Narrative:

During the VOR runway 6 approach into mvy, the crew observed an unsafe gear indication. The nose gear light was not illuminated. First officer flew the aircraft and the captain told the tower we needed to go missed approach and hold to figure out what the problem was. Crew chose to do a 'fly-by' to have the tower take a look to see if the gear was down. Mvy tower advised that the gear was down but at a 70-80 degree angle. Crew executed a missed approach and received delay vectors from cape approach. Captain raised the gear handle and performed the manual gear extension checklist. Both breakers passed, both horns failed, both lights failed (second gear light, bottom, was MEL'ed). The gear was then manually extended by the captain. All 3 gear lights were now on, and the gear unsafe handle light was off. We then began another VOR runway 6 approach into mvy. On final, the tower advised us that the nose gear now appeared to be at a 90 degree angle, and offered to allow us to circle in the traffic pattern while we decided what to do. Mvy tower then closed the airport and advised us the airport was ours, and there would be equipment standing by. While remaining in the pattern, the first officer flew the aircraft and the captain spoke with company on SELCAL and operations frequency. The aircraft was flown at 700 ft MSL +/-100 ft. While circling, tower asked us if we could give them about 5 mins before we landed to give them time to bring in additional crash fire rescue equipment equipment from other places on the island. Tower also advised us that the state police informed them that there was limited hospital facilities on the island. With 9 passenger, we still felt ok landing at mvy. Company asked us to divert to bos and captain asked them why. We didn't get a response and eventually they said it was because of 'facilities' in bos. (Don't know what facilities exactly they were referring to, ie, maintenance, medical.) we then decided to stay at mvy. Company then suggested we burn off fuel and we agreed. Captain determined we needed to burn approximately 1 hour of fuel before landing. During circling we considered fuel burn, hospital facilities, crash fire rescue equipment availability, runway length and terrain immediately adjacent to the runway and overrun. The 2 main factors that influenced my decision to divert to bos and land instead of landing at mvy were that if we were going to burn fuel anyway, we might as well go back to boston where there is a larger runway and more capacity at the hospitals. En route to bos, we briefed the approach and rebriefed the evacuate/evacuation procedures and engine shutdown procedures. Bos approach gave us delay box vectors approximately 15 mi south of bos airport. When the fuel on board reached approximately 300 pounds, we began the ILS runway 4R sidestep runway 4L approach. Controls were xferred from the first officer the captain during the base leg vector. We decided to land flaps 35 degrees, and hold the nose off as long as possible. (It was mentioned from the company chief pilot on SELCAL that a captain in rdg once told/advised him to land with reduced flaps and a higher speed, and try to skip the nose gear on the runway to straighten out the nose gear.) we chose not to do that. We were switched to a separate tower frequency of our own with ATC, crash fire rescue equipment, and us. We broke out at approximately 1500 ft MSL, sidestepped to runway 4L and touched down at reference -10 KTS. (Aircraft at approximately 13000 pounds.) the captain held the nosewheel off the runway and allowed it to touch down at about 40 KIAS. When the nose touched down, the nose of the aircraft initially jerked to the right no more than approximately 1 foot. The captain then lifted the nose and allowed it to touch down a second time when it seemed to skip once and then straighten out. Captain allowed the aircraft to roll with minimal braking to stop the aircraft at taxiway N1. During the rollout, the passenger applauded. Captain stated he used full left rudder and differential braking to maintain directional control. After bringing the aircraft to a stop, the captain secured the engines using memory items and the first officer advised tower we were evacing the aircraft on the runway. We chose not to taxi the aircraft off the runway because we didn't know the condition of the gear. We were concerned that if the gear collapsed while taxiing, the propeller blades would strike the ground, shatter and come through the fuselage. The captain left the cockpit first and opened the door while the first officer finished talking to tower and retrieved the fire extinguisher from under his seat. The captain and first officer exited the aircraft and the fire chief asked me how many people were on board. I told him there were 9. I put down the fire extinguisher near the nose of the aircraft and re-entered the aircraft to instruct the passenger to exit and follow the fire chief's instructions. I also apologized to the passenger for the inconvenience and made the comment that 'I couldn't imagine what they went through back there.' the passenger thanked us, and told us we did a great job. The passenger were asked to exit out of the main cabin door and the fire chief met them at the base of the stairs and instructed them to go to his vehicle. Maintenance came and looked at the nose gear and told us it was ok to tow the aircraft. The passenger bags were unloaded from the coat closet and cargo compartment and put in a van. An electric tug was brought from the ramp and aircraft was towed back to gate with the captain and first officer on board. During that time the cockpit voice recorder circuit breaker was pulled to preserve the data.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE02 CREW HAD NOSE GEAR FAIL TO EXTEND. NOSEWHEEL WAS ALSO COCKED.

