Narrative:

Scheduled cargo flight from rno to oak. WX at departure time was reported as follows: XA56Z 270 degrees 20 KTS gusting to 25 KTS, 10 SM, scattered 055, 08/M03 altimeter 29.78. Low level windshear reported in the area. We were cleared into position and hold runway 34L. We held for between 1-2 mins for traffic to clear the runway, and were then cleared for takeoff. With the brakes applied, I initially advanced the power slowly in an attempt to preclude surging in the #2 engine (a known consequence of high xwinds and low aircraft speed in the B727). I heard a noise just before the power was stabilized, but saw nothing on the engine gauges and thought the so had dropped something (he had not). After the power was stabilized at 1.4 EPR, I released the brakes while I started to advance the throttles to takeoff power. Immediately after moving the throttles forward from 1.4 EPR, the #2 engine surged. I saw the fluctuation in egt. I recognized the surging as being due to the xwinds, and closed the throttles. We did not even reach taxi speed on the takeoff roll, and cleared the runway at taxiway Q, the first turnoff. Our procedures did not require a logbook entry since our speed was below 70 KTS, and since we knew the surging was caused by disrupted airflow, we felt no maintenance was required. After clearing the runway, we discussed additional techniques outlined in our aircraft manual that we could use to handle the crosswind/surge. After we were reclred for takeoff, we used all of the techniques and had a normal departure. The first officer later reported he had seen a surge of the #2 engine when I thought the so had dropped something. His timely identify of what he had seen and my prompt recognition of the situation would have kept me from increasing power to the #2 engine until we had significant forward motion. While I was prepared for the crosswind, in terms of slow initial throttle movement, I was not prepared for the fact that I may have had to use more than one strategy. In the future. I think planning on using a combination of all techniques would be appropriate, so as to minimize the chances of having another occurrence of this nature.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727 FREIGHTER ABORTS ITS LOW SPD TKOF WHEN #2 ENG SURGES DUE TO THE XWINDS AT RNO, NV.

Narrative: SCHEDULED CARGO FLT FROM RNO TO OAK. WX AT DEP TIME WAS RPTED AS FOLLOWS: XA56Z 270 DEGS 20 KTS GUSTING TO 25 KTS, 10 SM, SCATTERED 055, 08/M03 ALTIMETER 29.78. LOW LEVEL WINDSHEAR RPTED IN THE AREA. WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD RWY 34L. WE HELD FOR BTWN 1-2 MINS FOR TFC TO CLR THE RWY, AND WERE THEN CLRED FOR TKOF. WITH THE BRAKES APPLIED, I INITIALLY ADVANCED THE PWR SLOWLY IN AN ATTEMPT TO PRECLUDE SURGING IN THE #2 ENG (A KNOWN CONSEQUENCE OF HIGH XWINDS AND LOW ACFT SPD IN THE B727). I HEARD A NOISE JUST BEFORE THE PWR WAS STABILIZED, BUT SAW NOTHING ON THE ENG GAUGES AND THOUGHT THE SO HAD DROPPED SOMETHING (HE HAD NOT). AFTER THE PWR WAS STABILIZED AT 1.4 EPR, I RELEASED THE BRAKES WHILE I STARTED TO ADVANCE THE THROTTLES TO TKOF PWR. IMMEDIATELY AFTER MOVING THE THROTTLES FORWARD FROM 1.4 EPR, THE #2 ENG SURGED. I SAW THE FLUCTUATION IN EGT. I RECOGNIZED THE SURGING AS BEING DUE TO THE XWINDS, AND CLOSED THE THROTTLES. WE DID NOT EVEN REACH TAXI SPD ON THE TKOF ROLL, AND CLRED THE RWY AT TXWY Q, THE FIRST TURNOFF. OUR PROCS DID NOT REQUIRE A LOGBOOK ENTRY SINCE OUR SPD WAS BELOW 70 KTS, AND SINCE WE KNEW THE SURGING WAS CAUSED BY DISRUPTED AIRFLOW, WE FELT NO MAINT WAS REQUIRED. AFTER CLRING THE RWY, WE DISCUSSED ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES OUTLINED IN OUR ACFT MANUAL THAT WE COULD USE TO HANDLE THE XWIND/SURGE. AFTER WE WERE RECLRED FOR TKOF, WE USED ALL OF THE TECHNIQUES AND HAD A NORMAL DEP. THE FO LATER RPTED HE HAD SEEN A SURGE OF THE #2 ENG WHEN I THOUGHT THE SO HAD DROPPED SOMETHING. HIS TIMELY IDENT OF WHAT HE HAD SEEN AND MY PROMPT RECOGNITION OF THE SIT WOULD HAVE KEPT ME FROM INCREASING PWR TO THE #2 ENG UNTIL WE HAD SIGNIFICANT FORWARD MOTION. WHILE I WAS PREPARED FOR THE XWIND, IN TERMS OF SLOW INITIAL THROTTLE MOVEMENT, I WAS NOT PREPARED FOR THE FACT THAT I MAY HAVE HAD TO USE MORE THAN ONE STRATEGY. IN THE FUTURE. I THINK PLANNING ON USING A COMBINATION OF ALL TECHNIQUES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE, SO AS TO MINIMIZE THE CHANCES OF HAVING ANOTHER OCCURRENCE OF THIS NATURE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.