Narrative:

It was the first officer's leg. The flight pushed back from msp at XA06 local. With a bit of a long taxi, a re-route, and sequencing into the departure traffic, we did not get airborne for 15-20 mins. Starting about 10 mins west of msp we encountered the line of WX we had worked through on the previous leg to get into msp. We were filed at FL280, and climbed to that altitude as we entered the WX. Center was giving us routing that looked best to them, and we were picking our way between the buildups using the radar. We were encountering light general precipitation of steady intensity, had some lightning off either side, and moderate st elmos fire on the windshield. I had asked for a higher altitude to get out of the st elmos and to hopefully pick our way between the buildups a little easier, but higher was not available. I was running the speed brakes slightly extended to try to dissipate some of the static. We were doing a fair amount of deviating trying to pick up our way through the WX at that altitude. When we were just a little over 100 NM from scottsbluff, the 'a' flight attendant came forward and advised us they thought they smelled a light odor of smoke in the cabin. I immediately turned off the galley power and the recirculation fan, sent an ACARS message for dispatch to call me, and told her to investigate and keep me informed. (We had 3 working and 3 deadheading flight attendants, all by now scurrying around the cabin feeling the floor for hot spots and checking for a possible source of the smoke.) I gave the first officer the ATC radios (he was already the PF), and talked to dispatch. About that time we flew out into clear air and the st elmos fire quit. The flight attendant came back and said the smoke seemed to be gone. I suspected it might be related to the heavy static we had been flying through, and consulting with dispatch and maintenance, we concurred that if we had no further indications, we could continue to denver. I had only hung up from that conversation for a min or so when she came back up and said the smoke odor was back. I typed a quick note to dispatch 'smoke back,' sent it and a 'call me,' knew that we were headed in the general direction of bff, and asked her if they could determine where the smoke might be coming from. She said it seemed to be strongest near the floor, especially near seats 2A and B. Suspecting a possible passenger entertainment system, I instructed my first officer to pull the circuit breaker located directly behind him. I also considered the possibility of a fluorescent ballast, so I had the flight attendants turn off all the cabin lights to eliminate electrical power to that possible source of the problem. Dispatch was up on the radio by now, and told us to get the plane on the ground. (My plan exactly.) they suggested cys, but I told him bff was closer and was my preference. He concurred, said it was a 'big a' alternate, and should have facilities to deplane the passenger. First officer told ATC we had smoke in the cabin and wanted to proceed direct to bff. They cleared us direct, and gave us lower. First officer cranked up the speed and started down toward bff, which now was about 80-90 NM on our nose. Dispatch gave us basic information on the airport, and said he would coordinate with them to have the airport ready for us. I grabbed the qrc, ran the short checklist, and while the flight attendant was giving me an update on the situation, asked the first officer if he could run the smoke checklist referenced by the qrc. He was on autoplt and able to handle that for me. We