Narrative:

The decision was made to make the approach at the destination. An approach was commenced with a radar vector to the OM. At what I thought was the position of the marker, I got no marker signal and upon checking the GPS, found I was too far inside to commence an approach. I then realized that the GS had not become active either. I declared a missed approach and went around for another try. As I was being vectored for a second approach, I tested the marker and it tested as working properly. I now was wondering what was going on with the GS. As I was turned on final for the approach, I still did not see the GS come active and didn't advise the controller. I idented the marker in 3 ways. The approach controller gave me distance, both the GPS and DME were counting down properly and at that time, I decided to do a localizer only approach. This approach also resulted in a missed approach due to no ground or runway contact at minimums. Then I ran into an unexpected problem. I wasn't paying too much attention to the engine instruments since they were only a casual part of my scan. However, I noticed that the oil temperature was now rising far above normal. This became a major factor in my decision since I now had to get the airplane on the ground. I felt that if I didn't, and the oil temperature went beyond redline with the outside temperatures being so hot this summer as well as on this particular day, I would have a real emergency with a failed engine on my hands in IFR conditions. So I was again vectored for another approach and made the decision that I had an emergency on my hands and would have to do whatever was necessary to complete the flight without any further interruptions. I intercepted the localizer and hand flew the approach to full ILS minimums, broke out and found I was offset from the centerline of the runway too far to make a safe landing. I requested and received a circling approach to another runway, which I saw I could not make and then settled myself down and made shallow turns to line myself back up on the primary runway and landed safely. On touchdown, the oil temperature had exceeded the safe operating range, but thankfully not the manufacturer's redline. Mistakes made and lessons learned: 1) I should not have made the second approach after I found out that the marker wasn't working. Diverting to the alternate should have been the choice to make. I was, however, concerned that the alternate may have dropped down so that I would be faced with the same conditions after arriving there having used up 45 mins more of fuel. That would have still left me with legal reserves, but reserves below my comfort level given the low IFR conditions in the area. I also could have returned to VFR conditions at my departure airport but dismissed that due to a building line of thunderstorms I had just come through. 2) I should have let approach control know that I wasn't getting the marker on the first approach nor the GS on the second approach. I also should have declared an emergency after I missed the second approach. I didn't do it because it would have frightened my wife who was in the right seat. I didn't want another problem to deal with as I was too busy trying to fly the airplane and get it on the ground. 3) I hand flew the airplane on all the approachs and didn't even think to get help from the autoplt. If I had turned it on in approach mode, it would have helped me fly the ILS more accurately. 4) I have made arrangements to check out all the avionics, instruments and associated system and am considering upgrading to a second ILS receiver so I will have a backup. 5) in retrospect, I went through what I never thought I would ever experience. First it was denial. This is not happening to me. Then it was hope. I hoped that the marker and GS would get back to work. Finally, I just shut down all other thinking to fly the airplane and land safely. 6) I'm not happy with myself at all over this event. I'll never do that again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF SMA LANDS IN EMER CONDITIONS AFTER SEVERAL UNSUCCESSFUL APCHS AT VAD.

