Narrative:

While being vectored on downwind for runway 24R at lax, socal (approach) called out traffic preceding us at our 3 O'clock low position on a 3 NM final. We acknowledged that we had the traffic in sight, at which time socal cleared us to begin a base turn for the visual approach to runway 24R. During the base turn, I acquired additional traffic off our nose about 3-4 NM proceeding to runway 25L. Socal confirmed the additional traffic was to the south runway complex and switched us to tower controller. At this point, I became task saturated completing aircraft confign changes as requested by the captain (PF), frequency changes (to tower), and trying to maintain visual contact on both aircraft (runway 25L and runway 24R) through the hazy conditions. Because we had started our base turn high and fast for normal approach, I was not initially alarmed at the rate we were approaching the extended runway 24R centerline. I assumed the captain was going to combine a slip maneuver with a slight overshoot s-turn to lose our excess altitude and airspeed. I did not devote complete attention to our rollout to final because of the many tasks I was trying to accomplish. Consequently, I first queried the captain as to where we were going after we had already passed through the extended centerline at a rate much greater than I had anticipated for a 'minor overshoot.' only then did I comprehend the captain had misidented the correct runway and was lining up for approach to runway 25R. During the event, visual contact was maintained on both preceding aircraft and we never got closer than 8000-9000 ft slant range but there was a serious potential for conflict with other traffic to the runway 25 complex that we were unaware of. Fortunately, the captain made an aggressive repos to the runway 24R final about the same time tower and myself alerted to our overshoot. My lesson learned involved task prioritization in the final approach area. Even in VMC, both crew members need to stay attuned to aircraft position. I also should have verbalized my impressions of the impending overshoot to the captain and force the PF to inform me of any intentional deviations that may be planned for the approach. I assumed that the overshoot was intentional which was a big error.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 CREW OVERSHOOTS THEIR ASSIGNED RWY OF RWY 24R AT LAX WHEN THE CAPT IS FIXATED ON THE S COMPLEX RWYS.

Narrative: WHILE BEING VECTORED ON DOWNWIND FOR RWY 24R AT LAX, SOCAL (APCH) CALLED OUT TFC PRECEDING US AT OUR 3 O'CLOCK LOW POS ON A 3 NM FINAL. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT, AT WHICH TIME SOCAL CLRED US TO BEGIN A BASE TURN FOR THE VISUAL APCH TO RWY 24R. DURING THE BASE TURN, I ACQUIRED ADDITIONAL TFC OFF OUR NOSE ABOUT 3-4 NM PROCEEDING TO RWY 25L. SOCAL CONFIRMED THE ADDITIONAL TFC WAS TO THE S RWY COMPLEX AND SWITCHED US TO TWR CTLR. AT THIS POINT, I BECAME TASK SATURATED COMPLETING ACFT CONFIGN CHANGES AS REQUESTED BY THE CAPT (PF), FREQ CHANGES (TO TWR), AND TRYING TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT ON BOTH ACFT (RWY 25L AND RWY 24R) THROUGH THE HAZY CONDITIONS. BECAUSE WE HAD STARTED OUR BASE TURN HIGH AND FAST FOR NORMAL APCH, I WAS NOT INITIALLY ALARMED AT THE RATE WE WERE APCHING THE EXTENDED RWY 24R CTRLINE. I ASSUMED THE CAPT WAS GOING TO COMBINE A SLIP MANEUVER WITH A SLIGHT OVERSHOOT S-TURN TO LOSE OUR EXCESS ALT AND AIRSPD. I DID NOT DEVOTE COMPLETE ATTN TO OUR ROLLOUT TO FINAL BECAUSE OF THE MANY TASKS I WAS TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH. CONSEQUENTLY, I FIRST QUERIED THE CAPT AS TO WHERE WE WERE GOING AFTER WE HAD ALREADY PASSED THROUGH THE EXTENDED CTRLINE AT A RATE MUCH GREATER THAN I HAD ANTICIPATED FOR A 'MINOR OVERSHOOT.' ONLY THEN DID I COMPREHEND THE CAPT HAD MISIDENTED THE CORRECT RWY AND WAS LINING UP FOR APCH TO RWY 25R. DURING THE EVENT, VISUAL CONTACT WAS MAINTAINED ON BOTH PRECEDING ACFT AND WE NEVER GOT CLOSER THAN 8000-9000 FT SLANT RANGE BUT THERE WAS A SERIOUS POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT WITH OTHER TFC TO THE RWY 25 COMPLEX THAT WE WERE UNAWARE OF. FORTUNATELY, THE CAPT MADE AN AGGRESSIVE REPOS TO THE RWY 24R FINAL ABOUT THE SAME TIME TWR AND MYSELF ALERTED TO OUR OVERSHOOT. MY LESSON LEARNED INVOLVED TASK PRIORITIZATION IN THE FINAL APCH AREA. EVEN IN VMC, BOTH CREW MEMBERS NEED TO STAY ATTUNED TO ACFT POS. I ALSO SHOULD HAVE VERBALIZED MY IMPRESSIONS OF THE IMPENDING OVERSHOOT TO THE CAPT AND FORCE THE PF TO INFORM ME OF ANY INTENTIONAL DEVS THAT MAY BE PLANNED FOR THE APCH. I ASSUMED THAT THE OVERSHOOT WAS INTENTIONAL WHICH WAS A BIG ERROR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.