kept getting updates from the flight attendants almost continuously, sometimes that the smoke seemed to be subsiding, then that it was coming back. Someone reported that they thought they saw some thin wispy vapor coming from the air vents on the side-wall cove just below the bins. This led me to suspect a pack or bleed-air source was also a possibility. I switched 1 pack off for a couple of mins, and then turned it back on and shut the other pack off. Nothing seemed to correlate well with the appearance and subsiding of the smoke. Somewhere in here I made a PA to the passenger telling them briefly of our situation andthat we were proceeding to scottsbluff for a landing in approximately 10-12 mins. The flight attendants prepped the cabin and got the passenger ready. We went through the smoke/fumesecond officerdor removal checklist, but with only intermittent very light wisp of odor we did not feel it necessary to put on the oxygen masks or smoke goggles at that time. We ran the electrical fire/smoke checklist to see if there was anything we had missed. About the only thing left was to turn the bus xfer switch off, which we did. About this time ATC offered that alliance airport was closer, and asked if we wanted it. It was not depicted on our map display, indicating that it was not considered a 'suitable' alternate. The smoke did not seem to be getting any worse, no hot spots were found, and we had no indications of flame or an actual fire. Also, we were too high for a direct approach for alliance (which was not on our map display and we had no approach charts for). I figured that with the maneuvering to get down, alliance was only 3-4 mins closer in point of time to us than bff, where crash fire rescue equipment was already notified and getting ready for us. I did not know what kind of crash fire rescue equipment was available at alliance. If we had indications of a serious or escalating situation, I would have dove for alliance and evacuate/evacuationed on the runway. Our situation seemed pretty stable with intermittent occurrence of light smoke odor, so we elected to continue to bff where everything was set up for us and was within just a couple of mins of the same time. We checked with the flight attendants for any last updates, and gave them a 'prepare for landing, 5 mins' announcement. This was about the first time that we were far enough ahead to consider sending the first officer back to investigate in the cabin. We had 6 flight attendants all over the cabin giving us very good information. Also, with the intermittent nature of the smoke, I did not feel he would likely find anything significant within a reasonable amount of time. The situation was not escalating, so I elected to keep him up front to fly as normal an approach as possible. We were also now talking to bff unicom, relaying information to the fire department and getting valuable information from a flight that had just landed about runway, wind, and ramp construction areas. He suggested landing runway 30 (which has an ILS), doing a 180 degree on the runway, and back-taxi to avoid the ramp construction. From there the fire department would lead us on to the parking ramp unless we needed to evacuate/evacuation sooner. Flight attendants advised us there did not seem to be any smoke on approach, so we made a normal landing, taxied expeditiously back to the ramp, parked, shut down, and checked the status in the back. They did not smell smoke at that time, so we told the passenger to remain seated for the moment while we figured out how to get them off the airplane safely. I