Narrative: DURING THE VOR RWY 6 APCH INTO MVY, THE CREW OBSERVED AN UNSAFE GEAR INDICATION. THE NOSE GEAR LIGHT WAS NOT ILLUMINATED. FO FLEW THE ACFT AND THE CAPT TOLD THE TWR WE NEEDED TO GO MISSED APCH AND HOLD TO FIGURE OUT WHAT THE PROB WAS. CREW CHOSE TO DO A 'FLY-BY' TO HAVE THE TWR TAKE A LOOK TO SEE IF THE GEAR WAS DOWN. MVY TWR ADVISED THAT THE GEAR WAS DOWN BUT AT A 70-80 DEG ANGLE. CREW EXECUTED A MISSED APCH AND RECEIVED DELAY VECTORS FROM CAPE APCH. CAPT RAISED THE GEAR HANDLE AND PERFORMED THE MANUAL GEAR EXTENSION CHKLIST. BOTH BREAKERS PASSED, BOTH HORNS FAILED, BOTH LIGHTS FAILED (SECOND GEAR LIGHT, BOTTOM, WAS MEL'ED). THE GEAR WAS THEN MANUALLY EXTENDED BY THE CAPT. ALL 3 GEAR LIGHTS WERE NOW ON, AND THE GEAR UNSAFE HANDLE LIGHT WAS OFF. WE THEN BEGAN ANOTHER VOR RWY 6 APCH INTO MVY. ON FINAL, THE TWR ADVISED US THAT THE NOSE GEAR NOW APPEARED TO BE AT A 90 DEG ANGLE, AND OFFERED TO ALLOW US TO CIRCLE IN THE TFC PATTERN WHILE WE DECIDED WHAT TO DO. MVY TWR THEN CLOSED THE ARPT AND ADVISED US THE ARPT WAS OURS, AND THERE WOULD BE EQUIP STANDING BY. WHILE REMAINING IN THE PATTERN, THE FO FLEW THE ACFT AND THE CAPT SPOKE WITH COMPANY ON SELCAL AND OPS FREQ. THE ACFT WAS FLOWN AT 700 FT MSL +/-100 FT. WHILE CIRCLING, TWR ASKED US IF WE COULD GIVE THEM ABOUT 5 MINS BEFORE WE LANDED TO GIVE THEM TIME TO BRING IN ADDITIONAL CFR EQUIP FROM OTHER PLACES ON THE ISLAND. TWR ALSO ADVISED US THAT THE STATE POLICE INFORMED THEM THAT THERE WAS LIMITED HOSPITAL FACILITIES ON THE ISLAND. WITH 9 PAX, WE STILL FELT OK LNDG AT MVY. COMPANY ASKED US TO DIVERT TO BOS AND CAPT ASKED THEM WHY. WE DIDN'T GET A RESPONSE AND EVENTUALLY THEY SAID IT WAS BECAUSE OF 'FACILITIES' IN BOS. (DON'T KNOW WHAT FACILITIES EXACTLY THEY WERE REFERRING TO, IE, MAINT, MEDICAL.) WE THEN DECIDED TO STAY AT MVY. COMPANY THEN SUGGESTED WE BURN OFF FUEL AND WE AGREED. CAPT DETERMINED WE NEEDED TO BURN APPROX 1 HR OF FUEL BEFORE LNDG. DURING CIRCLING WE CONSIDERED FUEL BURN, HOSPITAL FACILITIES, CFR AVAILABILITY, RWY LENGTH AND TERRAIN IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE RWY AND OVERRUN. THE 2 MAIN FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED MY DECISION TO DIVERT TO BOS AND LAND INSTEAD OF LNDG AT MVY WERE THAT IF WE WERE GOING TO BURN FUEL ANYWAY, WE MIGHT AS WELL GO BACK TO BOSTON WHERE THERE IS A LARGER RWY AND MORE CAPACITY AT THE HOSPITALS. ENRTE TO BOS, WE BRIEFED THE APCH AND REBRIEFED THE EVAC PROCS AND ENG SHUTDOWN PROCS. BOS APCH GAVE US DELAY BOX VECTORS APPROX 15 MI S OF BOS ARPT. WHEN THE FUEL ON BOARD REACHED APPROX 300 LBS, WE BEGAN THE ILS RWY 4R SIDESTEP RWY 4L APCH. CTLS WERE XFERRED FROM THE FO THE CAPT DURING THE BASE