Narrative:

I turned final at about 800 ft, calling my position, and -- now focusing on my descent and aiming point -- wasn't tracking the other 2 aircraft. I saw no other peripheral/relative motive during my descent. When I flared, I suddenly saw the biplane coming at me, maybe 10-15 ft off the runway, approximately 150-200 ft maximum ahead just left of centerline. I heard his engine at full power and saw that he was attempting to climb, with his right wing dropping. He had seen me and was taking evasive action. Now in a low flare, I aborted the landing and focused on stabilizing myself through the growing hole, avoiding any effects from the biplane and the crosswind (both from the left, although a bank and trees on the end of runway 32 alter the crosswind effects), and getting a climb established. Based on the distance ahead as he began his climb and turn, I estimate we passed with maybe 25 ft vertical and 20 ft horizontal, but it could have been greater if he was a high performance biplane. While climbing out on runway heading, I radioed the unicom to check the wind again (thinking maybe I had 'lost track' and runway 14 was now favored and the biplane at least had some reason for perceiving runway 14 as viable). Unicom reported wind 250 degrees at 10 KTS. I made 3 or 4 more lndgs and did not see or hear from the biplane or the yellow plane at all. When I got back to the FBO and reported the incident, a flight instructor who'd been up in the area with a student said 'I saw that! He took off right into you!' I said, 'you mean he did a touch-and-go?' he said he wasn't sure, and he didn't see where the biplane went after the incident. He said he'd heard my position reports, and the biplane just came in runway 14. In my opinion, the immediate cause of the incident was the biplane's failure to verify pattern activity and its violation of the established traffic pattern. Contributing factors include: 1) the biplane's lack of, or failure to use, radios and monitor pattern activity or report his position and intentions, 2) because he was so low, and 3) a biplane confign, he may or may not have even been able to see me in the pattern. He could have been planning on flying in low and close to the runway, turning a very short final, slipping the plane in as they do, and taking the first exit to clear the active, at the very far end of the runway. (Worst case, maybe he was aware of me and planning on doing this, thinking he could clear the runway first!) anyhow, 4) because he had a 10 KT quartering tailwind, he was well down the runway. Recognizing the situation, was probably struggling to get airspeed as he entered my flare area, just beyond the 5) displaced threshold on runway 32, which, being displaced, put me farther down the runway and saw the situation, we both had incredibly narrow margins of escape (especially given the banks and trees to the sides of the runway. Another contributing factor 6) was my perception of the biplane as transiting to the aerobatics box, rather than suspecting the worst. 7) I might have further avoided the incident if I had scanned for head-on traffic, pattern altitude to ground, when established on final, but frankly, that could easily become an adverse distraction from critical final approach phase. Because I could see an 'escape' hole, my reaction to the initial situation wasn't sheer terror. However, what quickly became an issue was getting stabilized, getting enough airspeed and getting into a climb. Seconds after initiating the transition, I realized how easily I could squeak out of one disaster and fly my way into the next, by overreacting to what was now behind me. I decided to do the go around from the very late flare (eg, I was close to the ground and low airspeed, I recall seeing 40 KTS). I had 40 degrees flaps and felt vulnerable to the situation, wanting power to maneuver and 'escape.' in retrospect, I could have attempted the landing, but probably would have messed it up and/or been significantly affected by the biplane's propeller wash and vortices.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 EXECUTES MISSED APCH GAR WHILE IN THE FLARE AS BIPLANE LIFTS OFF OPPOSITE DIRECTION WHILE EXECUTING DOWNWIND TKOF.

