Narrative:

As we climbed through FL198, ZDC (118.75) queried our assigned altitude. We responded that we were cleared to FL210, which was set in the altitude alerter. The controller came back, 'negative, descend to FL190,' which we proceeded to do. Both of us recall hearing FL210 (probably from the previous sector on 124.05) and reading it back. The first officer recalled me setting the alerter, and I make it a habit to call it out as I set it and point to it until I receive a confirmation from the other pilot. I had him go off frequency to 124.05 to check with the previous controller, who insisted he had assigned us FL190. In the absence of hearing the actual voice tapes, both of us are convinced (for different reasons) that we were actually cleared to FL210. I had originally intended to check the release before departure to see what our final filed altitude was supposed to be, but I got busy and didn't get around to it. Because of this, I know I had no 'expectation mindset' that would have induced me to 'hear' something different from what the controller actually cleared us from 13000 ft directly to FL210, because the climb is normally done more incrementally. Increased vigilance and good habit patterns are critical to reducing the frequency of this kind of incident. Nothing short of a hard copy transmission of the data which the controller inputs into his/her computer will ever completely eliminate the possibility of this sort of misunderstanding, and I realize that sort of technology is still a way off in the future. It is precisely because of this that the FAA's recent 'interpretive ruling' is so inherently irresponsible and unsafe. I sincerely believe there was nothing additional that I or the first officer could or should have done to preclude this situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN ACR FLC FLYING A DHC8 NEAR RIC RPTS CONFUSION AS TO THEIR CLRED FLT LEVEL.

Narrative: AS WE CLBED THROUGH FL198, ZDC (118.75) QUERIED OUR ASSIGNED ALT. WE RESPONDED THAT WE WERE CLRED TO FL210, WHICH WAS SET IN THE ALT ALERTER. THE CTLR CAME BACK, 'NEGATIVE, DSND TO FL190,' WHICH WE PROCEEDED TO DO. BOTH OF US RECALL HEARING FL210 (PROBABLY FROM THE PREVIOUS SECTOR ON 124.05) AND READING IT BACK. THE FO RECALLED ME SETTING THE ALERTER, AND I MAKE IT A HABIT TO CALL IT OUT AS I SET IT AND POINT TO IT UNTIL I RECEIVE A CONFIRMATION FROM THE OTHER PLT. I HAD HIM GO OFF FREQ TO 124.05 TO CHK WITH THE PREVIOUS CTLR, WHO INSISTED HE HAD ASSIGNED US FL190. IN THE ABSENCE OF HEARING THE ACTUAL VOICE TAPES, BOTH OF US ARE CONVINCED (FOR DIFFERENT REASONS) THAT WE WERE ACTUALLY CLRED TO FL210. I HAD ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO CHK THE RELEASE BEFORE DEP TO SEE WHAT OUR FINAL FILED ALT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE, BUT I GOT BUSY AND DIDN'T GET AROUND TO IT. BECAUSE OF THIS, I KNOW I HAD NO 'EXPECTATION MINDSET' THAT WOULD HAVE INDUCED ME TO 'HEAR' SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM WHAT THE CTLR ACTUALLY CLRED US FROM 13000 FT DIRECTLY TO FL210, BECAUSE THE CLB IS NORMALLY DONE MORE INCREMENTALLY. INCREASED VIGILANCE AND GOOD HABIT PATTERNS ARE CRITICAL TO REDUCING THE FREQ OF THIS KIND OF INCIDENT. NOTHING SHORT OF A HARD COPY XMISSION OF THE DATA WHICH THE CTLR INPUTS INTO HIS/HER COMPUTER WILL EVER COMPLETELY ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS SORT OF MISUNDERSTANDING, AND I REALIZE THAT SORT OF TECHNOLOGY IS STILL A WAY OFF IN THE FUTURE. IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THIS THAT THE FAA'S RECENT 'INTERPRETIVE RULING' IS SO INHERENTLY IRRESPONSIBLE AND UNSAFE. I SINCERELY BELIEVE THERE WAS NOTHING ADDITIONAL THAT I OR THE FO COULD OR SHOULD HAVE DONE TO PRECLUDE THIS SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.