Narrative:

Visual/VMC landing on runway 12. Cleared to land, hold short of high speed runway 1. Clearance acknowledged. Pilots thought that high speed runway 1 was a point on the parallel taxiway to hold short of after clearing at taxiway Q4. During rollout, we saw the high speed runway 1 sign on left of runway and realized we were transgressing into the 'hold short of' protected space. Situation was complicated by a long rollout of previous traffic and cockpit crew discussion/brief of possible go around. We continued because: 1) we could touch down in touchdown zone on speed and profile. 2) previous aircraft was clear. 3) we had normal braking capability. In the diversion/distraction of the late rollout of previous aircraft, we missed the necessity to hold short, and we had misunderstood where the hold short point was. The crew was alert, worked well together, and had briefed the potential for a hold short clearance. 45 mins prior to landing and again outside the marker. We believe that hold short landing clrncs are a potential for disaster. (Our company 10-7 page has a paragraph describing what to do in event of a 'hold short of high speed runway 1 clearance.' each pilot read that paragraph several times, but overlooked the graphic for runway high speed 1 point. We thought it was a point on the parallel taxiway.)

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CREW MISIDENTED HOLDING POINT AFTER ACCEPTING A LAHSO CLRNC.

Narrative: VISUAL/VMC LNDG ON RWY 12. CLRED TO LAND, HOLD SHORT OF HIGH SPD RWY 1. CLRNC ACKNOWLEDGED. PLTS THOUGHT THAT HIGH SPD RWY 1 WAS A POINT ON THE PARALLEL TXWY TO HOLD SHORT OF AFTER CLRING AT TXWY Q4. DURING ROLLOUT, WE SAW THE HIGH SPD RWY 1 SIGN ON L OF RWY AND REALIZED WE WERE TRANSGRESSING INTO THE 'HOLD SHORT OF' PROTECTED SPACE. SIT WAS COMPLICATED BY A LONG ROLLOUT OF PREVIOUS TFC AND COCKPIT CREW DISCUSSION/BRIEF OF POSSIBLE GAR. WE CONTINUED BECAUSE: 1) WE COULD TOUCH DOWN IN TOUCHDOWN ZONE ON SPD AND PROFILE. 2) PREVIOUS ACFT WAS CLR. 3) WE HAD NORMAL BRAKING CAPABILITY. IN THE DIVERSION/DISTR OF THE LATE ROLLOUT OF PREVIOUS ACFT, WE MISSED THE NECESSITY TO HOLD SHORT, AND WE HAD MISUNDERSTOOD WHERE THE HOLD SHORT POINT WAS. THE CREW WAS ALERT, WORKED WELL TOGETHER, AND HAD BRIEFED THE POTENTIAL FOR A HOLD SHORT CLRNC. 45 MINS PRIOR TO LNDG AND AGAIN OUTSIDE THE MARKER. WE BELIEVE THAT HOLD SHORT LNDG CLRNCS ARE A POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER. (OUR COMPANY 10-7 PAGE HAS A PARAGRAPH DESCRIBING WHAT TO DO IN EVENT OF A 'HOLD SHORT OF HIGH SPD RWY 1 CLRNC.' EACH PLT READ THAT PARAGRAPH SEVERAL TIMES, BUT OVERLOOKED THE GRAPHIC FOR RWY HIGH SPD 1 POINT. WE THOUGHT IT WAS A POINT ON THE PARALLEL TXWY.)

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.