Narrative:

We were flying the sabine five arrival into iah. The arrival has a crossing restr at smith intersection of 10000 ft and 250 KTS, which we had programmed into the FMC. There were numerous thunderstorms and rain showers along and near the arrival route. Traffic was heavy with many inbound aircraft in-trail. ZHU vectored us on and off the arrival several times as we approached the area of sabine pass and smith intersection. We were expecting a descent to cross smith at 10000 ft and 250 KTS as published but the controller gave us small dscnts from our cruise altitude of FL310 in 1000 ft or 2000 ft increments. As he continued to hold us high due to presumed traffic conflicts we began to realize it would be difficult to make the published crossing restr. After stepping down to FL200 at 20 NM from smith the controller quickly cleared us direct smith to cross smith at 10000 ft and 250 KTS. By this time according to our programmed path descent profile on the FMC we were 8000 ft high to make the restr. We did not make the restr even with maximum descent effort (speed brakes, etc). We were 2000 ft high at smith. The controller subsequently got very upset with us as if the whole thing was our fault. We had to be vectored in a large 360 degree circle to get down to 10000 ft and 250 KTS before houston approach would accept us. The whole event happened rapidly with much voice congestion on the frequency making it difficult to notify ATC that we would not make the crossing restr. The controller later asked us when we knew we would not make the crossing restr as he wished to be advised of this earlier by us. 'I am a controller not a pilot and would appreciate a heads up when you think you will not make a crossing restr.' we felt that ATC should have some awareness of descent performing capabilities of aircraft they handle frequently (most of the time they seem to). This was a case where we were held so high that it should have been obvious to the controller that we would be unable to make the crossing restr. We would have been able to give ATC a more timely heads up of our inability to make the crossing if not for cockpit workload and frequency congestion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLC OF A B737-300 FAILED TO CROSS AN ALT XING RESTR DURING DSCNT ARR CAUSING THE ARTCC CTLR TO PROVIDE VECTORED 360 DEG TURN FOR SPACING FOR THE HDOF TO APCH CTL.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING THE SABINE FIVE ARR INTO IAH. THE ARR HAS A XING RESTR AT SMITH INTXN OF 10000 FT AND 250 KTS, WHICH WE HAD PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMC. THERE WERE NUMEROUS TSTMS AND RAIN SHOWERS ALONG AND NEAR THE ARR RTE. TFC WAS HVY WITH MANY INBOUND ACFT IN-TRAIL. ZHU VECTORED US ON AND OFF THE ARR SEVERAL TIMES AS WE APCHED THE AREA OF SABINE PASS AND SMITH INTXN. WE WERE EXPECTING A DSCNT TO CROSS SMITH AT 10000 FT AND 250 KTS AS PUBLISHED BUT THE CTLR GAVE US SMALL DSCNTS FROM OUR CRUISE ALT OF FL310 IN 1000 FT OR 2000 FT INCREMENTS. AS HE CONTINUED TO HOLD US HIGH DUE TO PRESUMED TFC CONFLICTS WE BEGAN TO REALIZE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE THE PUBLISHED XING RESTR. AFTER STEPPING DOWN TO FL200 AT 20 NM FROM SMITH THE CTLR QUICKLY CLRED US DIRECT SMITH TO CROSS SMITH AT 10000 FT AND 250 KTS. BY THIS TIME ACCORDING TO OUR PROGRAMMED PATH DSCNT PROFILE ON THE FMC WE WERE 8000 FT HIGH TO MAKE THE RESTR. WE DID NOT MAKE THE RESTR EVEN WITH MAX DSCNT EFFORT (SPD BRAKES, ETC). WE WERE 2000 FT HIGH AT SMITH. THE CTLR SUBSEQUENTLY GOT VERY UPSET WITH US AS IF THE WHOLE THING WAS OUR FAULT. WE HAD TO BE VECTORED IN A LARGE 360 DEG CIRCLE TO GET DOWN TO 10000 FT AND 250 KTS BEFORE HOUSTON APCH WOULD ACCEPT US. THE WHOLE EVENT HAPPENED RAPIDLY WITH MUCH VOICE CONGESTION ON THE FREQ MAKING IT DIFFICULT TO NOTIFY ATC THAT WE WOULD NOT MAKE THE XING RESTR. THE CTLR LATER ASKED US WHEN WE KNEW WE WOULD NOT MAKE THE XING RESTR AS HE WISHED TO BE ADVISED OF THIS EARLIER BY US. 'I AM A CTLR NOT A PLT AND WOULD APPRECIATE A HEADS UP WHEN YOU THINK YOU WILL NOT MAKE A XING RESTR.' WE FELT THAT ATC SHOULD HAVE SOME AWARENESS OF DSCNT PERFORMING CAPABILITIES OF ACFT THEY HANDLE FREQUENTLY (MOST OF THE TIME THEY SEEM TO). THIS WAS A CASE WHERE WE WERE HELD SO HIGH THAT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBVIOUS TO THE CTLR THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAKE THE XING RESTR. WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GIVE ATC A MORE TIMELY HEADS UP OF OUR INABILITY TO MAKE THE XING IF NOT FOR COCKPIT WORKLOAD AND FREQ CONGESTION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.