started the APU in case we needed electricity or hydraulics for anything. Next, I hung my head out the window, told the firemen we currently had no smoke, and asked where the boarding stairs were. He said they had none. That was a bit of a surprise, and necessitated reconsidering the egress plan rapidly. (For a 'big a' alternate, we expected to have a way to deplane the passenger.) I saw a tall stair stand over by the fence, and asked what that was. It was a deicing stand. I asked them to roll it over and see if we could get it to work with our door. With no imminent threat, I did not want to pop the slides and most likely injure some passenger in a slide evacuate/evacuation. The deicing stand did not fit our door, being considerably higher and having a railing that prevented easy access to the stairs. About this time, the flight attendant advised me they were smelling a bit of smoke odor again. The fire department had pulled the deicing stand back and put a heavy gauge ladder up to door 1L. I asked them to roll the deice stand up parallel to the leading edge of the left wing just outboard of the engine, and we would open the overwing exit. I sent my first officer back to open the left overwing exit and manage that exit. Then I made a PA announcement advising the passenger that we were getting reports of smoke odor again, and advised them of the plan. I told them that we had a ladder at the front door for those agile enough to climb down it, and that in addition we would be opening the left overwing exit door only, and walking out the wing to the stairs. I also asked for everyone who felt they needed assistance with either exit to please advise a flight attendant. I grabbed the top of the ladder with my r-hand, moved it to the front corner of door 1L, and started helping people onto the ladder with my l-hand. Then I recruited an abm to take over for me for a moment while I shut off the APU and battery switch to remove all electrics that might possibly be contributing to the reoccurrence of the smoke. (While I was helping up front, my first officer found that someone had already opened the left overwing exit. We are currently trying to determine if it was a passenger or a flight attendant. He found a male deadheading flight attendant out on the wing directing people to the stairs, and all was going very smoothly with what I would prefer to call an orderly expeditious egress. Again, since there seemed to be no immediate danger, we elected to not opt for a full blown slide evacuate/evacuation, but always had the option of converting to that if we got any indications that it was necessary. In my decision, I was trying to weigh the risk of passenger injury on the slides versus the ladder and stand, and was concerned about people walking on the wing and going down the ladder, but also knew the chances were high for some injuries if we used the slides.) next, I went back and used the PA to ask the flight attendants in the back how it was going and if the smoke was getting bad. They reported it was going well with minimal smoke odor. I told them that if the smoke was increasing or they felt they needed to, to go ahead and pop the slides. Almost everyone was off by now, and they did not feel that a slide was necessary. I helped the last few people onto the ladder, made sure everyone was safely off, and invited the fire department up to help look around. I would estimate from the time we set the brakes until all the people were off the plane was approximately 5 mins (we could have converted to a full evacuate/evacuation with slides at any