Narrative: I TURNED FINAL AT ABOUT 800 FT, CALLING MY POS, AND -- NOW FOCUSING ON MY DSCNT AND AIMING POINT -- WASN'T TRACKING THE OTHER 2 ACFT. I SAW NO OTHER PERIPHERAL/RELATIVE MOTIVE DURING MY DSCNT. WHEN I FLARED, I SUDDENLY SAW THE BIPLANE COMING AT ME, MAYBE 10-15 FT OFF THE RWY, APPROX 150-200 FT MAX AHEAD JUST L OF CTRLINE. I HEARD HIS ENG AT FULL PWR AND SAW THAT HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO CLB, WITH HIS R WING DROPPING. HE HAD SEEN ME AND WAS TAKING EVASIVE ACTION. NOW IN A LOW FLARE, I ABORTED THE LNDG AND FOCUSED ON STABILIZING MYSELF THROUGH THE GROWING HOLE, AVOIDING ANY EFFECTS FROM THE BIPLANE AND THE XWIND (BOTH FROM THE L, ALTHOUGH A BANK AND TREES ON THE END OF RWY 32 ALTER THE XWIND EFFECTS), AND GETTING A CLB ESTABLISHED. BASED ON THE DISTANCE AHEAD AS HE BEGAN HIS CLB AND TURN, I ESTIMATE WE PASSED WITH MAYBE 25 FT VERT AND 20 FT HORIZ, BUT IT COULD HAVE BEEN GREATER IF HE WAS A HIGH PERFORMANCE BIPLANE. WHILE CLBING OUT ON RWY HDG, I RADIOED THE UNICOM TO CHK THE WIND AGAIN (THINKING MAYBE I HAD 'LOST TRACK' AND RWY 14 WAS NOW FAVORED AND THE BIPLANE AT LEAST HAD SOME REASON FOR PERCEIVING RWY 14 AS VIABLE). UNICOM RPTED WIND 250 DEGS AT 10 KTS. I MADE 3 OR 4 MORE LNDGS AND DID NOT SEE OR HEAR FROM THE BIPLANE OR THE YELLOW PLANE AT ALL. WHEN I GOT BACK TO THE FBO AND RPTED THE INCIDENT, A FLT INSTRUCTOR WHO'D BEEN UP IN THE AREA WITH A STUDENT SAID 'I SAW THAT! HE TOOK OFF RIGHT INTO YOU!' I SAID, 'YOU MEAN HE DID A TOUCH-AND-GO?' HE SAID HE WASN'T SURE, AND HE DIDN'T SEE WHERE THE BIPLANE WENT AFTER THE INCIDENT. HE SAID HE'D HEARD MY POS RPTS, AND THE BIPLANE JUST CAME IN RWY 14. IN MY OPINION, THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT WAS THE BIPLANE'S FAILURE TO VERIFY PATTERN ACTIVITY AND ITS VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED TFC PATTERN. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS INCLUDE: 1) THE BIPLANE'S LACK OF, OR FAILURE TO USE, RADIOS AND MONITOR PATTERN ACTIVITY OR RPT HIS POS AND INTENTIONS, 2) BECAUSE HE WAS SO LOW, AND 3) A BIPLANE CONFIGN, HE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE EVEN BEEN ABLE TO SEE ME IN THE PATTERN. HE COULD HAVE BEEN PLANNING ON FLYING IN LOW AND CLOSE TO THE RWY, TURNING A VERY SHORT FINAL, SLIPPING THE PLANE IN AS THEY DO, AND TAKING THE FIRST EXIT TO CLR THE ACTIVE, AT THE VERY FAR END OF THE RWY. (WORST CASE, MAYBE HE WAS AWARE OF ME AND PLANNING ON DOING THIS, THINKING HE COULD CLR THE RWY FIRST!) ANYHOW, 4) BECAUSE HE HAD A 10 KT QUARTERING TAILWIND, HE WAS WELL DOWN THE RWY. RECOGNIZING THE SIT, WAS PROBABLY STRUGGLING TO GET AIRSPD AS HE ENTERED MY FLARE AREA, JUST BEYOND THE 5) DISPLACED THRESHOLD ON RWY 32, WHICH, BEING DISPLACED, PUT ME FARTHER DOWN THE RWY AND SAW THE SIT, WE BOTH HAD INCREDIBLY NARROW MARGINS OF ESCAPE (ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE BANKS AND TREES TO THE SIDES OF THE RWY. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR 6) WAS MY PERCEPTION OF THE BIPLANE AS TRANSITING TO THE AEROBATICS BOX, RATHER THAN SUSPECTING THE WORST. 7) I MIGHT HAVE FURTHER AVOIDED THE INCIDENT IF I HAD SCANNED FOR HEAD-ON TFC, PATTERN ALT TO GND, WHEN ESTABLISHED ON FINAL, BUT FRANKLY, THAT COULD EASILY BECOME AN ADVERSE DISTR FROM CRITICAL FINAL APCH PHASE. BECAUSE I COULD SEE AN 'ESCAPE' HOLE, MY REACTION TO THE INITIAL SIT WASN'T SHEER TERROR. HOWEVER, WHAT QUICKLY BECAME AN ISSUE WAS GETTING STABILIZED, GETTING ENOUGH AIRSPD AND GETTING INTO A CLB. SECONDS AFTER INITIATING THE TRANSITION, I REALIZED HOW EASILY I COULD SQUEAK OUT OF ONE DISASTER AND FLY MY WAY INTO THE NEXT, BY OVERREACTING TO WHAT WAS NOW BEHIND ME. I DECIDED TO DO THE GAR FROM THE VERY LATE FLARE (EG, I WAS CLOSE TO THE GND AND LOW AIRSPD, I RECALL SEEING 40 KTS). I HAD 40 DEGS FLAPS AND FELT VULNERABLE TO THE SIT, WANTING PWR TO MANEUVER AND 'ESCAPE.' IN RETROSPECT, I COULD HAVE ATTEMPTED THE LNDG, BUT PROBABLY WOULD HAVE MESSED IT UP AND/OR BEEN SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY THE BIPLANE'S PROP WASH AND VORTICES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.