Narrative: THE DECISION WAS MADE TO MAKE THE APCH AT THE DEST. AN APCH WAS COMMENCED WITH A RADAR VECTOR TO THE OM. AT WHAT I THOUGHT WAS THE POS OF THE MARKER, I GOT NO MARKER SIGNAL AND UPON CHKING THE GPS, FOUND I WAS TOO FAR INSIDE TO COMMENCE AN APCH. I THEN REALIZED THAT THE GS HAD NOT BECOME ACTIVE EITHER. I DECLARED A MISSED APCH AND WENT AROUND FOR ANOTHER TRY. AS I WAS BEING VECTORED FOR A SECOND APCH, I TESTED THE MARKER AND IT TESTED AS WORKING PROPERLY. I NOW WAS WONDERING WHAT WAS GOING ON WITH THE GS. AS I WAS TURNED ON FINAL FOR THE APCH, I STILL DID NOT SEE THE GS COME ACTIVE AND DIDN'T ADVISE THE CTLR. I IDENTED THE MARKER IN 3 WAYS. THE APCH CTLR GAVE ME DISTANCE, BOTH THE GPS AND DME WERE COUNTING DOWN PROPERLY AND AT THAT TIME, I DECIDED TO DO A LOC ONLY APCH. THIS APCH ALSO RESULTED IN A MISSED APCH DUE TO NO GND OR RWY CONTACT AT MINIMUMS. THEN I RAN INTO AN UNEXPECTED PROB. I WASN'T PAYING TOO MUCH ATTN TO THE ENG INSTS SINCE THEY WERE ONLY A CASUAL PART OF MY SCAN. HOWEVER, I NOTICED THAT THE OIL TEMP WAS NOW RISING FAR ABOVE NORMAL. THIS BECAME A MAJOR FACTOR IN MY DECISION SINCE I NOW HAD TO GET THE AIRPLANE ON THE GND. I FELT THAT IF I DIDN'T, AND THE OIL TEMP WENT BEYOND REDLINE WITH THE OUTSIDE TEMPS BEING SO HOT THIS SUMMER AS WELL AS ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY, I WOULD HAVE A REAL EMER WITH A FAILED ENG ON MY HANDS IN IFR CONDITIONS. SO I WAS AGAIN VECTORED FOR ANOTHER APCH AND MADE THE DECISION THAT I HAD AN EMER ON MY HANDS AND WOULD HAVE TO DO WHATEVER WAS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THE FLT WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INTERRUPTIONS. I INTERCEPTED THE LOC AND HAND FLEW THE APCH TO FULL ILS MINIMUMS, BROKE OUT AND FOUND I WAS OFFSET FROM THE CTRLINE OF THE RWY TOO FAR TO MAKE A SAFE LNDG. I REQUESTED AND RECEIVED A CIRCLING APCH TO ANOTHER RWY, WHICH I SAW I COULD NOT MAKE AND THEN SETTLED MYSELF DOWN AND MADE SHALLOW TURNS TO LINE MYSELF BACK UP ON THE PRIMARY RWY AND LANDED SAFELY. ON TOUCHDOWN, THE OIL TEMP HAD EXCEEDED THE SAFE OPERATING RANGE, BUT THANKFULLY NOT THE MANUFACTURER'S REDLINE. MISTAKES MADE AND LESSONS LEARNED: 1) I SHOULD NOT HAVE MADE THE SECOND APCH AFTER I FOUND OUT THAT THE MARKER WASN'T WORKING. DIVERTING TO THE ALTERNATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE CHOICE TO MAKE. I WAS, HOWEVER, CONCERNED THAT THE ALTERNATE MAY HAVE DROPPED DOWN SO THAT I WOULD BE FACED WITH THE SAME CONDITIONS AFTER ARRIVING THERE HAVING USED UP 45 MINS MORE OF FUEL. THAT WOULD HAVE STILL LEFT ME WITH LEGAL RESERVES, BUT RESERVES BELOW MY COMFORT LEVEL GIVEN THE LOW IFR CONDITIONS IN THE AREA. I ALSO COULD HAVE RETURNED TO VFR CONDITIONS AT MY DEP ARPT BUT DISMISSED THAT DUE TO A BUILDING LINE OF TSTMS I HAD JUST COME THROUGH. 2) I SHOULD HAVE LET APCH CTL KNOW THAT I WASN'T GETTING THE MARKER ON THE FIRST APCH NOR THE GS ON THE SECOND APCH. I ALSO SHOULD HAVE DECLARED AN EMER AFTER I MISSED THE SECOND APCH. I DIDN'T DO IT BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE FRIGHTENED MY WIFE WHO WAS IN THE R SEAT. I DIDN'T WANT ANOTHER PROB TO DEAL WITH AS I WAS TOO BUSY TRYING TO FLY THE AIRPLANE AND GET IT ON THE GND. 3) I HAND FLEW THE AIRPLANE ON ALL THE APCHS AND DIDN'T EVEN THINK TO GET HELP FROM THE AUTOPLT. IF I HAD TURNED IT ON IN APCH MODE, IT WOULD HAVE HELPED ME FLY THE ILS MORE ACCURATELY. 4) I HAVE MADE ARRANGEMENTS TO CHK OUT ALL THE AVIONICS, INSTS AND ASSOCIATED SYS AND AM CONSIDERING UPGRADING TO A SECOND ILS RECEIVER SO I WILL HAVE A BACKUP. 5) IN RETROSPECT, I WENT THROUGH WHAT I NEVER THOUGHT I WOULD EVER EXPERIENCE. FIRST IT WAS DENIAL. THIS IS NOT HAPPENING TO ME. THEN IT WAS HOPE. I HOPED THAT THE MARKER AND GS WOULD GET BACK TO WORK. FINALLY, I JUST SHUT DOWN ALL OTHER THINKING TO FLY THE AIRPLANE AND LAND SAFELY. 6) I'M NOT HAPPY WITH MYSELF AT ALL OVER THIS EVENT. I'LL NEVER DO THAT AGAIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.