time we felt it necessary), and we did it with no injuries to anyone involved. I then proceeded to look around with my flashlight, but found nothing. The fire department came on board with an infrared detector, and found no hot spots above 97 degrees F. I next went down and opened the cargo pits, but we detected no smoke odor down there. With all the passenger off, the local agents escorted them into the terminal while we looked the plane over as best we could. We had reported on the ground canceling IFR to center by radio, but I was unable to use the seat-phone to advise dispatch of our condition since all power was off. Things were pretty well secure by now, so I sent my first officer in to the terminal to call dispatch, tell them everyone was off safely, and to start coordinating what we were going to do with the passenger next. I stayed with the airplane and continued working with the fire department, especially so I could be there to operate system if necessary if anything appeared to start burning. After the airplane had been electrically cold for 10-15 mins with no sign of problems, I checked in with first officer (he was doing fine on the phone). A few of the flight attendants and station agents and I went back out and unloaded all the carry-on bags into a pick-up truck and took them to the terminal where the passenger claimed them. By now it was looking like we were going to get another B737-300 in by about XF00 to take the passenger on to denver, so we starting looking for a better way to get them back on board the new airplane safely. The ladder was not a great option, someone suggested the snorkel truck basket could carry 2-3 at a time. Finally, they located a roofing truck with a flat dump-truck type bed and high side rails. (The last thing I wanted to do at this point was to injure someone loading them on the new airplane.) this sounded like the safest option availab

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW HAD ODOR AND SMOKE IN THE CABIN.

Narrative: IT WAS THE FO'S LEG. THE FLT PUSHED BACK FROM MSP AT XA06 LCL. WITH A BIT OF A LONG TAXI, A RE-RTE, AND SEQUENCING INTO THE DEP TFC, WE DID NOT GET AIRBORNE FOR 15-20 MINS. STARTING ABOUT 10 MINS W OF MSP WE ENCOUNTERED THE LINE OF WX WE HAD WORKED THROUGH ON THE PREVIOUS LEG TO GET INTO MSP. WE WERE FILED AT FL280, AND CLBED TO THAT ALT AS WE ENTERED THE WX. CTR WAS GIVING US ROUTING THAT LOOKED BEST TO THEM, AND WE WERE PICKING OUR WAY BTWN THE BUILDUPS USING THE RADAR. WE WERE ENCOUNTERING LIGHT GENERAL PRECIPITATION OF STEADY INTENSITY, HAD SOME LIGHTNING OFF EITHER SIDE, AND MODERATE ST ELMOS FIRE ON THE WINDSHIELD. I HAD ASKED FOR A HIGHER ALT TO GET OUT OF THE ST ELMOS AND TO HOPEFULLY PICK OUR WAY BTWN THE BUILDUPS A LITTLE EASIER, BUT HIGHER WAS NOT AVAILABLE. I WAS RUNNING THE SPD BRAKES SLIGHTLY EXTENDED TO TRY TO DISSIPATE SOME OF THE STATIC. WE WERE DOING A FAIR AMOUNT OF DEVIATING TRYING TO PICK UP OUR WAY THROUGH THE WX AT THAT ALT. WHEN WE WERE JUST A LITTLE OVER 100 NM FROM SCOTTSBLUFF, THE 'A' FLT ATTENDANT CAME FORWARD AND ADVISED US THEY THOUGHT THEY SMELLED A LIGHT ODOR OF SMOKE IN THE CABIN. I IMMEDIATELY TURNED OFF THE GALLEY PWR AND THE RECIRCULATION FAN, SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE FOR DISPATCH TO CALL ME, AND TOLD HER TO INVESTIGATE AND KEEP ME INFORMED. (WE HAD 3 WORKING AND 3 DEADHEADING FLT ATTENDANTS, ALL BY NOW SCURRYING AROUND THE CABIN FEELING THE FLOOR FOR HOT SPOTS AND CHKING FOR A POSSIBLE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE.) I GAVE THE FO THE ATC RADIOS (HE WAS ALREADY THE PF), AND