Narrative:

The following is a report of the incident that took place on jan/fri/99 at pontiac, mi, in learjet nabcd at XA31 on runway 9R. I was the captain on this flight. For the flight from tol to ptk, when I got my WX briefing for the flight I was told the WX at ptk had been and was currently 400 ft overcast with 5 SM visibility and the winds were 110 degrees at 16 KTS with gusts to 27 KTS. It was forecasted to be 600 ft overcast with an occasional 300 ft overcast and 3 mi visibility in light rain and mist. Ind was the filed alternate. I had enough fuel on the airplane to do 1 missed approach and then go to the alternate with legal reserve. Upon reaching ptk, the ATIS was giving the WX as 200 ft overcast, 2 1/2 mi visibility with winds at 150 degrees at 16 KTS gusting to 24 KTS, and it was noted that it was turbulent with windshear reported on the approach. It was very turbulent with strong wind gust and wind changes throughout the approach. The localizer was captured, and the approach outside the marker was normal. Inside about 1/3 of the way down, the CDI jumped from nearly centered to about a 1 1/2 DOT deflection to the left. It took a very major correction before the needle started to move back to the right, at which point it moved very rapidly back to the right side of the course. I then corrected in the correct direction. At 200 ft AGL, the runway environment was not in sight so a missed approach was done. On the go around I had the first officer ask for another approach, at the same time giving some thought about going to the alternate. During this time of decision, I heard another aircraft had made the approach successfully. By the time we had been radar vectored for the intercept, a second aircraft had made the approach. Since 2 other aircraft landed successfully, I felt the conditions warranted the approach, but again we encountered the same conditions stated above. Upon GS intercept, the first officer asked me if we were going to start down. I looked at his GS and it was showing we had not only intercepted but were slightly high on the GS. Relying on his instruments, I started the descent, and my GS started working -- or so I thought. The GS was more erratic on this approach than on the previous one. On this approach we had basically the same thing happen with the CDI. This time we got a visual at 200 ft slightly right of the runway. When the first officer called runway at 10 O'clock, my CDI was showing us left of course. At this time I felt I could safely make the runway. I made an abrupt turn to the left and overshot the runway. In the turn back to the right, the shaker went off, I leveled the wings, and at this point we settled onto the runway with the nose cocked to the left and left of centerline. When I tried to straighten the nose, we slid off the runway into the snow and came to a rest. The right main outer gear door was dislodged and at some point the bottom of the right tip tank was slightly scraped. The aircraft was pulled back onto the runway and was started with battery power, then taxied to the hangar. All aspects of the taxi, steering and braking were normal. The aircraft was flown to dallas love field with a ferry permit 4 days later with no repairs necessary for flight. Human performance considerations: I had only 2 hours sleep in the previous 25 hours. I had spent most of the last 2 1/2 weeks working out of town. The day and night of jan/thu/99 was spent catching up with domestic chores. The morning of jan/thu/99 I was told I would be second up. Later I discovered I had been first up all day but had not been notified of the change in status, which is the main reason I got no sleep during the day. I went to bed late and got paged for the flight early in the morning on jan/fri/99. We took freight from addison, tx, to tol and then were told to go get something to eat while they tried to sell the aircraft out on other trip. At somewhere just past XB00 I was told we were going to ptk, picking up freight and taking it to el paso, tx. 