Narrative:

I was the first officer assigned to EMB120 ship xx abc along with a captain and a flight attendant to operate air carrier cvg msn on aug/yy/98. Using EMB120 pilots checklist aircraft not modified per airworthiness directive xyz revision dated jun/bb/98 the following checklists were completed: before engine start, turnaround items, pushback, taxi and before takeoff. This was my leg and I would be the PF. As we approached runway 27, there were 3 aircraft waiting to take off ahead of us and 4 aircraft on the south side from intersection M2 to taxiway M to spot X. This caused us to be delayed a few mins until we would be cleared for takeoff. Cvg tower was using runway 18L, runway 18R, and runway 27 for departures. We were cleared into position and hold on runway 27 by cvg tower. I acknowledged and began the lineup recommended EMB120 checklist flow, down through 'cleared for takeoff' and then awaited further clearance from the tower. As an aircraft departing runway 18R passed over runway 27, cvg tower cleared us for takeoff. At this time I acknowledged the takeoff clearance and placed my left hand onto what I thought were the condition levers, which turned out to be the power levers and pushed forward slowly and steadily. Upon hearing the screaming of the propellers, I immediately started to pull the power levers back to ground idle. As this was happening, I did not notice what the torque value was, and did not hear a T-6 warning or see a warning or caution light. The captain, during this time, was doing his lineup checklist flow and was turning on the external lights. When he heard the propeller noise, he placed his hands on my hands and we both pulled power levers back to ground idle. This did not take more than 1 if 2 seconds, after which the captain placed the condition levers from minimum to maximum and I finished the lineup checklist below 'cleared for takeoff' line. This was completed and we started the takeoff roll and departed runway 27. Standard calls were made and takeoff and climb out went according to the flight standards manual. After the captain completed the climb checklist, he told me he contacted maintenance control and they told him to bring the aircraft back to cvg so they could inspect the engines and the propellers. The captain called the flight attendant and made the announcement to the passenger and then told ATC we needed to divert to cvg and got us the clearance to do so. He also contacted dispatch and received an amended release. ATC was told this was not an emergency, but we needed to return due to a mechanical condition and did not require any special assistance from ATC. All checklists were completed and we landed on runway 18R and taxied to gate aa.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AS AN EMB120 BEGINS TKOF ROLL, THE PLT PUSHES THE PWR LEVERS FORWARD INSTEAD OF THE CONDITION LEVER AND THE ENG IS SUSPECTED OF BEING OVERTORQUED. FLC PULLS THE PWR BACK, THEN RESUMES TKOF ONLY TO RETURN LAND FOR ENG INSPECTION.

Narrative: I WAS THE FO ASSIGNED TO EMB120 SHIP XX ABC ALONG WITH A CAPT AND A FLT ATTENDANT TO OPERATE ACR CVG MSN ON AUG/YY/98. USING EMB120 PLTS CHKLIST ACFT NOT MODIFIED PER AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE XYZ REVISION DATED JUN/BB/98 THE FOLLOWING CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED: BEFORE ENG START, TURNAROUND ITEMS, PUSHBACK, TAXI AND BEFORE TKOF. THIS WAS MY LEG AND I WOULD BE THE PF. AS WE APCHED RWY 27, THERE WERE 3 ACFT WAITING TO TAKE OFF AHEAD OF US AND 4 ACFT ON THE S SIDE FROM INTXN M2 TO TXWY M TO SPOT X. THIS CAUSED US TO BE DELAYED A FEW MINS UNTIL WE WOULD BE CLRED FOR TKOF. CVG TWR WAS USING RWY 18L, RWY 18R, AND RWY 27 FOR DEPS. WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 27 BY CVG TWR. I ACKNOWLEDGED AND BEGAN THE LINEUP RECOMMENDED EMB120 CHKLIST FLOW, DOWN THROUGH 'CLRED FOR TKOF' AND THEN AWAITED FURTHER CLRNC FROM THE TWR. AS AN ACFT DEPARTING RWY 18R PASSED OVER RWY 27, CVG TWR CLRED US FOR TKOF. AT THIS TIME I ACKNOWLEDGED THE TKOF CLRNC AND PLACED MY L HAND ONTO WHAT I THOUGHT WERE THE CONDITION LEVERS, WHICH TURNED OUT TO BE THE PWR LEVERS AND PUSHED FORWARD SLOWLY AND STEADILY. UPON HEARING THE SCREAMING OF THE PROPS, I IMMEDIATELY STARTED TO PULL THE PWR LEVERS BACK TO GND IDLE. AS THIS WAS HAPPENING, I DID NOT NOTICE WHAT THE TORQUE VALUE WAS, AND DID NOT HEAR A T-6 WARNING OR SEE A WARNING OR CAUTION LIGHT. THE CAPT, DURING THIS TIME, WAS DOING HIS LINEUP CHKLIST FLOW AND WAS TURNING ON THE EXTERNAL LIGHTS. WHEN HE HEARD THE PROP NOISE, HE PLACED HIS HANDS ON MY HANDS AND WE BOTH PULLED PWR LEVERS BACK TO GND IDLE. THIS DID NOT TAKE MORE THAN 1 IF 2 SECONDS, AFTER WHICH THE CAPT PLACED THE CONDITION LEVERS FROM MINIMUM TO MAX AND I FINISHED THE LINEUP CHKLIST BELOW 'CLRED FOR TKOF' LINE. THIS WAS COMPLETED AND WE STARTED THE TKOF ROLL AND DEPARTED RWY 27. STANDARD CALLS WERE MADE AND TKOF AND CLBOUT WENT ACCORDING TO THE FLT STANDARDS MANUAL. AFTER THE CAPT COMPLETED THE CLB CHKLIST, HE TOLD ME HE CONTACTED MAINT CTL AND THEY TOLD HIM TO BRING THE ACFT BACK TO CVG SO THEY COULD INSPECT THE ENGS AND THE PROPS. THE CAPT CALLED THE FLT ATTENDANT AND MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PAX AND THEN TOLD ATC WE NEEDED TO DIVERT TO CVG AND GOT US THE CLRNC TO DO SO. HE ALSO CONTACTED DISPATCH AND RECEIVED AN AMENDED RELEASE. ATC WAS TOLD THIS WAS NOT AN EMER, BUT WE NEEDED TO RETURN DUE TO A MECHANICAL CONDITION AND DID NOT REQUIRE ANY SPECIAL ASSISTANCE FROM ATC. ALL CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETED AND WE LANDED ON RWY 18R AND TAXIED TO GATE AA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.