TALKED TO DISPATCH. ABOUT THAT TIME WE FLEW OUT INTO CLR AIR AND THE ST ELMOS FIRE QUIT. THE FLT ATTENDANT CAME BACK AND SAID THE SMOKE SEEMED TO BE GONE. I SUSPECTED IT MIGHT BE RELATED TO THE HVY STATIC WE HAD BEEN FLYING THROUGH, AND CONSULTING WITH DISPATCH AND MAINT, WE CONCURRED THAT IF WE HAD NO FURTHER INDICATIONS, WE COULD CONTINUE TO DENVER. I HAD ONLY HUNG UP FROM THAT CONVERSATION FOR A MIN OR SO WHEN SHE CAME BACK UP AND SAID THE SMOKE ODOR WAS BACK. I TYPED A QUICK NOTE TO DISPATCH 'SMOKE BACK,' SENT IT AND A 'CALL ME,' KNEW THAT WE WERE HEADED IN THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF BFF, AND ASKED HER IF THEY COULD DETERMINE WHERE THE SMOKE MIGHT BE COMING FROM. SHE SAID IT SEEMED TO BE STRONGEST NEAR THE FLOOR, ESPECIALLY NEAR SEATS 2A AND B. SUSPECTING A POSSIBLE PAX ENTERTAINMENT SYS, I INSTRUCTED MY FO TO PULL THE CIRCUIT BREAKER LOCATED DIRECTLY BEHIND HIM. I ALSO CONSIDERED THE POSSIBILITY OF A FLUORESCENT BALLAST, SO I HAD THE FLT ATTENDANTS TURN OFF ALL THE CABIN LIGHTS TO ELIMINATE ELECTRICAL PWR TO THAT POSSIBLE SOURCE OF THE PROB. DISPATCH WAS UP ON THE RADIO BY NOW, AND TOLD US TO GET THE PLANE ON THE GND. (MY PLAN EXACTLY.) THEY SUGGESTED CYS, BUT I TOLD HIM BFF WAS CLOSER AND WAS MY PREFERENCE. HE CONCURRED, SAID IT WAS A 'BIG A' ALTERNATE, AND SHOULD HAVE FACILITIES TO DEPLANE THE PAX. FO TOLD ATC WE HAD SMOKE IN THE CABIN AND WANTED TO PROCEED DIRECT TO BFF. THEY CLRED US DIRECT, AND GAVE US LOWER. FO CRANKED UP THE SPD AND STARTED DOWN TOWARD BFF, WHICH NOW WAS ABOUT 80-90 NM ON OUR NOSE. DISPATCH GAVE US BASIC INFO ON THE ARPT, AND SAID HE WOULD COORDINATE WITH THEM TO HAVE THE ARPT READY FOR US. I GRABBED THE QRC, RAN THE SHORT CHKLIST, AND WHILE THE FLT ATTENDANT WAS GIVING ME AN UPDATE ON THE SIT, ASKED THE FO IF HE COULD RUN THE SMOKE CHKLIST REFED BY THE QRC. HE WAS ON AUTOPLT AND ABLE TO HANDLE THAT FOR ME. WE KEPT GETTING UPDATES FROM THE FLT ATTENDANTS ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY, SOMETIMES THAT THE SMOKE SEEMED TO BE SUBSIDING, THEN THAT IT WAS COMING BACK. SOMEONE RPTED THAT THEY THOUGHT THEY SAW SOME THIN WISPY VAPOR COMING FROM THE AIR VENTS ON THE SIDE-WALL COVE JUST BELOW THE BINS. THIS LED ME TO SUSPECT A PACK OR BLEED-AIR SOURCE WAS ALSO A POSSIBILITY. I SWITCHED 1 PACK OFF FOR A COUPLE OF MINS, AND THEN TURNED IT BACK ON AND SHUT THE OTHER PACK OFF. NOTHING SEEMED TO CORRELATE WELL WITH THE APPEARANCE AND SUBSIDING OF THE SMOKE. SOMEWHERE IN HERE I MADE A PA TO THE PAX TELLING THEM BRIEFLY OF OUR SIT ANDTHAT WE WERE PROCEEDING TO SCOTTSBLUFF FOR A LNDG IN APPROX 10-12 MINS. THE FLT ATTENDANTS PREPPED THE CABIN AND GOT THE PAX READY. WE WENT THROUGH THE SMOKE/FUMES/ODOR REMOVAL CHKLIST, BUT WITH ONLY INTERMITTENT VERY LIGHT WISP OF ODOR WE DID NOT FEEL IT NECESSARY TO PUT ON THE OXYGEN MASKS OR SMOKE GOGGLES AT THAT TIME. WE RAN THE ELECTRICAL FIRE/SMOKE CHKLIST TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANYTHING WE HAD MISSED. ABOUT THE ONLY THING LEFT WAS TO TURN THE BUS XFER SWITCH OFF, WHICH WE DID. ABOUT THIS TIME ATC OFFERED THAT ALLIANCE ARPT WAS CLOSER, AND ASKED IF WE WANTED IT. IT WAS NOT DEPICTED ON OUR MAP DISPLAY, INDICATING THAT IT WAS NOT CONSIDERED A 'SUITABLE' ALTERNATE. THE SMOKE DID NOT SEEM TO BE GETTING ANY WORSE, NO HOT SPOTS WERE FOUND, AND WE HAD NO INDICATIONS OF FLAME OR AN ACTUAL FIRE. ALSO, WE WERE TOO HIGH FOR A DIRECT APCH FOR ALLIANCE (WHICH WAS NOT ON OUR MAP DISPLAY AND WE HAD NO APCH CHARTS FOR). I FIGURED THAT WITH THE MANEUVERING TO GET DOWN, ALLIANCE WAS ONLY 3-4 MINS CLOSER IN POINT OF TIME