Narrative:

My employer, air carrier X, is inspecting the aircraft flight data recorder to determine if the aircraft mentioned in this report (DC9-15F) was involved in an unrpted hard landing incident. It should be noted that no landing I was involved in this aircraft could be reasonably classified as 'hard.' however, air carrier X -- an far part 121 carrier -- does not define 'hard landing' in their general operations manual or aircraft operations manual. Nor do they train their flcs in recognition or reporting of same. I am further concerned that air carrier X is removing the aircraft flight data recorder to investigate this matter. The flight data recorder does not appear to be designed for recording landing quality. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the company requested information from all flight crew that had flown aircraft during the period from the last aircraft inspection by maintenance. It seems that a maintenance inspection found that the wing leading edges were warped, but nothing else, which prompted maintenance reasoning that there could have been a hard landing causing the damage. However, the reporter believes that the warping could have been caused by a malfunctioning leading edge anti-ice bleed air which was written up do to an overheat leading edge warning light write-ups in the maintenance log. He believes since the 13TH stage bleed air is very hot and is therefore blocked out for use on the ground, maintenance had no way of checking its operation on the ground and needed a flight test which was not done after their maintenance signoff release.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO COMPLAINS THAT HIS COMPANY IS INSPECTING HIS ASSIGNED ACFT FOR A RPTED HARD LNDG OF WHICH HE HAS NO RECOLLECTION.

Narrative: MY EMPLOYER, ACR X, IS INSPECTING THE ACFT FLT DATA RECORDER TO DETERMINE IF THE ACFT MENTIONED IN THIS RPT (DC9-15F) WAS INVOLVED IN AN UNRPTED HARD LNDG INCIDENT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NO LNDG I WAS INVOLVED IN THIS ACFT COULD BE REASONABLY CLASSIFIED AS 'HARD.' HOWEVER, ACR X -- AN FAR PART 121 CARRIER -- DOES NOT DEFINE 'HARD LNDG' IN THEIR GENERAL OPS MANUAL OR ACFT OPS MANUAL. NOR DO THEY TRAIN THEIR FLCS IN RECOGNITION OR RPTING OF SAME. I AM FURTHER CONCERNED THAT ACR X IS REMOVING THE ACFT FLT DATA RECORDER TO INVESTIGATE THIS MATTER. THE FLT DATA RECORDER DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE DESIGNED FOR RECORDING LNDG QUALITY. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE COMPANY REQUESTED INFO FROM ALL FLC THAT HAD FLOWN ACFT DURING THE PERIOD FROM THE LAST ACFT INSPECTION BY MAINT. IT SEEMS THAT A MAINT INSPECTION FOUND THAT THE WING LEADING EDGES WERE WARPED, BUT NOTHING ELSE, WHICH PROMPTED MAINT REASONING THAT THERE COULD HAVE BEEN A HARD LNDG CAUSING THE DAMAGE. HOWEVER, THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE WARPING COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY A MALFUNCTIONING LEADING EDGE ANTI-ICE BLEED AIR WHICH WAS WRITTEN UP DO TO AN OVERHEAT LEADING EDGE WARNING LIGHT WRITE-UPS IN THE MAINT LOG. HE BELIEVES SINCE THE 13TH STAGE BLEED AIR IS VERY HOT AND IS THEREFORE BLOCKED OUT FOR USE ON THE GND, MAINT HAD NO WAY OF CHKING ITS OP ON THE GND AND NEEDED A FLT TEST WHICH WAS NOT DONE AFTER THEIR MAINT SIGNOFF RELEASE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.