Narrative:

While programming the FMGC for our departure out of reagan national airport, dc, we were boarded by an FAA inspector conducting a routine check on his way out to sfo. The individual talked considerably during our preflight duties, thus causing distraction to both the captain and myself. This manifested itself in the following: on the captain's initial setup flow, he failed to recognize that the power xfer unit for the 2 independent hydraulic system was not in the armed position. We both failed to notice that our #2 VOR circuit breaker had popped after our initial VOR check. When our final weights had been verified, I entered the calculated gross weight where I should have only entered the new zero fuel weight. This resulted in a computer generated gross weight of over 15000 pounds above our actual gross weight. Once the ptu was noticed to be unarmed it was quickly placed in the armed position. Unlike the B757/767 the ptu being disarmed is not as big of a deal. In fact, it can be dispatched that way since should a hydraulic situation arise, our engine and system monitoring computer (ECAM) would direct us to simply turn it on. Once it was discovered that the #2 VOR was OTS, we quickly informed the controling ATC agency in compliance with FARS of our downgraded navigation capability. However, this did not affect our flight since we were navigating off of the IRU- DME system. Nor would it have prevented us from making any approach including a CAT III autoland. The gross weight error would not and did not affect safety of flight for the following reasons: 1) thrust required for takeoff is not based on aircraft gross weight but on outside air conditions. Maximum takeoff thrust was used anyway. 2) V speeds are manually derived and manually inserted into the FMGC. The computer cannot nor would not change, enter, or modify the V speeds. Our V speeds were based on the correct gross weight. 3) our flap setting was derived for data that was obtained using the correct gross weight before the programming error occurred. Regardless, almost every A320 departure from dca requires a flaps 3 degree takeoff -- any other suggestion would have resulted in further investigation and undoubtedly discovery of the problem. In closing, a more withdrawn and quiet approach by FAA jump seaters would help in eliminating distrs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PREFLT DISTR IN COCKPIT CONTRIBUTED TO MULTIPLE PROGRAMMING AND COCKPIT SETUP ERRORS.

Narrative: WHILE PROGRAMMING THE FMGC FOR OUR DEP OUT OF REAGAN NATIONAL ARPT, DC, WE WERE BOARDED BY AN FAA INSPECTOR CONDUCTING A ROUTINE CHK ON HIS WAY OUT TO SFO. THE INDIVIDUAL TALKED CONSIDERABLY DURING OUR PREFLT DUTIES, THUS CAUSING DISTR TO BOTH THE CAPT AND MYSELF. THIS MANIFESTED ITSELF IN THE FOLLOWING: ON THE CAPT'S INITIAL SETUP FLOW, HE FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE PWR XFER UNIT FOR THE 2 INDEPENDENT HYD SYS WAS NOT IN THE ARMED POS. WE BOTH FAILED TO NOTICE THAT OUR #2 VOR CIRCUIT BREAKER HAD POPPED AFTER OUR INITIAL VOR CHK. WHEN OUR FINAL WTS HAD BEEN VERIFIED, I ENTERED THE CALCULATED GROSS WT WHERE I SHOULD HAVE ONLY ENTERED THE NEW ZERO FUEL WT. THIS RESULTED IN A COMPUTER GENERATED GROSS WT OF OVER 15000 LBS ABOVE OUR ACTUAL GROSS WT. ONCE THE PTU WAS NOTICED TO BE UNARMED IT WAS QUICKLY PLACED IN THE ARMED POS. UNLIKE THE B757/767 THE PTU BEING DISARMED IS NOT AS BIG OF A DEAL. IN FACT, IT CAN BE DISPATCHED THAT WAY SINCE SHOULD A HYD SIT ARISE, OUR ENG AND SYS MONITORING COMPUTER (ECAM) WOULD DIRECT US TO SIMPLY TURN IT ON. ONCE IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE #2 VOR WAS OTS, WE QUICKLY INFORMED THE CTLING ATC AGENCY IN COMPLIANCE WITH FARS OF OUR DOWNGRADED NAV CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, THIS DID NOT AFFECT OUR FLT SINCE WE WERE NAVING OFF OF THE IRU- DME SYS. NOR WOULD IT HAVE PREVENTED US FROM MAKING ANY APCH INCLUDING A CAT III AUTOLAND. THE GROSS WT ERROR WOULD NOT AND DID NOT AFFECT SAFETY OF FLT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 1) THRUST REQUIRED FOR TKOF IS NOT BASED ON ACFT GROSS WT BUT ON OUTSIDE AIR CONDITIONS. MAX TKOF THRUST WAS USED ANYWAY. 2) V SPDS ARE MANUALLY DERIVED AND MANUALLY INSERTED INTO THE FMGC. THE COMPUTER CANNOT NOR WOULD NOT CHANGE, ENTER, OR MODIFY THE V SPDS. OUR V SPDS WERE BASED ON THE CORRECT GROSS WT. 3) OUR FLAP SETTING WAS DERIVED FOR DATA THAT WAS OBTAINED USING THE CORRECT GROSS WT BEFORE THE PROGRAMMING ERROR OCCURRED. REGARDLESS, ALMOST EVERY A320 DEP FROM DCA REQUIRES A FLAPS 3 DEG TKOF -- ANY OTHER SUGGESTION WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN FURTHER INVESTIGATION AND UNDOUBTEDLY DISCOVERY OF THE PROB. IN CLOSING, A MORE WITHDRAWN AND QUIET APCH BY FAA JUMP SEATERS WOULD HELP IN ELIMINATING DISTRS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.