Narrative:

We departed rsw airport and flew the alico 2 departure. Rsw departure handed us off to ZMA and gave us a 360 degree heading and to climb and maintain 14000 ft. We should also look for traffic at 11-12 O'clock, X mi sbound at 15000 ft MSL, climb will be reference that traffic. The captain and I both had the traffic in sight and he instructed me to 'call the traffic' to ZMA. ZMA then issued us a climb clearance to some altitude 'at or above' FL230 reference that traffic. As we began a slow climb we both had visual contact with the traffic and I commented 'we better climb slow or we'll get an RA on this guy.' the captain replied 'yeah, that's why I'm climbing slow.' he was climbing at less than 500 FPM. As the traffic passed our 10 O'clock position, we received a TA. As the traffic passed our 9 O'clock position, we received an RA to monitor vertical climb. Even though we had the traffic in sight and knew there was no possibility of conflict, the captain turned the aircraft 20 degrees right and leveled or maybe even slightly descended. From the 'TA' to the 'clear of conflict' message was approximately 20-30 seconds. The captain and I discussed this at length after the flight and still agreed that we acted appropriately. There is no direction in our general operations manual or flight crew operating manual stating that it is necessary to deviate based on a TA. The RA did not last long enough to even facilitate more of a reaction than was accomplished. In retrospect and in looking to the future (I will be in captain upgrade in a few months) I have decided not to accept visual climbs or dscnts, as this places too much responsibility on the pilot. Also, I have no intention of accepting visual approachs based on following another aircraft.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF AN MD82 LEVELED OFF AND TURNED FOR PRECAUTIONARY AVOIDANCE IN RESPONSE TO A TCASII ALERT.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED RSW ARPT AND FLEW THE ALICO 2 DEP. RSW DEP HANDED US OFF TO ZMA AND GAVE US A 360 DEG HDG AND TO CLB AND MAINTAIN 14000 FT. WE SHOULD ALSO LOOK FOR TFC AT 11-12 O'CLOCK, X MI SBOUND AT 15000 FT MSL, CLB WILL BE REF THAT TFC. THE CAPT AND I BOTH HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AND HE INSTRUCTED ME TO 'CALL THE TFC' TO ZMA. ZMA THEN ISSUED US A CLB CLRNC TO SOME ALT 'AT OR ABOVE' FL230 REF THAT TFC. AS WE BEGAN A SLOW CLB WE BOTH HAD VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE TFC AND I COMMENTED 'WE BETTER CLB SLOW OR WE'LL GET AN RA ON THIS GUY.' THE CAPT REPLIED 'YEAH, THAT'S WHY I'M CLBING SLOW.' HE WAS CLBING AT LESS THAN 500 FPM. AS THE TFC PASSED OUR 10 O'CLOCK POS, WE RECEIVED A TA. AS THE TFC PASSED OUR 9 O'CLOCK POS, WE RECEIVED AN RA TO MONITOR VERT CLB. EVEN THOUGH WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AND KNEW THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF CONFLICT, THE CAPT TURNED THE ACFT 20 DEGS R AND LEVELED OR MAYBE EVEN SLIGHTLY DSNDED. FROM THE 'TA' TO THE 'CLR OF CONFLICT' MESSAGE WAS APPROX 20-30 SECONDS. THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED THIS AT LENGTH AFTER THE FLT AND STILL AGREED THAT WE ACTED APPROPRIATELY. THERE IS NO DIRECTION IN OUR GENERAL OPS MANUAL OR FLC OPERATING MANUAL STATING THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO DEVIATE BASED ON A TA. THE RA DID NOT LAST LONG ENOUGH TO EVEN FACILITATE MORE OF A REACTION THAN WAS ACCOMPLISHED. IN RETROSPECT AND IN LOOKING TO THE FUTURE (I WILL BE IN CAPT UPGRADE IN A FEW MONTHS) I HAVE DECIDED NOT TO ACCEPT VISUAL CLBS OR DSCNTS, AS THIS PLACES TOO MUCH RESPONSIBILITY ON THE PLT. ALSO, I HAVE NO INTENTION OF ACCEPTING VISUAL APCHS BASED ON FOLLOWING ANOTHER ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.