Narrative:

I was working the west departure radar position with mke TRACON operating in the runway 25L confign. Special procedures were in effect. 4 of 5 radar scopes were in operation, traffic overall was moderately busy. I was working at least 11 aircraft at the time of the incident and considered myself extremely busy with complex traffic. During this time, departure traffic that would normally depart our northwest departure corridor is rerted to our northeast departure corridor at different altitudes. Aircraft #1 was being vectored by me on a northerly heading and the routing indicated that he was to depart the northwest departure corridor. The requested altitude on the strip was 7000 ft but I missed it and climbed him to 10000 ft, his normal altitude when departing in that corridor. The ARTCC took the automated handoff on aircraft #1 and as he approached the airspace boundary, I turned him to a 340 degree heading and was about to have him contact the ARTCC when I observed aircraft #2 directly north of aircraft #1, sbound, descending out of 10500 ft. I immediately issued an immediate left turn to aircraft #1 to 260 degrees and shortly after that I also issued an immediate climb to 12000 ft. Aircraft #1 said he had aircraft #2 in sight, but the radar track showed that the 2 aircraft had lost minimum separation standards. Contributing factors, if not the major problem overall, are that every yr for 1 week, during which our traffic is at its peak, we are forced to use different procedures, when in fact we should be using our standard procedures that are ingrained in us the other 51 weeks of the yr. Aircraft #1 was exactly where he should have been the other 358 days of the yr. The flight progress strip was not amended properly at the flight data position to indicate the proper departure track and ground control and local control did not catch the error either. The ARTCC, osh sector accepted the handoff with the aircraft #1 in the wrong departure corridor at 10000 ft instead of 7000 ft. The ARTCC fah sector vectored aircraft #2 on a heading that intruded on my departure corridor instead of being direct to bjb VOR. During this incident the conflict alert did not activate and the pilot of aircraft #1 later told us that his TCASII RA was telling him to descend but he chose to follow my instructions instead. I based my instructions on what I knew aircraft #2 was going to do, again a reflex action based on standard procedures. I feel that if we continue to use different procedures during 1 week of the yr, steps must be taken to assure that control position that are inundated with traffic are given the proper tools and help to work the position safely!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RPTR CLBED ACFT X TO AN ALT THAT WAS NOT REQUESTED. LOST SEPARATION WITH ACFT Y THAT WAS DSNDING TO SAME ALT.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE W DEP RADAR POS WITH MKE TRACON OPERATING IN THE RWY 25L CONFIGN. SPECIAL PROCS WERE IN EFFECT. 4 OF 5 RADAR SCOPES WERE IN OP, TFC OVERALL WAS MODERATELY BUSY. I WAS WORKING AT LEAST 11 ACFT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT AND CONSIDERED MYSELF EXTREMELY BUSY WITH COMPLEX TFC. DURING THIS TIME, DEP TFC THAT WOULD NORMALLY DEPART OUR NW DEP CORRIDOR IS RERTED TO OUR NE DEP CORRIDOR AT DIFFERENT ALTS. ACFT #1 WAS BEING VECTORED BY ME ON A NORTHERLY HDG AND THE ROUTING INDICATED THAT HE WAS TO DEPART THE NW DEP CORRIDOR. THE REQUESTED ALT ON THE STRIP WAS 7000 FT BUT I MISSED IT AND CLBED HIM TO 10000 FT, HIS NORMAL ALT WHEN DEPARTING IN THAT CORRIDOR. THE ARTCC TOOK THE AUTOMATED HDOF ON ACFT #1 AND AS HE APCHED THE AIRSPACE BOUNDARY, I TURNED HIM TO A 340 DEG HDG AND WAS ABOUT TO HAVE HIM CONTACT THE ARTCC WHEN I OBSERVED ACFT #2 DIRECTLY N OF ACFT #1, SBOUND, DSNDING OUT OF 10500 FT. I IMMEDIATELY ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE L TURN TO ACFT #1 TO 260 DEGS AND SHORTLY AFTER THAT I ALSO ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE CLB TO 12000 FT. ACFT #1 SAID HE HAD ACFT #2 IN SIGHT, BUT THE RADAR TRACK SHOWED THAT THE 2 ACFT HAD LOST MINIMUM SEPARATION STANDARDS. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS, IF NOT THE MAJOR PROB OVERALL, ARE THAT EVERY YR FOR 1 WK, DURING WHICH OUR TFC IS AT ITS PEAK, WE ARE FORCED TO USE DIFFERENT PROCS, WHEN IN FACT WE SHOULD BE USING OUR STANDARD PROCS THAT ARE INGRAINED IN US THE OTHER 51 WKS OF THE YR. ACFT #1 WAS EXACTLY WHERE HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE OTHER 358 DAYS OF THE YR. THE FLT PROGRESS STRIP WAS NOT AMENDED PROPERLY AT THE FLT DATA POS TO INDICATE THE PROPER DEP TRACK AND GND CTL AND LCL CTL DID NOT CATCH THE ERROR EITHER. THE ARTCC, OSH SECTOR ACCEPTED THE HDOF WITH THE ACFT #1 IN THE WRONG DEP CORRIDOR AT 10000 FT INSTEAD OF 7000 FT. THE ARTCC FAH SECTOR VECTORED ACFT #2 ON A HDG THAT INTRUDED ON MY DEP CORRIDOR INSTEAD OF BEING DIRECT TO BJB VOR. DURING THIS INCIDENT THE CONFLICT ALERT DID NOT ACTIVATE AND THE PLT OF ACFT #1 LATER TOLD US THAT HIS TCASII RA WAS TELLING HIM TO DSND BUT HE CHOSE TO FOLLOW MY INSTRUCTIONS INSTEAD. I BASED MY INSTRUCTIONS ON WHAT I KNEW ACFT #2 WAS GOING TO DO, AGAIN A REFLEX ACTION BASED ON STANDARD PROCS. I FEEL THAT IF WE CONTINUE TO USE DIFFERENT PROCS DURING 1 WK OF THE YR, STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO ASSURE THAT CTL POS THAT ARE INUNDATED WITH TFC ARE GIVEN THE PROPER TOOLS AND HELP TO WORK THE POS SAFELY!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.