Narrative:

The following events occurred shortly after takeoff from cgs, md, on mar/xa/99. I was plting a katana 2-PLACE plane (1 passenger) with the intention of traveling in a southwest direction (approximately 245 degrees) to 6v3, va. The cloud ceiling was low (approximately 2900 ft MSL) with intermittent light rain. I did not call for clearance before leaving the ground because of the experience during my previous trip into washington airspace (jan/xa/99). I called for clearance prior to departing from W32 airport and was told that for my VFR departure I did not need to give them any information but to contact them by radio once airborne. I interpreted this to mean that the phone call was not required and did not call for ground clearance prior to departure on my subsequent trip (the day of this incident). Mar/xa/99, XA00, I contacted dca approach immediately after takeoff and was told to remain out of class B airspace and stand by. This message threw me a bit as I had thought that cgs was firmly in class B airspace. I momentarily forgot that it was outside below 1500 ft MSL. I wanted to ask for clarification but the controller was clearly quite busy. At this point, I planned to move away from cgs to clear that pattern but still avoid getting too close to dca in the time it would take to get clearance. Unfortunately, my mental image of the time it would take for my being entered into the system was off. It took longer than I expected and I was tracking more directly towards dca than I initially believed. My agitation grew while waiting for a break in the radio traffic because I knew I was very close to dca but was not sure which direction to head to cause the fewest problems. I let myself drift up to approximately 1800 ft MSL to stay above any pattern altitudes I may have gotten close to. As soon as there was a break in the radio traffic, I contacted approach and indicated that I was a bit confused and requested assistance. The ATC immediately gave me a transponder code and directed me to turn to cross over dca, indicating that I had violated the airspace and that I should have called from the ground for clearance. He was polite and constructive throughout, despite a serious infraction on my part. Fortunately, no further incident occurred and I was being directed clear of the dca airspace without difficulty. Interpretation: at the post-100 hour flying period, I have enough experience that I can physically fly with confidence. At the same time, I still feel the stress of dealing with the ATC's in busy airspace and do not wish to be perceived as a neophyte wasting their time. My first failure was in not calling from the ground. My second was in not asking for immediate clarification from the ATC when I had questions. My expectation that the approval and resolution would come immediately was misplaced. These are mistakes that I intend to avoid in the future. The ATC controller's handling of the situation was diplomatic in the extreme given the demands on his time and attention and the hazard I introduced. The only suggestion that I can make the for controllers is to encourage them to acknowledge all ground clearance calls as appropriate. While I shoulder the responsibility, I do believe that had I not had the perception that the ground call was not needed for VFR clearance on my jan/xa/99 flight, I would have made the call. It is possible that this would have broken the chain of events that developed in this incident.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PVT PLT ENTERS CLASS B AIRSPACE WITHOUT CLRNC TO DO SO.