Narrative:

I was captain and PF on a scheduled air carrier flight from cleveland, oh, to baltimore, md. Approach vectored us to an ILS/visual to runway 10. Approach then informed us that runway 10 was going to be closed, and then vectored us to ILS runway 15R and informed us that a baron would be parallel traffic to runway 15L. I also heard other traffic being vectored to runway 4. As I was touching down and rolling out, tower informed us to make our turnoff at taxiway east (the last turnoff prior to runway 4 intersection), or to expedite through runway 4, but not to turn off onto runway 4. Then it occurred to me 'this was a lahso' and I had serious reason to believe that we might hit the other aircraft (a GA type). I applied heavy braking (which disengaged the autobrakes, that I had selected to #2, out of 1, 2, 3, or maximum). I made the turnoff at taxiway east. I taxied in and after parking at the gate, I asked ground control for the telephone number to the tower and I called from the jetway. I did not speak to the actual controller. I told the tower person what had transpired and I didn't like it. Mainly because 1) this was a lahso and I wasn't told. 2) I was flying a B737-700 which was just getting lahso approval. 3) I did not have the missed approach instructions for the runway 15R with lahso for runway 4. 4) I did not know if I had the company required minimum distance for lahso (6100 ft). 5) if I had been told that this was a lahso I would have denied it! In my opinion, lahso is used for increasing operations only and is a lose/lose situation for the pilot. I consider this a serious error and I have no recourse. Also 6) the B737-700 is heavier than the B737-300 (even though seating capacity is the same) and rollouts are longer.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737. AFTER LNDG, A CREW IS TOLD TO EXIT RWY AT A TXWY ONLY 4000 FT AHEAD, OR EXPEDITE ACROSS RWY 4.

Narrative: I WAS CAPT AND PF ON A SCHEDULED ACR FLT FROM CLEVELAND, OH, TO BALTIMORE, MD. APCH VECTORED US TO AN ILS/VISUAL TO RWY 10. APCH THEN INFORMED US THAT RWY 10 WAS GOING TO BE CLOSED, AND THEN VECTORED US TO ILS RWY 15R AND INFORMED US THAT A BARON WOULD BE PARALLEL TFC TO RWY 15L. I ALSO HEARD OTHER TFC BEING VECTORED TO RWY 4. AS I WAS TOUCHING DOWN AND ROLLING OUT, TWR INFORMED US TO MAKE OUR TURNOFF AT TXWY E (THE LAST TURNOFF PRIOR TO RWY 4 INTXN), OR TO EXPEDITE THROUGH RWY 4, BUT NOT TO TURN OFF ONTO RWY 4. THEN IT OCCURRED TO ME 'THIS WAS A LAHSO' AND I HAD SERIOUS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT WE MIGHT HIT THE OTHER ACFT (A GA TYPE). I APPLIED HVY BRAKING (WHICH DISENGAGED THE AUTOBRAKES, THAT I HAD SELECTED TO #2, OUT OF 1, 2, 3, OR MAX). I MADE THE TURNOFF AT TXWY E. I TAXIED IN AND AFTER PARKING AT THE GATE, I ASKED GND CTL FOR THE TELEPHONE NUMBER TO THE TWR AND I CALLED FROM THE JETWAY. I DID NOT SPEAK TO THE ACTUAL CTLR. I TOLD THE TWR PERSON WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED AND I DIDN'T LIKE IT. MAINLY BECAUSE 1) THIS WAS A LAHSO AND I WASN'T TOLD. 2) I WAS FLYING A B737-700 WHICH WAS JUST GETTING LAHSO APPROVAL. 3) I DID NOT HAVE THE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE RWY 15R WITH LAHSO FOR RWY 4. 4) I DID NOT KNOW IF I HAD THE COMPANY REQUIRED MINIMUM DISTANCE FOR LAHSO (6100 FT). 5) IF I HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THIS WAS A LAHSO I WOULD HAVE DENIED IT! IN MY OPINION, LAHSO IS USED FOR INCREASING OPS ONLY AND IS A LOSE/LOSE SIT FOR THE PLT. I CONSIDER THIS A SERIOUS ERROR AND I HAVE NO RECOURSE. ALSO 6) THE B737-700 IS HEAVIER THAN THE B737-300 (EVEN THOUGH SEATING CAPACITY IS THE SAME) AND ROLLOUTS ARE LONGER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.