'How quick will you be airborne' was the first question from dispatch. My response was 'first I have to get fuel' and dispatch asked 'why don't you have it already?' my response was 'I did not know where we were going.'with what seemed to be a fairly easy approach into ptk, I based my fuel load on the absolute minimum so we could be airborne faster. This proved to be a bad choice. But I was tired and not thinking clearly, plus the first officer wasn't being much help. He was complaining and wanted to go home, which made me rush even more trying to take care of everything myself. The decision to continue the approach even after the GS problem was not a very wise one, and when we saw the runway, I should have done a missed approach but did not wish to endure the turbulence and equipment problems again. If I had been thinking clrer, I would not have let dispatch press me into 'how quick can you be airborne,' because I normally don't let their assertiveness bother me. Supplemental information from acn 426199: in my opinion, we were not in a position where we could make a normal approach to landing and I (the first officer) called 'go missed.' now below decision altitude (maybe 1500 ft AGL), the captain banked to the left in excess of 30 degrees. Now turned towards the runway, the captain continued the approach, and I again called 'go missed.' at this point, we were overshooting the runway to the left side and approximately 1000 ft down the runway and 50-70 ft AGL when the captain made an aggressive turn back to the right. The stick shaker engaged, wings leveled, and the aircraft settled to the ground on the runway and to the left of centerline. We then slid off into the snow for some distance and came to a rest. Upon initial observation, the damage included the right main gear door missing, some cord showing on the inboard right main tire, and the bottom of the right tip tank had paint ground off as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LJ25 CREW WENT OFF THE SIDE OF THE RWY AT PTK.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING IS A RPT OF THE INCIDENT THAT TOOK PLACE ON JAN/FRI/99 AT PONTIAC, MI, IN LEARJET NABCD AT XA31 ON RWY 9R. I WAS THE CAPT ON THIS FLT. FOR THE FLT FROM TOL TO PTK, WHEN I GOT MY WX BRIEFING FOR THE FLT I WAS TOLD THE WX AT PTK HAD BEEN AND WAS CURRENTLY 400 FT OVCST WITH 5 SM VISIBILITY AND THE WINDS WERE 110 DEGS AT 16 KTS WITH GUSTS TO 27 KTS. IT WAS FORECASTED TO BE 600 FT OVCST WITH AN OCCASIONAL 300 FT OVCST AND 3 MI VISIBILITY IN LIGHT RAIN AND MIST. IND WAS THE FILED ALTERNATE. I HAD ENOUGH FUEL ON THE AIRPLANE TO DO 1 MISSED APCH AND THEN GO TO THE ALTERNATE WITH LEGAL RESERVE. UPON REACHING PTK, THE ATIS WAS GIVING THE WX AS 200 FT OVCST, 2 1/2 MI VISIBILITY WITH WINDS AT 150 DEGS AT 16 KTS GUSTING TO 24 KTS, AND IT WAS NOTED THAT IT WAS TURBULENT WITH WINDSHEAR RPTED ON THE APCH. IT WAS VERY TURBULENT WITH STRONG WIND GUST AND WIND CHANGES THROUGHOUT THE APCH. THE LOC WAS CAPTURED, AND THE APCH OUTSIDE THE MARKER WAS NORMAL. INSIDE ABOUT 1/3 OF THE WAY DOWN, THE CDI JUMPED FROM NEARLY CTRED TO ABOUT A 1 1/2 DOT DEFLECTION TO THE L. IT TOOK A VERY MAJOR CORRECTION BEFORE THE NEEDLE STARTED TO MOVE BACK TO THE R, AT WHICH POINT IT MOVED VERY RAPIDLY BACK TO THE R SIDE OF THE COURSE. I THEN CORRECTED IN THE CORRECT DIRECTION. AT 200 FT AGL, THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WAS NOT IN SIGHT SO A MISSED APCH WAS DONE. ON THE GAR I HAD THE FO ASK FOR ANOTHER APCH, AT THE SAME TIME GIVING SOME THOUGHT ABOUT GOING TO THE ALTERNATE. DURING THIS TIME OF DECISION, I HEARD ANOTHER ACFT HAD MADE THE APCH SUCCESSFULLY. BY THE TIME WE HAD BEEN RADAR VECTORED FOR THE INTERCEPT, A SECOND ACFT HAD MADE THE APCH. SINCE 2 OTHER ACFT LANDED SUCCESSFULLY, I FELT THE CONDITIONS WARRANTED THE APCH, BUT AGAIN WE ENCOUNTERED THE SAME CONDITIONS