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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 423677 |
Time | |
Date | 199812 |
Day | Fri |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : yyc.airport |
State Reference | AB |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Weather Elements | Snow |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Super 80 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | ils localizer & glide slope : 35 |
Flight Phase | landing : hold short landing : roll |
Route In Use | approach : instrument precision |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 423677 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : commercial pilot : instrument pilot : multi engine |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | other |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Narrative:
After declining lahso on initial contact with yyc approach, yyc tower instructed us to hold short of runway 28 on our runway 35 rollout. When we advised him that we had declined the lahso, he said we were on the ground now, and that if he could determine we could stop, then he could issue the restr. We jumped on the brakes as all this was transpiring, but asked for his telephone number. After getting the tower supervisor on the line, and the controller, the discussion went well, ie, he now seems to understand that he can request turnoff at a taxiway but not compel it. His words '...he assumed from where we were that we could stop.' I told him he had further assumed that all our antiskid and thrust reversers were operating normal, that the blowing snow reported had not in fact begun to reduce braking action, etc. I had no desire for this controller to be harassed. Our discussion seemed to end in a mutually derived agreement about who was actually commanding and accomplishing the landing. The real question is where did his concept come from and do any other controllers share that belief?
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED CREW TO HOLD SHORT OF INTERSECTING RWY DURING LNDG ROLL.
Narrative: AFTER DECLINING LAHSO ON INITIAL CONTACT WITH YYC APCH, YYC TWR INSTRUCTED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28 ON OUR RWY 35 ROLLOUT. WHEN WE ADVISED HIM THAT WE HAD DECLINED THE LAHSO, HE SAID WE WERE ON THE GND NOW, AND THAT IF HE COULD DETERMINE WE COULD STOP, THEN HE COULD ISSUE THE RESTR. WE JUMPED ON THE BRAKES AS ALL THIS WAS TRANSPIRING, BUT ASKED FOR HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER. AFTER GETTING THE TWR SUPVR ON THE LINE, AND THE CTLR, THE DISCUSSION WENT WELL, IE, HE NOW SEEMS TO UNDERSTAND THAT HE CAN REQUEST TURNOFF AT A TXWY BUT NOT COMPEL IT. HIS WORDS '...HE ASSUMED FROM WHERE WE WERE THAT WE COULD STOP.' I TOLD HIM HE HAD FURTHER ASSUMED THAT ALL OUR ANTISKID AND THRUST REVERSERS WERE OPERATING NORMAL, THAT THE BLOWING SNOW RPTED HAD NOT IN FACT BEGUN TO REDUCE BRAKING ACTION, ETC. I HAD NO DESIRE FOR THIS CTLR TO BE HARASSED. OUR DISCUSSION SEEMED TO END IN A MUTUALLY DERIVED AGREEMENT ABOUT WHO WAS ACTUALLY COMMANDING AND ACCOMPLISHING THE LNDG. THE REAL QUESTION IS WHERE DID HIS CONCEPT COME FROM AND DO ANY OTHER CTLRS SHARE THAT BELIEF?
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.