An air carrier flight crew flying a B737 from sfo failed to raise the flaps per their company SOP an...

Attributes
ACN	444359
Time
Date	199907
Day	Fri
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	atc facility : zoa.artcc
State Reference	CA
Altitude	msl single value : 13000
Environment
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	artcc : zoa.artcc
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	other
Flight Phase	climbout : intermediate altitude
Route In Use	departure sid : porte 3
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp pilot : multi engine
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 8000 flight time type : 2500
ASRS Report	444359
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : atp pilot : commercial
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 4000 flight time type : 150
ASRS Report	443670
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies non adherence : far other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	flight crew : became reoriented none taken : detected after the fact none taken : anomaly accepted
Consequence	other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

During departure at approximately 800 ft AGL, sfo bay departure control called an early turn for traffic. This momentary distraction made me forget to call for 'flaps up, VNAV' as is SOP. My first officer also forgot to back me up during this moment of the departure phase. At 3000 ft MSL, I called for the after takeoff check, as is required. The first officer ran the checklist, but during the 'flaps and slats up' challenge, he didn't realize flaps were still at the takeoff position. After accelerating at 10000 ft MSL, I felt the buffeting, which was similar to light chop, and checked the flap gauge. Airspeed at this point was 270 KIAS, a 40 KT flap overspd. After slowing to 225 KIAS, I called for flaps up, and then proceeded to call company maintenance for further guidance. In retrospect, it's very hard to believe I allowed this major oversight. I cannot think of a great reminder to prevent its occurrence in the future, other than using 800 ft radar altitude, as I always have in the past. I simply hope this is a one-time occurrence that will never happen again. I also discussed with my first officer my technique in running the after takeoff checklist which is to check the gauge (flaps) and then look up to check the leading edge devices annunciator panel (a series of green and yellow lights and slats). He was quite confident he checked the gauge, but feels he must have 'looked right through it.' I told him that incorporating the led annunciator panel is my personal backup that the flaps are indeed up. This has to be a PNF duty, due to the position of the annunciator panel.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC FLYING A B737 FROM SFO FAILED TO RAISE THE FLAPS PER THEIR COMPANY SOP AND ACFT FLT MANUAL RESULTING IN A FLAP OVERSPD.

Narrative: DURING DEP AT APPROX 800 FT AGL, SFO BAY DEP CTL CALLED AN EARLY TURN FOR TFC. THIS MOMENTARY DISTR MADE ME FORGET TO CALL FOR 'FLAPS UP, VNAV' AS IS SOP. MY FO ALSO FORGOT TO BACK ME UP DURING THIS MOMENT OF THE DEP PHASE. AT 3000 FT MSL, I CALLED FOR THE AFTER TKOF CHK, AS IS REQUIRED. THE FO RAN THE CHKLIST, BUT DURING THE 'FLAPS AND SLATS UP' CHALLENGE, HE DIDN'T REALIZE FLAPS WERE STILL AT THE TKOF POS. AFTER ACCELERATING AT 10000 FT MSL, I FELT THE BUFFETING, WHICH WAS SIMILAR TO LIGHT CHOP, AND CHKED THE FLAP GAUGE. AIRSPD AT THIS POINT WAS 270 KIAS, A 40 KT FLAP OVERSPD. AFTER SLOWING TO 225 KIAS, I CALLED FOR FLAPS UP, AND THEN PROCEEDED TO CALL COMPANY MAINT FOR FURTHER GUIDANCE. IN RETROSPECT, IT'S VERY HARD TO BELIEVE I ALLOWED THIS MAJOR OVERSIGHT. I CANNOT THINK OF A GREAT REMINDER TO PREVENT ITS OCCURRENCE IN THE FUTURE, OTHER THAN USING 800 FT RADAR ALT, AS I ALWAYS HAVE IN THE PAST. I SIMPLY HOPE THIS IS A ONE-TIME OCCURRENCE THAT WILL NEVER HAPPEN AGAIN. I ALSO DISCUSSED WITH MY FO MY TECHNIQUE IN RUNNING THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WHICH IS TO CHK THE GAUGE (FLAPS) AND THEN LOOK UP TO CHK THE LEADING EDGE DEVICES ANNUNCIATOR PANEL (A SERIES OF GREEN AND YELLOW LIGHTS AND SLATS). HE WAS QUITE CONFIDENT HE CHKED THE GAUGE, BUT FEELS HE MUST HAVE 'LOOKED RIGHT THROUGH IT.' I TOLD HIM THAT INCORPORATING THE LED ANNUNCIATOR PANEL IS MY PERSONAL BACKUP THAT THE FLAPS ARE INDEED UP. THIS HAS TO BE A PNF DUTY, DUE TO THE POS OF THE ANNUNCIATOR PANEL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

An air carrier flight crew flying a B737 from sfo failed to raise the flaps per their company SOP and aircraft flight manual resulting in a flap overspd.