TO US THAN BFF, WHERE CFR WAS ALREADY NOTIFIED AND GETTING READY FOR US. I DID NOT KNOW WHAT KIND OF CFR WAS AVAILABLE AT ALLIANCE. IF WE HAD INDICATIONS OF A SERIOUS OR ESCALATING SIT, I WOULD HAVE DOVE FOR ALLIANCE AND EVACED ON THE RWY. OUR SIT SEEMED PRETTY STABLE WITH INTERMITTENT OCCURRENCE OF LIGHT SMOKE ODOR, SO WE ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO BFF WHERE EVERYTHING WAS SET UP FOR US AND WAS WITHIN JUST A COUPLE OF MINS OF THE SAME TIME. WE CHKED WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS FOR ANY LAST UPDATES, AND GAVE THEM A 'PREPARE FOR LNDG, 5 MINS' ANNOUNCEMENT. THIS WAS ABOUT THE FIRST TIME THAT WE WERE FAR ENOUGH AHEAD TO CONSIDER SENDING THE FO BACK TO INVESTIGATE IN THE CABIN. WE HAD 6 FLT ATTENDANTS ALL OVER THE CABIN GIVING US VERY GOOD INFO. ALSO, WITH THE INTERMITTENT NATURE OF THE SMOKE, I DID NOT FEEL HE WOULD LIKELY FIND ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT WITHIN A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF TIME. THE SIT WAS NOT ESCALATING, SO I ELECTED TO KEEP HIM UP FRONT TO FLY AS NORMAL AN APCH AS POSSIBLE. WE WERE ALSO NOW TALKING TO BFF UNICOM, RELAYING INFO TO THE FIRE DEPT AND GETTING VALUABLE INFO FROM A FLT THAT HAD JUST LANDED ABOUT RWY, WIND, AND RAMP CONSTRUCTION AREAS. HE SUGGESTED LNDG RWY 30 (WHICH HAS AN ILS), DOING A 180 DEG ON THE RWY, AND BACK-TAXI TO AVOID THE RAMP CONSTRUCTION. FROM THERE THE FIRE DEPT WOULD LEAD US ON TO THE PARKING RAMP UNLESS WE NEEDED TO EVAC SOONER. FLT ATTENDANTS ADVISED US THERE DID NOT SEEM TO BE ANY SMOKE ON APCH, SO WE MADE A NORMAL LNDG, TAXIED EXPEDITIOUSLY BACK TO THE RAMP, PARKED, SHUT DOWN, AND CHKED THE STATUS IN THE BACK. THEY DID NOT SMELL SMOKE AT THAT TIME, SO WE TOLD THE PAX TO REMAIN SEATED FOR THE MOMENT WHILE WE FIGURED OUT HOW TO GET THEM OFF THE AIRPLANE SAFELY. I STARTED THE APU IN CASE WE NEEDED ELECTRICITY OR HYDS FOR ANYTHING. NEXT, I HUNG MY HEAD OUT THE WINDOW, TOLD THE FIREMEN WE CURRENTLY HAD NO SMOKE, AND ASKED WHERE THE BOARDING STAIRS WERE. HE SAID THEY HAD NONE. THAT WAS A BIT OF A SURPRISE, AND NECESSITATED RECONSIDERING THE EGRESS PLAN RAPIDLY. (FOR A 'BIG A' ALTERNATE, WE EXPECTED TO HAVE A WAY TO DEPLANE THE PAX.) I SAW A TALL STAIR STAND OVER BY THE FENCE, AND ASKED WHAT THAT WAS. IT WAS A DEICING STAND. I ASKED THEM TO ROLL IT OVER AND SEE IF WE COULD GET IT TO WORK WITH OUR DOOR. WITH NO IMMINENT THREAT, I DID NOT WANT TO POP THE SLIDES AND MOST LIKELY INJURE SOME PAX IN A SLIDE EVAC. THE DEICING STAND DID NOT FIT OUR DOOR, BEING CONSIDERABLY HIGHER AND HAVING A RAILING THAT PREVENTED EASY ACCESS TO THE STAIRS. ABOUT THIS TIME, THE FLT ATTENDANT ADVISED ME THEY WERE SMELLING A BIT OF SMOKE ODOR AGAIN. THE FIRE DEPT HAD PULLED THE DEICING STAND BACK AND PUT A HVY GAUGE LADDER UP TO DOOR 1L. I ASKED THEM TO ROLL THE DEICE STAND UP PARALLEL TO THE LEADING EDGE OF THE L WING JUST OUTBOARD OF THE ENG, AND WE WOULD OPEN THE OVERWING EXIT. I SENT MY FO BACK TO OPEN THE L OVERWING EXIT AND MANAGE THAT EXIT. THEN I MADE A PA ANNOUNCEMENT ADVISING THE PAX THAT WE WERE GETTING RPTS OF SMOKE ODOR AGAIN, AND ADVISED THEM OF THE PLAN. I TOLD THEM THAT WE HAD A LADDER AT THE FRONT DOOR FOR THOSE AGILE ENOUGH TO CLB DOWN IT, AND THAT IN ADDITION WE WOULD BE OPENING THE L OVERWING EXIT DOOR ONLY, AND WALKING OUT THE WING TO THE STAIRS. I ALSO ASKED FOR EVERYONE WHO FELT THEY NEEDED ASSISTANCE WITH EITHER EXIT TO PLEASE ADVISE A FLT ATTENDANT. I GRABBED THE TOP OF THE LADDER WITH MY R-HAND, MOVED IT TO THE FRONT CORNER OF DOOR 1L, AND STARTED HELPING PEOPLE ONTO THE LADDER WITH