Narrative:

While backtracking on runway 7 tupj, we were cleared for takeoff and advised of traffic upwind (a single engine cessna) which had taken off just before we were cleared onto the runway. Since the aircraft was behind us, we replied that we would be looking for the traffic. As we turned around at the end of the runway, I felt very rushed to complete taxi and takeoff checks. As we rolled, neither pilot was thinking about the cessna. At approximately 500 ft (AGL and MSL), I noticed the cessna on TCASII directly ahead. It was clear that if we continued on the standard instrument departure, we would climb up into him. I leveled off and called out the traffic which was on TCASII. With our busy tasks inside the cockpit, neither pilot could pick up the cessna visually. The captain called for an early turn as we continued a gentle climb (paralleling the cessna's climb). An island to the north of the runway centerline dictated that the left turnout start above 1000 ft, but since we had the terrain in sight we started the turn at about 700 ft. I floated the turn to go around the island, even though that would eat up lateral separation. How do you split the difference between terrain you can see and traffic that you can't? We finally picked up the aircraft visually at our 2 O'clock position after turning about 45 degrees off runway heading. We never had less than 1000 ft vertical separation per TCASII. Even though we never got a TCASII alert, TCASII was the single factor that avoided a close call. It broke the chain created by our failing to look for the traffic before we started rolling. Rushing the operation started the chain.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ATR42 ON TKOF AND CLB FROM BEEF ISLAND, VI, MAKES A LOW, EARLY TURNOUT IN PROX OF TERRAIN TO AVOID A CESSNA AHEAD THAT IS DETECTED BY THEIR TCASII. TWR HAD GIVEN AN ADVISORY OF THAT TFC DURING TKOF CLRNC.

Narrative: WHILE BACKTRACKING ON RWY 7 TUPJ, WE WERE CLRED FOR TKOF AND ADVISED OF TFC UPWIND (A SINGLE ENG CESSNA) WHICH HAD TAKEN OFF JUST BEFORE WE WERE CLRED ONTO THE RWY. SINCE THE ACFT WAS BEHIND US, WE REPLIED THAT WE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR THE TFC. AS WE TURNED AROUND AT THE END OF THE RWY, I FELT VERY RUSHED TO COMPLETE TAXI AND TKOF CHKS. AS WE ROLLED, NEITHER PLT WAS THINKING ABOUT THE CESSNA. AT APPROX 500 FT (AGL AND MSL), I NOTICED THE CESSNA ON TCASII DIRECTLY AHEAD. IT WAS CLR THAT IF WE CONTINUED ON THE STANDARD INST DEP, WE WOULD CLB UP INTO HIM. I LEVELED OFF AND CALLED OUT THE TFC WHICH WAS ON TCASII. WITH OUR BUSY TASKS INSIDE THE COCKPIT, NEITHER PLT COULD PICK UP THE CESSNA VISUALLY. THE CAPT CALLED FOR AN EARLY TURN AS WE CONTINUED A GENTLE CLB (PARALLELING THE CESSNA'S CLB). AN ISLAND TO THE N OF THE RWY CTRLINE DICTATED THAT THE L TURNOUT START ABOVE 1000 FT, BUT SINCE WE HAD THE TERRAIN IN SIGHT WE STARTED THE TURN AT ABOUT 700 FT. I FLOATED THE TURN TO GO AROUND THE ISLAND, EVEN THOUGH THAT WOULD EAT UP LATERAL SEPARATION. HOW DO YOU SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE BTWN TERRAIN YOU CAN SEE AND TFC THAT YOU CAN'T? WE FINALLY PICKED UP THE ACFT VISUALLY AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS AFTER TURNING ABOUT 45 DEGS OFF RWY HDG. WE NEVER HAD LESS THAN 1000 FT VERT SEPARATION PER TCASII. EVEN THOUGH WE NEVER GOT A TCASII ALERT, TCASII WAS THE SINGLE FACTOR THAT AVOIDED A CLOSE CALL. IT BROKE THE CHAIN CREATED BY OUR FAILING TO LOOK FOR THE TFC BEFORE WE STARTED ROLLING. RUSHING THE OP STARTED THE CHAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.