Narrative:

After performing the after landing checklist, and while filling out company paperwork, I noticed the frequency of the nose gear on the taxiway expansion joints seemed to be too fast. I glanced up through the windscreen and noticed the aircraft was going too fast. I called it to the captain's and first officer's attention just as a ground controller also noticed it. The captain was agitated and did not respond. I looked at the GPS for confirmation of our speed and found it turned off. I estimate our speed at 60 KTS minimum. Due to the irregular manner that this captain conducted several of our flts together. I felt the need to document the events. I saw and noted the following: 1) a total breakdown in cockpit discipline. Below 10000 ft there was ongoing discussion about the company mistreating the pilots. This upstaged checklist usage, traffic awareness and aircraft control. Checklist usage was met with improper responses or no responses to my repeated calling of the item (ie, during parking check: flight engineer 'start levers.' captain's response 'you don't hear the engines running do you?') 2) excessive bank angle and pitch angles at low altitude in the traffic pattern at toledo express and boston logan airports. (GPWS warnings were going off and were ignored. 'Bank angle, bank angle, descent rate, descent rate'.) on departure from toledo the aircraft was pitched up to 20 degrees and airspeed was allowed to decrease to 5 KTS below minimum maneuvering speed for our weight (captain flying). While he was pitching and banking the aircraft like this, he was yelling 'weeeee' as though he was a child on a backyard swing. 3) EPR limits were exceeded during climb (2.25 with -7/-9 engines) purposely as retribution to the company for alleged mistreatment of the captain. (This was called out to the captain by the flight engineer but ignored.) 4) the first officer was flying a visual approach to tol express was unstabilized below 1000 ft (1500 FPM descent at the MM and approximately 24 KTS over bug speed). The first officer had misjudged the wind which blew the aircraft past the runway centerline and closer to the runway. Bank angles were 45 degrees, pitch was about 7 degrees nose down during the turn. I called it out and the captain did not intercede. (The aircraft was fairly light though, 145000 pounds -- we landed beyond the touchdown zone and stopped without difficulty.) 5) an extremely unsafe item was the speed at which the aircraft was taxied in at bos on the morning of nov/xa/98. By my estimation the aircraft was in excess of 60 KTS on the taxiway in the vicinity of an MD80. I looked down at the GPS to confirm my suspicions and found it had already been turned off. The controller on duty noticed our speed, 'can you stop before crossing in front of the MD80?' 6) the copilot left his seat while the aircraft was still taxiing, and the captain permitted it. 7) when I repeated checklist items to try to regain cockpit discipline the captain told me, 'hey...you take care of the flight engineer stuff and we'll take care of the pilot stuff. All I need from you is fuel and power.' on another occasion the captain stated to me 'you know we really don't need a flight engineer on this aircraft.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B727 CAPT WAS NOT OPERATING THE ACFT IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS ACR OPERATING MANUAL.

