Narrative:

An inadvertent propeller strike while I was conducting a multi-engine training flight. The student, training for a multi-engine land rating, and I were practicing engine failure emergency procedures and single engine approachs at a local non tower airport. My normal procedure for flying and instructing in these types of sits is to do a complete 'before landing checklist' procedure abeam the touchdown point. The reason for this is I want the student to put the landing gear in the down position at the normal point in the approach, regardless of whether it is a 1 engine out emergency or a normal 2 engine approach. This is what I had instructed the student to do during ground instruction and during prior flight instruction. On this particular circuit, the student had hesitated during his engine failure checklist and was having trouble maintaining his altitude and airspeed. He was overloading himself and becoming frustrated. Because of this, he forgot to do his checklist procedures (before landing), and he forgot to put his landing gear down abeam the landing point. This is a normal occurrence in new multi-engine students and had occurred on prior flts with this student. Until this point I had prompted the student to go through his before landing checklist at the normal time -- before or abeam the landing point. The normal reply to my prompting is usually along the lines of 'I was just getting ready to' or 'I was waiting until I was lined up on final.' the problem with these replies are: 1) I don't know for sure if they were actually 'just getting ready to,' or had forgotten the checklist, and 2) if they were waiting until final to do the checklist, I want them to understand why that is not a good idea. In this particular pattern, the student forgot to put the landing gear down. I decided to let him continue. As we turned final, the student overshot slightly and was having difficulties with overctling and airspeed stabilization. The student had been having difficulties with this before, and I began coaching him on stabilizing his control and airspeed. By the time we crossed the threshold the airplane was stabilized and the student began a very high flare. The airspeed began to decrease and at this time I took control of the aircraft and began to initiate the go around. The airplane began to sink as I added full power. A thud was heard and the airplane began a normal climb out. I flew a normal pattern and landed without further incident. Upon engine shutdown it was apparent that a dual propeller strike had taken place. I believe the contributing factors which led to this situation were: 1) the high flare, 2) the high density altitude which resulted in a delayed response of engine power, and finally and most importantly, 3) my failure to initiate the go around in a timely manner. I believe that if I had initiated the go around a little sooner, this situation would have been avoidable. I also should have anticipated the student's high flare and reacted to it sooner. Finally, the density altitude should have been better taken into account and further moved my positive control and go around. The student learned a valuable lesson, as did I. What I have learned from this, and my advice to other instructors, is to not allow a simulated emergency to turn into a real one. Stay ahead of the airplane. Try to anticipate the student's actions, and always leave yourself an out.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PROPS DAMAGED DURING TRAINING WHEN TOUCH-AND-GO WAS MADE WITH LNDG GEAR UP.

Narrative: AN INADVERTENT PROP STRIKE WHILE I WAS CONDUCTING A MULTI-ENG TRAINING FLT. THE STUDENT, TRAINING FOR A MULTI-ENG LAND RATING, AND I WERE PRACTICING ENG FAILURE EMER PROCS AND SINGLE ENG APCHS AT A LCL NON TWR ARPT. MY NORMAL PROC FOR FLYING AND INSTRUCTING IN THESE TYPES OF SITS IS TO DO A COMPLETE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST' PROC ABEAM THE TOUCHDOWN POINT. THE REASON FOR THIS IS I WANT THE STUDENT TO PUT THE LNDG GEAR IN THE DOWN POS AT THE NORMAL POINT IN THE APCH, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT IS A 1 ENG OUT EMER OR A NORMAL 2 ENG APCH. THIS IS WHAT I HAD INSTRUCTED THE STUDENT TO DO DURING GND INSTRUCTION AND DURING PRIOR FLT INSTRUCTION. ON THIS PARTICULAR CIRCUIT, THE STUDENT HAD HESITATED DURING HIS ENG FAILURE CHKLIST AND WAS HAVING TROUBLE MAINTAINING HIS ALT AND AIRSPD. HE WAS OVERLOADING HIMSELF AND BECOMING FRUSTRATED. BECAUSE OF THIS, HE FORGOT TO DO HIS CHKLIST PROCS (BEFORE LNDG), AND HE FORGOT TO PUT HIS LNDG GEAR DOWN ABEAM THE LNDG POINT. THIS IS A NORMAL OCCURRENCE IN NEW MULTI-ENG STUDENTS AND HAD OCCURRED ON PRIOR FLTS WITH THIS STUDENT. UNTIL THIS POINT I HAD PROMPTED THE STUDENT TO GO THROUGH HIS BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST AT THE NORMAL TIME -- BEFORE OR ABEAM THE LNDG POINT. THE NORMAL REPLY TO MY PROMPTING IS USUALLY ALONG THE LINES OF 'I WAS JUST GETTING READY TO' OR 'I WAS WAITING UNTIL I WAS LINED UP ON FINAL.' THE PROB WITH THESE REPLIES ARE: 1) I DON'T KNOW FOR SURE IF THEY WERE ACTUALLY 'JUST GETTING READY TO,' OR HAD FORGOTTEN THE CHKLIST, AND 2) IF THEY WERE WAITING UNTIL FINAL TO DO THE CHKLIST, I WANT THEM TO UNDERSTAND WHY THAT IS NOT A GOOD IDEA. IN THIS PARTICULAR PATTERN, THE STUDENT FORGOT TO PUT THE LNDG GEAR DOWN. I DECIDED TO LET HIM CONTINUE. AS WE TURNED FINAL, THE STUDENT OVERSHOT SLIGHTLY AND WAS HAVING DIFFICULTIES WITH OVERCTLING AND AIRSPD STABILIZATION. THE STUDENT HAD BEEN HAVING DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS BEFORE, AND I BEGAN COACHING HIM ON STABILIZING HIS CTL AND AIRSPD. BY THE TIME WE CROSSED THE THRESHOLD THE AIRPLANE WAS STABILIZED AND THE STUDENT BEGAN A VERY HIGH FLARE. THE AIRSPD BEGAN TO DECREASE AND AT THIS TIME I TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT AND BEGAN TO INITIATE THE GAR. THE AIRPLANE BEGAN TO SINK AS I ADDED FULL PWR. A THUD WAS HEARD AND THE AIRPLANE BEGAN A NORMAL CLBOUT. I FLEW A NORMAL PATTERN AND LANDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. UPON ENG SHUTDOWN IT WAS APPARENT THAT A DUAL PROP STRIKE HAD TAKEN PLACE. I BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WHICH LED TO THIS SIT WERE: 1) THE HIGH FLARE, 2) THE HIGH DENSITY ALT WHICH RESULTED IN A DELAYED RESPONSE OF ENG PWR, AND FINALLY AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, 3) MY FAILURE TO INITIATE THE GAR IN A TIMELY MANNER. I BELIEVE THAT IF I HAD INITIATED THE GAR A LITTLE SOONER, THIS SIT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDABLE. I ALSO SHOULD HAVE ANTICIPATED THE STUDENT'S HIGH FLARE AND REACTED TO IT SOONER. FINALLY, THE DENSITY ALT SHOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AND FURTHER MOVED MY POSITIVE CTL AND GAR. THE STUDENT LEARNED A VALUABLE LESSON, AS DID I. WHAT I HAVE LEARNED FROM THIS, AND MY ADVICE TO OTHER INSTRUCTORS, IS TO NOT ALLOW A SIMULATED EMER TO TURN INTO A REAL ONE. STAY AHEAD OF THE AIRPLANE. TRY TO ANTICIPATE THE STUDENT'S ACTIONS, AND ALWAYS LEAVE YOURSELF AN OUT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.