Narrative:

On aug/xa/99 at approximately XA50, oma airport, acting as PIC of a BE20, I began my taxi from the FBO on the field. Ground control had issued me a taxi clearance to runway 36. The instructions were to taxi via taxiway C to runway 36, hold short of runway 32R. Approaching runway 32R, I was cleared to cross runway 32R, continue taxiing but to hold short of runway 36. Continuing west on taxiway C, approaching runway 32L, which was closed for construction, I realized I had misinterpreted the runway signs and was approaching runways 32L and 36 at the same time. I immediately brought my aircraft to a stop, short of runways 32L and 36. At that moment, the ground controller advised I had violated the critical area for runway 36, the active runway. As a result of my aircraft's position on the taxiway, a DC9's takeoff clearance had to be canceled. It was daytime VFR and I apparently felt comfortable taxiing to runway 36 without referring to the airport diagram on my chart. It turns out that while taxiing west on taxiway C and after crossing runway 32R, the 2 runways (32L and 36) intersect each other exactly at taxiway C. I remember seeing the runway 32L/14R runway sign but not the runway 36 sign. I'm certain it is there -- I just did not see it. This convergence of the 2 runways and the taxiway C became very clear to me after I referred to the airport diagram on the back of my chart. I have given this incident a great deal of thought since it happened, trying to figure out how and why it happened. There is no question this incident is a result of me failing to refer to the airport diagram of an airport I was unfamiliar with. The mistake is unquestionably mine and I recognize this. However, I cannot help but wonder had my taxi instructions included 'cleared to cross runway 32R, hold short of runways 32L and 36 at taxiway C,' this incident would never have happened. In my 26 yrs and over 11000 hours of flying I have never been a part of an aircraft incident. Being involved in this incident a rather humbling lesson has been learned.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE20 INVADES RWY CRITICAL AREA CAUSING ACR ACFT TKOF CLRNC TO BE CANCELED AT OMA.

Narrative: ON AUG/XA/99 AT APPROX XA50, OMA ARPT, ACTING AS PIC OF A BE20, I BEGAN MY TAXI FROM THE FBO ON THE FIELD. GND CTL HAD ISSUED ME A TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 36. THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO TAXI VIA TXWY C TO RWY 36, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 32R. APCHING RWY 32R, I WAS CLRED TO CROSS RWY 32R, CONTINUE TAXIING BUT TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 36. CONTINUING W ON TXWY C, APCHING RWY 32L, WHICH WAS CLOSED FOR CONSTRUCTION, I REALIZED I HAD MISINTERPRETED THE RWY SIGNS AND WAS APCHING RWYS 32L AND 36 AT THE SAME TIME. I IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT MY ACFT TO A STOP, SHORT OF RWYS 32L AND 36. AT THAT MOMENT, THE GND CTLR ADVISED I HAD VIOLATED THE CRITICAL AREA FOR RWY 36, THE ACTIVE RWY. AS A RESULT OF MY ACFT'S POS ON THE TXWY, A DC9'S TKOF CLRNC HAD TO BE CANCELED. IT WAS DAYTIME VFR AND I APPARENTLY FELT COMFORTABLE TAXIING TO RWY 36 WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE ARPT DIAGRAM ON MY CHART. IT TURNS OUT THAT WHILE TAXIING W ON TXWY C AND AFTER XING RWY 32R, THE 2 RWYS (32L AND 36) INTERSECT EACH OTHER EXACTLY AT TXWY C. I REMEMBER SEEING THE RWY 32L/14R RWY SIGN BUT NOT THE RWY 36 SIGN. I'M CERTAIN IT IS THERE -- I JUST DID NOT SEE IT. THIS CONVERGENCE OF THE 2 RWYS AND THE TXWY C BECAME VERY CLR TO ME AFTER I REFERRED TO THE ARPT DIAGRAM ON THE BACK OF MY CHART. I HAVE GIVEN THIS INCIDENT A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT SINCE IT HAPPENED, TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW AND WHY IT HAPPENED. THERE IS NO QUESTION THIS INCIDENT IS A RESULT OF ME FAILING TO REFER TO THE ARPT DIAGRAM OF AN ARPT I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH. THE MISTAKE IS UNQUESTIONABLY MINE AND I RECOGNIZE THIS. HOWEVER, I CANNOT HELP BUT WONDER HAD MY TAXI INSTRUCTIONS INCLUDED 'CLRED TO CROSS RWY 32R, HOLD SHORT OF RWYS 32L AND 36 AT TXWY C,' THIS INCIDENT WOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED. IN MY 26 YRS AND OVER 11000 HRS OF FLYING I HAVE NEVER BEEN A PART OF AN ACFT INCIDENT. BEING INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT A RATHER HUMBLING LESSON HAS BEEN LEARNED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.