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING EVENTS OCCURRED SHORTLY AFTER TKOF FROM CGS, MD, ON MAR/XA/99. I WAS PLTING A KATANA 2-PLACE PLANE (1 PAX) WITH THE INTENTION OF TRAVELING IN A SW DIRECTION (APPROX 245 DEGS) TO 6V3, VA. THE CLOUD CEILING WAS LOW (APPROX 2900 FT MSL) WITH INTERMITTENT LIGHT RAIN. I DID NOT CALL FOR CLRNC BEFORE LEAVING THE GND BECAUSE OF THE EXPERIENCE DURING MY PREVIOUS TRIP INTO WASHINGTON AIRSPACE (JAN/XA/99). I CALLED FOR CLRNC PRIOR TO DEPARTING FROM W32 ARPT AND WAS TOLD THAT FOR MY VFR DEP I DID NOT NEED TO GIVE THEM ANY INFO BUT TO CONTACT THEM BY RADIO ONCE AIRBORNE. I INTERPED THIS TO MEAN THAT THE PHONE CALL WAS NOT REQUIRED AND DID NOT CALL FOR GND CLRNC PRIOR TO DEP ON MY SUBSEQUENT TRIP (THE DAY OF THIS INCIDENT). MAR/XA/99, XA00, I CONTACTED DCA APCH IMMEDIATELY AFTER TKOF AND WAS TOLD TO REMAIN OUT OF CLASS B AIRSPACE AND STAND BY. THIS MESSAGE THREW ME A BIT AS I HAD THOUGHT THAT CGS WAS FIRMLY IN CLASS B AIRSPACE. I MOMENTARILY FORGOT THAT IT WAS OUTSIDE BELOW 1500 FT MSL. I WANTED TO ASK FOR CLARIFICATION BUT THE CTLR WAS CLRLY QUITE BUSY. AT THIS POINT, I PLANNED TO MOVE AWAY FROM CGS TO CLR THAT PATTERN BUT STILL AVOID GETTING TOO CLOSE TO DCA IN THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE TO GET CLRNC. UNFORTUNATELY, MY MENTAL IMAGE OF THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE FOR MY BEING ENTERED INTO THE SYS WAS OFF. IT TOOK LONGER THAN I EXPECTED AND I WAS TRACKING MORE DIRECTLY TOWARDS DCA THAN I INITIALLY BELIEVED. MY AGITATION GREW WHILE WAITING FOR A BREAK IN THE RADIO TFC BECAUSE I KNEW I WAS VERY CLOSE TO DCA BUT WAS NOT SURE WHICH DIRECTION TO HEAD TO CAUSE THE FEWEST PROBS. I LET MYSELF DRIFT UP TO APPROX 1800 FT MSL TO STAY ABOVE ANY PATTERN ALTS I MAY HAVE GOTTEN CLOSE TO. AS SOON AS THERE WAS A BREAK IN THE RADIO TFC, I CONTACTED APCH AND INDICATED THAT I WAS A BIT CONFUSED AND REQUESTED ASSISTANCE. THE ATC IMMEDIATELY GAVE ME A XPONDER CODE AND DIRECTED ME TO TURN TO CROSS OVER DCA, INDICATING THAT I HAD VIOLATED THE AIRSPACE AND THAT I SHOULD HAVE CALLED FROM THE GND FOR CLRNC. HE WAS POLITE AND CONSTRUCTIVE THROUGHOUT, DESPITE A SERIOUS INFRACTION ON MY PART. FORTUNATELY, NO FURTHER INCIDENT OCCURRED AND I WAS BEING DIRECTED CLR OF THE DCA AIRSPACE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. INTERP: AT THE POST-100 HR FLYING PERIOD, I HAVE ENOUGH EXPERIENCE THAT I CAN PHYSICALLY FLY WITH CONFIDENCE. AT THE SAME TIME, I STILL FEEL THE STRESS OF DEALING WITH THE ATC'S IN BUSY AIRSPACE AND DO NOT WISH TO BE PERCEIVED AS A NEOPHYTE WASTING THEIR TIME. MY FIRST FAILURE WAS IN NOT CALLING FROM THE GND. MY SECOND WAS IN NOT ASKING FOR IMMEDIATE CLARIFICATION FROM THE ATC WHEN I HAD QUESTIONS. MY EXPECTATION THAT THE APPROVAL AND RESOLUTION WOULD COME IMMEDIATELY WAS MISPLACED. THESE ARE MISTAKES THAT I INTEND TO AVOID IN THE FUTURE. THE ATC CTLR'S HANDLING OF THE SIT WAS DIPLOMATIC IN THE EXTREME GIVEN THE DEMANDS ON HIS TIME AND ATTN AND THE HAZARD I INTRODUCED. THE ONLY SUGGESTION THAT I CAN MAKE THE FOR CTLRS IS TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO ACKNOWLEDGE ALL GND CLRNC CALLS AS APPROPRIATE. WHILE I SHOULDER THE RESPONSIBILITY, I DO BELIEVE THAT HAD I NOT HAD THE PERCEPTION THAT THE GND CALL WAS NOT NEEDED FOR VFR CLRNC ON MY JAN/XA/99 FLT, I WOULD HAVE MADE THE CALL. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS WOULD HAVE BROKEN THE CHAIN OF EVENTS THAT DEVELOPED IN THIS INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.