STATED ABOVE. UPON GS INTERCEPT, THE FO ASKED ME IF WE WERE GOING TO START DOWN. I LOOKED AT HIS GS AND IT WAS SHOWING WE HAD NOT ONLY INTERCEPTED BUT WERE SLIGHTLY HIGH ON THE GS. RELYING ON HIS INSTS, I STARTED THE DSCNT, AND MY GS STARTED WORKING -- OR SO I THOUGHT. THE GS WAS MORE ERRATIC ON THIS APCH THAN ON THE PREVIOUS ONE. ON THIS APCH WE HAD BASICALLY THE SAME THING HAPPEN WITH THE CDI. THIS TIME WE GOT A VISUAL AT 200 FT SLIGHTLY R OF THE RWY. WHEN THE FO CALLED RWY AT 10 O'CLOCK, MY CDI WAS SHOWING US L OF COURSE. AT THIS TIME I FELT I COULD SAFELY MAKE THE RWY. I MADE AN ABRUPT TURN TO THE L AND OVERSHOT THE RWY. IN THE TURN BACK TO THE R, THE SHAKER WENT OFF, I LEVELED THE WINGS, AND AT THIS POINT WE SETTLED ONTO THE RWY WITH THE NOSE COCKED TO THE L AND L OF CTRLINE. WHEN I TRIED TO STRAIGHTEN THE NOSE, WE SLID OFF THE RWY INTO THE SNOW AND CAME TO A REST. THE R MAIN OUTER GEAR DOOR WAS DISLODGED AND AT SOME POINT THE BOTTOM OF THE R TIP TANK WAS SLIGHTLY SCRAPED. THE ACFT WAS PULLED BACK ONTO THE RWY AND WAS STARTED WITH BATTERY PWR, THEN TAXIED TO THE HANGAR. ALL ASPECTS OF THE TAXI, STEERING AND BRAKING WERE NORMAL. THE ACFT WAS FLOWN TO DALLAS LOVE FIELD WITH A FERRY PERMIT 4 DAYS LATER WITH NO REPAIRS NECESSARY FOR FLT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE CONSIDERATIONS: I HAD ONLY 2 HRS SLEEP IN THE PREVIOUS 25 HRS. I HAD SPENT MOST OF THE LAST 2 1/2 WKS WORKING OUT OF TOWN. THE DAY AND NIGHT OF JAN/THU/99 WAS SPENT CATCHING UP WITH DOMESTIC CHORES. THE MORNING OF JAN/THU/99 I WAS TOLD I WOULD BE SECOND UP. LATER I DISCOVERED I HAD BEEN FIRST UP ALL DAY BUT HAD NOT BEEN NOTIFIED OF THE CHANGE IN STATUS, WHICH IS THE MAIN REASON I GOT NO SLEEP DURING THE DAY. I WENT TO BED LATE AND GOT PAGED FOR THE FLT EARLY IN THE MORNING ON JAN/FRI/99. WE TOOK FREIGHT FROM ADDISON, TX, TO TOL AND THEN WERE TOLD TO GO GET SOMETHING TO EAT WHILE THEY TRIED TO SELL THE ACFT OUT ON OTHER TRIP. AT SOMEWHERE JUST PAST XB00 I WAS TOLD WE WERE GOING TO PTK, PICKING UP FREIGHT AND TAKING IT TO EL PASO, TX. 'HOW QUICK WILL YOU BE AIRBORNE' WAS THE FIRST QUESTION FROM DISPATCH. MY RESPONSE WAS 'FIRST I HAVE TO GET FUEL' AND DISPATCH ASKED 'WHY DON'T YOU HAVE IT ALREADY?' MY RESPONSE WAS 'I DID NOT KNOW WHERE WE WERE GOING.'WITH WHAT SEEMED TO BE A FAIRLY EASY APCH INTO PTK, I BASED MY FUEL LOAD ON THE ABSOLUTE MINIMUM SO WE COULD BE AIRBORNE FASTER. THIS PROVED TO BE A BAD CHOICE. BUT I WAS TIRED AND NOT THINKING CLRLY, PLUS THE FO WASN'T BEING MUCH HELP. HE WAS COMPLAINING AND WANTED TO GO HOME, WHICH MADE ME RUSH EVEN MORE TRYING TO TAKE CARE OF EVERYTHING MYSELF. THE DECISION TO CONTINUE THE APCH EVEN AFTER THE GS PROB WAS NOT A VERY WISE ONE, AND WHEN WE SAW THE RWY, I SHOULD HAVE DONE A MISSED APCH BUT DID NOT WISH TO ENDURE THE TURB AND EQUIP PROBS AGAIN. IF I HAD BEEN THINKING CLRER, I WOULD NOT HAVE LET DISPATCH PRESS ME INTO 'HOW QUICK CAN YOU BE AIRBORNE,' BECAUSE I NORMALLY DON'T LET THEIR ASSERTIVENESS BOTHER ME. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 426199: IN MY OPINION, WE WERE NOT IN A POS WHERE WE COULD MAKE A NORMAL APCH TO LNDG AND I (THE FO) CALLED 'GO MISSED.' NOW BELOW DECISION ALT (MAYBE 1500 FT AGL), THE CAPT BANKED TO THE L IN EXCESS OF 30 DEGS. NOW TURNED TOWARDS THE RWY, THE CAPT CONTINUED THE APCH, AND I AGAIN CALLED 'GO MISSED.' AT THIS POINT, WE WERE OVERSHOOTING THE RWY TO THE L SIDE AND APPROX 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY AND 50-70 FT AGL WHEN THE CAPT MADE AN AGGRESSIVE TURN BACK TO THE R. THE STICK SHAKER ENGAGED, WINGS LEVELED, AND THE ACFT SETTLED TO THE GND ON THE RWY AND TO THE L OF CTRLINE. WE THEN SLID OFF INTO THE SNOW FOR SOME DISTANCE AND CAME TO A REST. UPON INITIAL OBSERVATION, THE DAMAGE INCLUDED THE R MAIN GEAR DOOR MISSING, SOME CORD SHOWING ON THE INBOARD R MAIN TIRE, AND THE BOTTOM OF THE R TIP TANK HAD PAINT GROUND OFF AS WELL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.