND A CABIN CALL. THE CHK CAPT WAS TALKING A LOT -- I THINK TO HELP THE PF CAPT FEEL LESS NERVOUS. I SHOULD HAVE ADVOCATED MORE REGARDING THE DSCNT. I THINK IF THE CHK AIRMAN WASN'T IN THE JUMP SEAT, OUR COMS WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.