MY L-HAND. THEN I RECRUITED AN ABM TO TAKE OVER FOR ME FOR A MOMENT WHILE I SHUT OFF THE APU AND BATTERY SWITCH TO REMOVE ALL ELECTRICS THAT MIGHT POSSIBLY BE CONTRIBUTING TO THE REOCCURRENCE OF THE SMOKE. (WHILE I WAS HELPING UP FRONT, MY FO FOUND THAT SOMEONE HAD ALREADY OPENED THE L OVERWING EXIT. WE ARE CURRENTLY TRYING TO DETERMINE IF IT WAS A PAX OR A FLT ATTENDANT. HE FOUND A MALE DEADHEADING FLT ATTENDANT OUT ON THE WING DIRECTING PEOPLE TO THE STAIRS, AND ALL WAS GOING VERY SMOOTHLY WITH WHAT I WOULD PREFER TO CALL AN ORDERLY EXPEDITIOUS EGRESS. AGAIN, SINCE THERE SEEMED TO BE NO IMMEDIATE DANGER, WE ELECTED TO NOT OPT FOR A FULL BLOWN SLIDE EVAC, BUT ALWAYS HAD THE OPTION OF CONVERTING TO THAT IF WE GOT ANY INDICATIONS THAT IT WAS NECESSARY. IN MY DECISION, I WAS TRYING TO WEIGH THE RISK OF PAX INJURY ON THE SLIDES VERSUS THE LADDER AND STAND, AND WAS CONCERNED ABOUT PEOPLE WALKING ON THE WING AND GOING DOWN THE LADDER, BUT ALSO KNEW THE CHANCES WERE HIGH FOR SOME INJURIES IF WE USED THE SLIDES.) NEXT, I WENT BACK AND USED THE PA TO ASK THE FLT ATTENDANTS IN THE BACK HOW IT WAS GOING AND IF THE SMOKE WAS GETTING BAD. THEY RPTED IT WAS GOING WELL WITH MINIMAL SMOKE ODOR. I TOLD THEM THAT IF THE SMOKE WAS INCREASING OR THEY FELT THEY NEEDED TO, TO GO AHEAD AND POP THE SLIDES. ALMOST EVERYONE WAS OFF BY NOW, AND THEY DID NOT FEEL THAT A SLIDE WAS NECESSARY. I HELPED THE LAST FEW PEOPLE ONTO THE LADDER, MADE SURE EVERYONE WAS SAFELY OFF, AND INVITED THE FIRE DEPT UP TO HELP LOOK AROUND. I WOULD ESTIMATE FROM THE TIME WE SET THE BRAKES UNTIL ALL THE PEOPLE WERE OFF THE PLANE WAS APPROX 5 MINS (WE COULD HAVE CONVERTED TO A FULL EVAC WITH SLIDES AT ANY TIME WE FELT IT NECESSARY), AND WE DID IT WITH NO INJURIES TO ANYONE INVOLVED. I THEN PROCEEDED TO LOOK AROUND WITH MY FLASHLIGHT, BUT FOUND NOTHING. THE FIRE DEPT CAME ON BOARD WITH AN INFRARED DETECTOR, AND FOUND NO HOT SPOTS ABOVE 97 DEGS F. I NEXT WENT DOWN AND OPENED THE CARGO PITS, BUT WE DETECTED NO SMOKE ODOR DOWN THERE. WITH ALL THE PAX OFF, THE LCL AGENTS ESCORTED THEM INTO THE TERMINAL WHILE WE LOOKED THE PLANE OVER AS BEST WE COULD. WE HAD RPTED ON THE GND CANCELING IFR TO CTR BY RADIO, BUT I WAS UNABLE TO USE THE SEAT-PHONE TO ADVISE DISPATCH OF OUR CONDITION SINCE ALL PWR WAS OFF. THINGS WERE PRETTY WELL SECURE BY NOW, SO I SENT MY FO IN TO THE TERMINAL TO CALL DISPATCH, TELL THEM EVERYONE WAS OFF SAFELY, AND TO START COORDINATING WHAT WE WERE GOING TO DO WITH THE PAX NEXT. I STAYED WITH THE AIRPLANE AND CONTINUED WORKING WITH THE FIRE DEPT, ESPECIALLY SO I COULD BE THERE TO OPERATE SYS IF NECESSARY IF ANYTHING APPEARED TO START BURNING. AFTER THE AIRPLANE HAD BEEN ELECTRICALLY COLD FOR 10-15 MINS WITH NO SIGN OF PROBS, I CHKED IN WITH FO (HE WAS DOING FINE ON THE PHONE). A FEW OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS AND STATION AGENTS AND I WENT BACK OUT AND UNLOADED ALL THE CARRY-ON BAGS INTO A PICK-UP TRUCK AND TOOK THEM TO THE TERMINAL WHERE THE PAX CLAIMED THEM. BY NOW IT WAS LOOKING LIKE WE WERE GOING TO GET ANOTHER B737-300 IN BY ABOUT XF00 TO TAKE THE PAX ON TO DENVER, SO WE STARTING LOOKING FOR A BETTER WAY TO GET THEM BACK ON BOARD THE NEW AIRPLANE SAFELY. THE LADDER WAS NOT A GREAT OPTION, SOMEONE SUGGESTED THE SNORKEL TRUCK BASKET COULD CARRY 2-3 AT A TIME. FINALLY, THEY LOCATED A ROOFING TRUCK WITH A FLAT DUMP-TRUCK TYPE BED AND HIGH SIDE RAILS. (THE LAST THING I WANTED TO DO AT THIS POINT WAS TO INJURE SOMEONE LOADING THEM ON THE NEW AIRPLANE.) THIS SOUNDED LIKE THE SAFEST OPTION AVAILAB

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.