Narrative:

We were approaching slc. The WX was clear below about FL180 with unrestr visibility. We were at 15000 ft, 11 NM south of ffu VOR when slc approach control told us to cross ffu at or above 11000 ft, intercept the localizer for slc runway 34R, and cleared us for the ILS to that runway. We confirmed the proper set-up of all instruments and navaids, and I intercepted the localizer. Continuing inbound on the localizer, I complied with the altitude stepdowns on the approach plate. I began xchking the brightly lit runway ahead of us at about 15 mi from the airport and confirmed that we were on the east side of the complex (runway 34L is west of the terminal area, runway 34R and runway 35 are east) and that we were still centered on the localizer. Intercepting the glide path from above, I landed with all ILS indications normal and centered. During rollout, I realized we were much farther east of the terminal complex than we should have been for runway 34R. The tower then said that it appeared to him that we were lined up with runway 35 when we were on short final, and that we had landed on runway 35 instead of runway 34R as cleared. We confirmed with tower that we had in fact flown the localizer to the runway with the correct ILS frequency selected, at which time he (tower) commented that a flight from another commercial carrier had done the same thing earlier in the evening. My first officer and I discussed the approach at length, confirming that it was flown accurately with the correct NAVAID and instrument set-up. We both commented that we had definitely seen the lights of runway 34L and runway 35, neither of us could recall seeing the approach or runway lights of runway 34R. We also noted that during rollout, with the aircraft slightly left of centerline on runway 35 (toward runway 34R), the localizer was displaced slightly right (away from runway 34R) on both the HSI and hgs. Since I am very familiar with this airport, I can only conclude that the combination of a centered up ILS and a brightly lit runway (on the correct side of the airport) in front of me decreased my focus on the overall layout of the airport complex and resulted in a landing on the incorrect runway. I would also hope that the tower controller would not hesitate to direct a go around should a questionable or hazardous situation arise. Supplemental information from acn 442741: contributing factors: the accurate ILS guidance to a runway other than tuned for is baffling. A similar incident with another major air carrier shortly before makes it even more so. ATIS indicated that approachs were being conducted to runway 34L/right and runway 35. 3 brightly lit runways would have provided added situational awareness. The 2 brightest lit runways not being the runway cleared to added to a loss of situational awareness. The PNF's lack of experience at the airport in question was also a factor. Tower indicated that they observed us lined up on the wrong runway. A go around could have been directed.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MLG CREW LANDED ON THE WRONG RWY AT SLC.

Narrative: WE WERE APCHING SLC. THE WX WAS CLR BELOW ABOUT FL180 WITH UNRESTR VISIBILITY. WE WERE AT 15000 FT, 11 NM S OF FFU VOR WHEN SLC APCH CTL TOLD US TO CROSS FFU AT OR ABOVE 11000 FT, INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR SLC RWY 34R, AND CLRED US FOR THE ILS TO THAT RWY. WE CONFIRMED THE PROPER SET-UP OF ALL INSTS AND NAVAIDS, AND I INTERCEPTED THE LOC. CONTINUING INBOUND ON THE LOC, I COMPLIED WITH THE ALT STEPDOWNS ON THE APCH PLATE. I BEGAN XCHKING THE BRIGHTLY LIT RWY AHEAD OF US AT ABOUT 15 MI FROM THE ARPT AND CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE ON THE E SIDE OF THE COMPLEX (RWY 34L IS W OF THE TERMINAL AREA, RWY 34R AND RWY 35 ARE E) AND THAT WE WERE STILL CTRED ON THE LOC. INTERCEPTING THE GLIDE PATH FROM ABOVE, I LANDED WITH ALL ILS INDICATIONS NORMAL AND CTRED. DURING ROLLOUT, I REALIZED WE WERE MUCH FARTHER E OF THE TERMINAL COMPLEX THAN WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN FOR RWY 34R. THE TWR THEN SAID THAT IT APPEARED TO HIM THAT WE WERE LINED UP WITH RWY 35 WHEN WE WERE ON SHORT FINAL, AND THAT WE HAD LANDED ON RWY 35 INSTEAD OF RWY 34R AS CLRED. WE CONFIRMED WITH TWR THAT WE HAD IN FACT FLOWN THE LOC TO THE RWY WITH THE CORRECT ILS FREQ SELECTED, AT WHICH TIME HE (TWR) COMMENTED THAT A FLT FROM ANOTHER COMMERCIAL CARRIER HAD DONE THE SAME THING EARLIER IN THE EVENING. MY FO AND I DISCUSSED THE APCH AT LENGTH, CONFIRMING THAT IT WAS FLOWN ACCURATELY WITH THE CORRECT NAVAID AND INST SET-UP. WE BOTH COMMENTED THAT WE HAD DEFINITELY SEEN THE LIGHTS OF RWY 34L AND RWY 35, NEITHER OF US COULD RECALL SEEING THE APCH OR RWY LIGHTS OF RWY 34R. WE ALSO NOTED THAT DURING ROLLOUT, WITH THE ACFT SLIGHTLY L OF CTRLINE ON RWY 35 (TOWARD RWY 34R), THE LOC WAS DISPLACED SLIGHTLY R (AWAY FROM RWY 34R) ON BOTH THE HSI AND HGS. SINCE I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS ARPT, I CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT THE COMBINATION OF A CTRED UP ILS AND A BRIGHTLY LIT RWY (ON THE CORRECT SIDE OF THE ARPT) IN FRONT OF ME DECREASED MY FOCUS ON THE OVERALL LAYOUT OF THE ARPT COMPLEX AND RESULTED IN A LNDG ON THE INCORRECT RWY. I WOULD ALSO HOPE THAT THE TWR CTLR WOULD NOT HESITATE TO DIRECT A GAR SHOULD A QUESTIONABLE OR HAZARDOUS SIT ARISE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 442741: CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: THE ACCURATE ILS GUIDANCE TO A RWY OTHER THAN TUNED FOR IS BAFFLING. A SIMILAR INCIDENT WITH ANOTHER MAJOR ACR SHORTLY BEFORE MAKES IT EVEN MORE SO. ATIS INDICATED THAT APCHS WERE BEING CONDUCTED TO RWY 34L/R AND RWY 35. 3 BRIGHTLY LIT RWYS WOULD HAVE PROVIDED ADDED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. THE 2 BRIGHTEST LIT RWYS NOT BEING THE RWY CLRED TO ADDED TO A LOSS OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. THE PNF'S LACK OF EXPERIENCE AT THE ARPT IN QUESTION WAS ALSO A FACTOR. TWR INDICATED THAT THEY OBSERVED US LINED UP ON THE WRONG RWY. A GAR COULD HAVE BEEN DIRECTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.