LEG VECTOR. WE DECIDED TO LAND FLAPS 35 DEGS, AND HOLD THE NOSE OFF AS LONG AS POSSIBLE. (IT WAS MENTIONED FROM THE COMPANY CHIEF PLT ON SELCAL THAT A CAPT IN RDG ONCE TOLD/ADVISED HIM TO LAND WITH REDUCED FLAPS AND A HIGHER SPD, AND TRY TO SKIP THE NOSE GEAR ON THE RWY TO STRAIGHTEN OUT THE NOSE GEAR.) WE CHOSE NOT TO DO THAT. WE WERE SWITCHED TO A SEPARATE TWR FREQ OF OUR OWN WITH ATC, CFR, AND US. WE BROKE OUT AT APPROX 1500 FT MSL, SIDESTEPPED TO RWY 4L AND TOUCHED DOWN AT REF -10 KTS. (ACFT AT APPROX 13000 LBS.) THE CAPT HELD THE NOSEWHEEL OFF THE RWY AND ALLOWED IT TO TOUCH DOWN AT ABOUT 40 KIAS. WHEN THE NOSE TOUCHED DOWN, THE NOSE OF THE ACFT INITIALLY JERKED TO THE R NO MORE THAN APPROX 1 FOOT. THE CAPT THEN LIFTED THE NOSE AND ALLOWED IT TO TOUCH DOWN A SECOND TIME WHEN IT SEEMED TO SKIP ONCE AND THEN STRAIGHTEN OUT. CAPT ALLOWED THE ACFT TO ROLL WITH MINIMAL BRAKING TO STOP THE ACFT AT TXWY N1. DURING THE ROLLOUT, THE PAX APPLAUDED. CAPT STATED HE USED FULL L RUDDER AND DIFFERENTIAL BRAKING TO MAINTAIN DIRECTIONAL CTL. AFTER BRINGING THE ACFT TO A STOP, THE CAPT SECURED THE ENGS USING MEMORY ITEMS AND THE FO ADVISED TWR WE WERE EVACING THE ACFT ON THE RWY. WE CHOSE NOT TO TAXI THE ACFT OFF THE RWY BECAUSE WE DIDN'T KNOW THE CONDITION OF THE GEAR. WE WERE CONCERNED THAT IF THE GEAR COLLAPSED WHILE TAXIING, THE PROP BLADES WOULD STRIKE THE GND, SHATTER AND COME THROUGH THE FUSELAGE. THE CAPT LEFT THE COCKPIT FIRST AND OPENED THE DOOR WHILE THE FO FINISHED TALKING TO TWR AND RETRIEVED THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER FROM UNDER HIS SEAT. THE CAPT AND FO EXITED THE ACFT AND THE FIRE CHIEF ASKED ME HOW MANY PEOPLE WERE ON BOARD. I TOLD HIM THERE WERE 9. I PUT DOWN THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER NEAR THE NOSE OF THE ACFT AND RE-ENTERED THE ACFT TO INSTRUCT THE PAX TO EXIT AND FOLLOW THE FIRE CHIEF'S INSTRUCTIONS. I ALSO APOLOGIZED TO THE PAX FOR THE INCONVENIENCE AND MADE THE COMMENT THAT 'I COULDN'T IMAGINE WHAT THEY WENT THROUGH BACK THERE.' THE PAX THANKED US, AND TOLD US WE DID A GREAT JOB. THE PAX WERE ASKED TO EXIT OUT OF THE MAIN CABIN DOOR AND THE FIRE CHIEF MET THEM AT THE BASE OF THE STAIRS AND INSTRUCTED THEM TO GO TO HIS VEHICLE. MAINT CAME AND LOOKED AT THE NOSE GEAR AND TOLD US IT WAS OK TO TOW THE ACFT. THE PAX BAGS WERE UNLOADED FROM THE COAT CLOSET AND CARGO COMPARTMENT AND PUT IN A VAN. AN ELECTRIC TUG WAS BROUGHT FROM THE RAMP AND ACFT WAS TOWED BACK TO GATE WITH THE CAPT AND FO ON BOARD. DURING THAT TIME THE COCKPIT VOICE RECORDER CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS PULLED TO PRESERVE THE DATA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.