Narrative: AFTER PERFORMING THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST, AND WHILE FILLING OUT COMPANY PAPERWORK, I NOTICED THE FREQUENCY OF THE NOSE GEAR ON THE TXWY EXPANSION JOINTS SEEMED TO BE TOO FAST. I GLANCED UP THROUGH THE WINDSCREEN AND NOTICED THE ACFT WAS GOING TOO FAST. I CALLED IT TO THE CAPT'S AND FO'S ATTN JUST AS A GND CTLR ALSO NOTICED IT. THE CAPT WAS AGITATED AND DID NOT RESPOND. I LOOKED AT THE GPS FOR CONFIRMATION OF OUR SPD AND FOUND IT TURNED OFF. I ESTIMATE OUR SPD AT 60 KTS MINIMUM. DUE TO THE IRREGULAR MANNER THAT THIS CAPT CONDUCTED SEVERAL OF OUR FLTS TOGETHER. I FELT THE NEED TO DOCUMENT THE EVENTS. I SAW AND NOTED THE FOLLOWING: 1) A TOTAL BREAKDOWN IN COCKPIT DISCIPLINE. BELOW 10000 FT THERE WAS ONGOING DISCUSSION ABOUT THE COMPANY MISTREATING THE PLTS. THIS UPSTAGED CHKLIST USAGE, TFC AWARENESS AND ACFT CTL. CHKLIST USAGE WAS MET WITH IMPROPER RESPONSES OR NO RESPONSES TO MY REPEATED CALLING OF THE ITEM (IE, DURING PARKING CHK: FE 'START LEVERS.' CAPT'S RESPONSE 'YOU DON'T HEAR THE ENGS RUNNING DO YOU?') 2) EXCESSIVE BANK ANGLE AND PITCH ANGLES AT LOW ALT IN THE TFC PATTERN AT TOLEDO EXPRESS AND BOSTON LOGAN ARPTS. (GPWS WARNINGS WERE GOING OFF AND WERE IGNORED. 'BANK ANGLE, BANK ANGLE, DSCNT RATE, DSCNT RATE'.) ON DEP FROM TOLEDO THE ACFT WAS PITCHED UP TO 20 DEGS AND AIRSPD WAS ALLOWED TO DECREASE TO 5 KTS BELOW MINIMUM MANEUVERING SPD FOR OUR WT (CAPT FLYING). WHILE HE WAS PITCHING AND BANKING THE ACFT LIKE THIS, HE WAS YELLING 'WEEEEE' AS THOUGH HE WAS A CHILD ON A BACKYARD SWING. 3) EPR LIMITS WERE EXCEEDED DURING CLB (2.25 WITH -7/-9 ENGS) PURPOSELY AS RETRIBUTION TO THE COMPANY FOR ALLEGED MISTREATMENT OF THE CAPT. (THIS WAS CALLED OUT TO THE CAPT BY THE FE BUT IGNORED.) 4) THE FO WAS FLYING A VISUAL APCH TO TOL EXPRESS WAS UNSTABILIZED BELOW 1000 FT (1500 FPM DSCNT AT THE MM AND APPROX 24 KTS OVER BUG SPD). THE FO HAD MISJUDGED THE WIND WHICH BLEW THE ACFT PAST THE RWY CTRLINE AND CLOSER TO THE RWY. BANK ANGLES WERE 45 DEGS, PITCH WAS ABOUT 7 DEGS NOSE DOWN DURING THE TURN. I CALLED IT OUT AND THE CAPT DID NOT INTERCEDE. (THE ACFT WAS FAIRLY LIGHT THOUGH, 145000 LBS -- WE LANDED BEYOND THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE AND STOPPED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.) 5) AN EXTREMELY UNSAFE ITEM WAS THE SPD AT WHICH THE ACFT WAS TAXIED IN AT BOS ON THE MORNING OF NOV/XA/98. BY MY ESTIMATION THE ACFT WAS IN EXCESS OF 60 KTS ON THE TXWY IN THE VICINITY OF AN MD80. I LOOKED DOWN AT THE GPS TO CONFIRM MY SUSPICIONS AND FOUND IT HAD ALREADY BEEN TURNED OFF. THE CTLR ON DUTY NOTICED OUR SPD, 'CAN YOU STOP BEFORE XING IN FRONT OF THE MD80?' 6) THE COPLT LEFT HIS SEAT WHILE THE ACFT WAS STILL TAXIING, AND THE CAPT PERMITTED IT. 7) WHEN I REPEATED CHKLIST ITEMS TO TRY TO REGAIN COCKPIT DISCIPLINE THE CAPT TOLD ME, 'HEY...YOU TAKE CARE OF THE FE STUFF AND WE'LL TAKE CARE OF THE PLT STUFF. ALL I NEED FROM YOU IS FUEL AND PWR.' ON ANOTHER OCCASION THE CAPT STATED TO ME 'YOU KNOW WE REALLY DON'T NEED A FE ON THIS ACFT.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.