Narrative:

Before departure I had been notified that my 8 1/2 month pregnant wife was having some pains that may be contractions. I also noticed that it looked like our dispatcher had not taken into effect an anti-skid deferral on our aircraft when figuring our alternate airport since we would have been very weight limited. I also noticed that our en route fuel burn was slightly lower than what I felt we would burn. I got very frustrated when dealing with the new dispatcher who had taken over for the old dispatcher because his english is not so good and he wasn't understanding my concerns. In fact at one point, I talked to his supervisor and snapped -- I started yelling at the supervisor. Anyway, we had multiple changes to our dispatch release. They changed our minimum fuel from 3200 pounds to 3300 pounds. I missed the change before departure, but once things calmed down on climb, I noticed my error. We burned approximately 50 pounds of fuel on our taxi out. We had left the gate with 3210 pounds. That means that we departed with approximately 3160 pounds of fuel -- 140 pounds less than our minimum required. Our dispatcher had put 200 pounds as contingency fuel -- meaning extra fuel, so I knew that we did still have enough fuel on the aircraft to meet far requirements, but we were tight on gas the whole way. The winds aloft were less of a headwind than guessed and there was no traffic on approach, so we ended up landing with approximately 400 more pounds of fuel than needed to meet the FARS. I was very stressed by all the events. I should have pulled myself off duty when I yelled at the dispatch supervisor since that is not a normal thing for me to do. I feel that if stress awareness or stress coping skills were taught during CRM it would help these types of sits. Supplemental information from acn 426964: the captain contacted our dispatcher to find a different alternate. This was brought about by a deferred anti-skid system in the aircraft meeting the special performance requirements associated with that, in which the original release didn't take into account. Oversight on our part, the new release had an increase in minimum takeoff fuel by 100 pounds that went unnoticed. Factors to the hastiness was pressure to get the flight out with passenger already boarded, lengthy delay already incurred, and the captain wanting to get back home to his wife (she called 1 hour before that she was going into labor). Ultimately, we didn't notice the change until after takeoff in the leveloff. Electing to continue safely, because of the contingency fuel originally put on made up for the difference on takeoff. Landed uneventfully with 390 pounds more than flight planned for.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BA41 CREW WAS GIVEN AN ALT THAT WAS UNSUITABLE, HAD DISPATCH CORRECT IT AND THEN DEPARTED WITH LESS THAN MINIMUM FUEL REQUIRED FOR THE FLT.

Narrative: BEFORE DEP I HAD BEEN NOTIFIED THAT MY 8 1/2 MONTH PREGNANT WIFE WAS HAVING SOME PAINS THAT MAY BE CONTRACTIONS. I ALSO NOTICED THAT IT LOOKED LIKE OUR DISPATCHER HAD NOT TAKEN INTO EFFECT AN ANTI-SKID DEFERRAL ON OUR ACFT WHEN FIGURING OUR ALTERNATE ARPT SINCE WE WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY WT LIMITED. I ALSO NOTICED THAT OUR ENRTE FUEL BURN WAS SLIGHTLY LOWER THAN WHAT I FELT WE WOULD BURN. I GOT VERY FRUSTRATED WHEN DEALING WITH THE NEW DISPATCHER WHO HAD TAKEN OVER FOR THE OLD DISPATCHER BECAUSE HIS ENGLISH IS NOT SO GOOD AND HE WASN'T UNDERSTANDING MY CONCERNS. IN FACT AT ONE POINT, I TALKED TO HIS SUPVR AND SNAPPED -- I STARTED YELLING AT THE SUPVR. ANYWAY, WE HAD MULTIPLE CHANGES TO OUR DISPATCH RELEASE. THEY CHANGED OUR MINIMUM FUEL FROM 3200 LBS TO 3300 LBS. I MISSED THE CHANGE BEFORE DEP, BUT ONCE THINGS CALMED DOWN ON CLB, I NOTICED MY ERROR. WE BURNED APPROX 50 LBS OF FUEL ON OUR TAXI OUT. WE HAD LEFT THE GATE WITH 3210 LBS. THAT MEANS THAT WE DEPARTED WITH APPROX 3160 LBS OF FUEL -- 140 LBS LESS THAN OUR MINIMUM REQUIRED. OUR DISPATCHER HAD PUT 200 LBS AS CONTINGENCY FUEL -- MEANING EXTRA FUEL, SO I KNEW THAT WE DID STILL HAVE ENOUGH FUEL ON THE ACFT TO MEET FAR REQUIREMENTS, BUT WE WERE TIGHT ON GAS THE WHOLE WAY. THE WINDS ALOFT WERE LESS OF A HEADWIND THAN GUESSED AND THERE WAS NO TFC ON APCH, SO WE ENDED UP LNDG WITH APPROX 400 MORE LBS OF FUEL THAN NEEDED TO MEET THE FARS. I WAS VERY STRESSED BY ALL THE EVENTS. I SHOULD HAVE PULLED MYSELF OFF DUTY WHEN I YELLED AT THE DISPATCH SUPVR SINCE THAT IS NOT A NORMAL THING FOR ME TO DO. I FEEL THAT IF STRESS AWARENESS OR STRESS COPING SKILLS WERE TAUGHT DURING CRM IT WOULD HELP THESE TYPES OF SITS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 426964: THE CAPT CONTACTED OUR DISPATCHER TO FIND A DIFFERENT ALTERNATE. THIS WAS BROUGHT ABOUT BY A DEFERRED ANTI-SKID SYS IN THE ACFT MEETING THE SPECIAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THAT, IN WHICH THE ORIGINAL RELEASE DIDN'T TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. OVERSIGHT ON OUR PART, THE NEW RELEASE HAD AN INCREASE IN MINIMUM TKOF FUEL BY 100 LBS THAT WENT UNNOTICED. FACTORS TO THE HASTINESS WAS PRESSURE TO GET THE FLT OUT WITH PAX ALREADY BOARDED, LENGTHY DELAY ALREADY INCURRED, AND THE CAPT WANTING TO GET BACK HOME TO HIS WIFE (SHE CALLED 1 HR BEFORE THAT SHE WAS GOING INTO LABOR). ULTIMATELY, WE DIDN'T NOTICE THE CHANGE UNTIL AFTER TKOF IN THE LEVELOFF. ELECTING TO CONTINUE SAFELY, BECAUSE OF THE CONTINGENCY FUEL ORIGINALLY PUT ON MADE UP FOR THE DIFFERENCE ON TKOF. LANDED UNEVENTFULLY WITH 390 LBS MORE THAN FLT PLANNED FOR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.