Narrative:

This evening, thunderstorms were active from northwest of dfw extending north several states. Thunderstorms had been a factor affecting routings all day. I was working a radar associate position for a high altitude (FL240 and above) sector that primarily handles west departures from dfw and overflts. Instead of 4 departure rtes west, we were restricting dfw to 2 rtes due to WX deviations. The problem(south) arose due to ineffective and/or unrealistic tmu restrs/reroutes for overflts. Aircraft eastbound were being routed to abi (abilene) J4, then on east. Aircraft wbound were also being rerouted to abi J4 wbound. There were in-trail restrs, but they didn't account for aircraft coming from different ctrs/sectors. Most traffic was being funneled through our sector in addition to normal overflts and departures. We ended up with huge strings of aircraft, deviating, plus, our departures trying to climb. We had way too many aircraft. We told our supervisor as the strips kept coming, and he called our tmu unit, but nothing was done. Truth be told, all of ZFW's airspace was probably overloaded, but I can only speak to what I worked. All of the adjoining sectors were overloaded. We all had handoff's (trackers) to help. Aircraft kept pouring through. An inbound, high sector, west of us, finally got so overloaded with arrs and overflts. They shut off the sector we were feeding to our immediate (dfw) west, called turki-hi. This sector is almost 200 mi by 100 mi and had 30 aircraft or more deviating, etc, when they got shut off, they couldn't contain their aircraft resulting in 18 deviations. They shut us off. We slammed our aircraft into holding and the sector went crazy with aircraft all over and trying to miss huge thunderstorms. End result -- our region has decided the system broke down. No one is being held accountable. Many, very senior atcs', have said it's the worst out of control situation they'd ever seen. Central flow (wash) or our tmu either didn't notice or didn't care that they completely overloaded the airspace west of dfw all the way to new mexico. The supervisors were ineffective. The blame is now falling on the controllers for not shutting one another off sooner. Though, none of us knew all the adjoining sectors were full. Tmu should have seen the writing on the wall. We saw the problem coming as the strips were being posted, but by then it was way too late. I'm afraid that, although tapes and radar data have been pulled and reviewed, the real problems are not being addressed and solutions, short of us shutting one another off, are not forthcoming. The system broke down that night. There was no loss of separation. Just numerous airspace deviations. We controllers busted our butts and made an impossible situation work, to a large degree by luck. There should be an independent review of this and a national training initiative started to identify what led to what, how no one noticed all the traffic in the country converging west of dfw and deviating around WX to boot. This is/was dangerous. Nothing has come out of our airspace review or regional office review that either has suggested any corrective measures that could be taken or are being taken to prevent a similar situation from occurring again. Our chief did send a pointed letter to the adjoining ctrs warning them to comply with our restrs like mi in-trail, etc, or face us rejecting the aircraft. We didn't shut off adjoining ctrs until way too many aircraft were already in our airspace. Tmu has too many neat, futuristic tools and computers, to track traffic on a huge scale. I don't understand how central flow didn't warn us or help us avoid this overload. The system broke down -- an en route environment was turned into a mad jumble of aircraft at too few altitudes, all deviating, climbing or descending. The radio congestion was horrendous. I hope I never see another night like that. There exists, an outstanding opportunity to look at what happened here and make solid recommendations to prevent it from happening again. Just telling us to shut one another off sooner doesn't seem to really solve the underlying lack of a plan.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZFW CTLR OBSERVES AIRSPACE DEVS DUE TO SECTOR TFC SATURATION, POOR TFC MGMNT PLANNING AND COORD AND PROCEDURAL PROBS DURING ADVERSE WX CONDITIONS.

Narrative: THIS EVENING, TSTMS WERE ACTIVE FROM NW OF DFW EXTENDING N SEVERAL STATES. TSTMS HAD BEEN A FACTOR AFFECTING ROUTINGS ALL DAY. I WAS WORKING A RADAR ASSOCIATE POS FOR A HIGH ALT (FL240 AND ABOVE) SECTOR THAT PRIMARILY HANDLES W DEPS FROM DFW AND OVERFLTS. INSTEAD OF 4 DEP RTES W, WE WERE RESTRICTING DFW TO 2 RTES DUE TO WX DEVS. THE PROB(S) AROSE DUE TO INEFFECTIVE AND/OR UNREALISTIC TMU RESTRS/REROUTES FOR OVERFLTS. ACFT EBOUND WERE BEING ROUTED TO ABI (ABILENE) J4, THEN ON E. ACFT WBOUND WERE ALSO BEING REROUTED TO ABI J4 WBOUND. THERE WERE IN-TRAIL RESTRS, BUT THEY DIDN'T ACCOUNT FOR ACFT COMING FROM DIFFERENT CTRS/SECTORS. MOST TFC WAS BEING FUNNELED THROUGH OUR SECTOR IN ADDITION TO NORMAL OVERFLTS AND DEPS. WE ENDED UP WITH HUGE STRINGS OF ACFT, DEVIATING, PLUS, OUR DEPS TRYING TO CLB. WE HAD WAY TOO MANY ACFT. WE TOLD OUR SUPVR AS THE STRIPS KEPT COMING, AND HE CALLED OUR TMU UNIT, BUT NOTHING WAS DONE. TRUTH BE TOLD, ALL OF ZFW'S AIRSPACE WAS PROBABLY OVERLOADED, BUT I CAN ONLY SPEAK TO WHAT I WORKED. ALL OF THE ADJOINING SECTORS WERE OVERLOADED. WE ALL HAD HDOF'S (TRACKERS) TO HELP. ACFT KEPT POURING THROUGH. AN INBOUND, HIGH SECTOR, W OF US, FINALLY GOT SO OVERLOADED WITH ARRS AND OVERFLTS. THEY SHUT OFF THE SECTOR WE WERE FEEDING TO OUR IMMEDIATE (DFW) W, CALLED TURKI-HI. THIS SECTOR IS ALMOST 200 MI BY 100 MI AND HAD 30 ACFT OR MORE DEVIATING, ETC, WHEN THEY GOT SHUT OFF, THEY COULDN'T CONTAIN THEIR ACFT RESULTING IN 18 DEVS. THEY SHUT US OFF. WE SLAMMED OUR ACFT INTO HOLDING AND THE SECTOR WENT CRAZY WITH ACFT ALL OVER AND TRYING TO MISS HUGE TSTMS. END RESULT -- OUR REGION HAS DECIDED THE SYS BROKE DOWN. NO ONE IS BEING HELD ACCOUNTABLE. MANY, VERY SENIOR ATCS', HAVE SAID IT'S THE WORST OUT OF CTL SIT THEY'D EVER SEEN. CENTRAL FLOW (WASH) OR OUR TMU EITHER DIDN'T NOTICE OR DIDN'T CARE THAT THEY COMPLETELY OVERLOADED THE AIRSPACE W OF DFW ALL THE WAY TO NEW MEXICO. THE SUPVRS WERE INEFFECTIVE. THE BLAME IS NOW FALLING ON THE CTLRS FOR NOT SHUTTING ONE ANOTHER OFF SOONER. THOUGH, NONE OF US KNEW ALL THE ADJOINING SECTORS WERE FULL. TMU SHOULD HAVE SEEN THE WRITING ON THE WALL. WE SAW THE PROB COMING AS THE STRIPS WERE BEING POSTED, BUT BY THEN IT WAS WAY TOO LATE. I'M AFRAID THAT, ALTHOUGH TAPES AND RADAR DATA HAVE BEEN PULLED AND REVIEWED, THE REAL PROBS ARE NOT BEING ADDRESSED AND SOLUTIONS, SHORT OF US SHUTTING ONE ANOTHER OFF, ARE NOT FORTHCOMING. THE SYS BROKE DOWN THAT NIGHT. THERE WAS NO LOSS OF SEPARATION. JUST NUMEROUS AIRSPACE DEVS. WE CTLRS BUSTED OUR BUTTS AND MADE AN IMPOSSIBLE SIT WORK, TO A LARGE DEGREE BY LUCK. THERE SHOULD BE AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THIS AND A NATIONAL TRAINING INITIATIVE STARTED TO IDENT WHAT LED TO WHAT, HOW NO ONE NOTICED ALL THE TFC IN THE COUNTRY CONVERGING W OF DFW AND DEVIATING AROUND WX TO BOOT. THIS IS/WAS DANGEROUS. NOTHING HAS COME OUT OF OUR AIRSPACE REVIEW OR REGIONAL OFFICE REVIEW THAT EITHER HAS SUGGESTED ANY CORRECTIVE MEASURES THAT COULD BE TAKEN OR ARE BEING TAKEN TO PREVENT A SIMILAR SIT FROM OCCURRING AGAIN. OUR CHIEF DID SEND A POINTED LETTER TO THE ADJOINING CTRS WARNING THEM TO COMPLY WITH OUR RESTRS LIKE MI IN-TRAIL, ETC, OR FACE US REJECTING THE ACFT. WE DIDN'T SHUT OFF ADJOINING CTRS UNTIL WAY TOO MANY ACFT WERE ALREADY IN OUR AIRSPACE. TMU HAS TOO MANY NEAT, FUTURISTIC TOOLS AND COMPUTERS, TO TRACK TFC ON A HUGE SCALE. I DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW CENTRAL FLOW DIDN'T WARN US OR HELP US AVOID THIS OVERLOAD. THE SYS BROKE DOWN -- AN ENRTE ENVIRONMENT WAS TURNED INTO A MAD JUMBLE OF ACFT AT TOO FEW ALTS, ALL DEVIATING, CLBING OR DSNDING. THE RADIO CONGESTION WAS HORRENDOUS. I HOPE I NEVER SEE ANOTHER NIGHT LIKE THAT. THERE EXISTS, AN OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK AT WHAT HAPPENED HERE AND MAKE SOLID RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN. JUST TELLING US TO SHUT ONE ANOTHER OFF SOONER DOESN'T SEEM TO REALLY SOLVE THE UNDERLYING LACK OF A PLAN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.