A B727-200 first officer reported that gjt has non standard clearance procedures which contributed t...

Attributes
ACN	454236
Time
Date	199911
Day	Wed
Local Time Of Day	1801 To 2400
Place
Locale Reference	airport : gjt.airport
State Reference	CO
Altitude	agl single value : 0
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B727-200
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	ground : pushback
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : flight engineer pilot : atp pilot : commercial
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 150 flight time total : 5200 flight time type : 184
ASRS Report	454236
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : less severe ground encounters : vehicle non adherence : published procedure non adherence : company policies non adherence : clearance
Independent Detector	other other : 6
Resolutory Action	none taken : detected after the fact
Consequence	other other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Situations
ATC Facility	procedure or policy : gjt.fss staffing : gjt.fss

Narrative:

I called for clearance about 10-15 mins prior to pushback at gjt. Ground control said 'clearance on request, advise when ready to taxi.' the captain referenced our airport page for gjt and said gjt requires a request for clearance 10 mins prior to taxi so they can coordinate with ZDV. I then told the captain I would get our clearance once we pushed back. We pushed back and started engines normally. All engines were running by the time the pushback was complete and the captain set the parking brake when directed to do so by the ground crew. At this point I picked up the release and told the captain I was going to get the clearance. I then told ground control we were ready to taxi and could we get our clearance. Ground control started to give a clearance that was lengthy and very different from the one on our release and I went heads down to copy the clearance. I did not realize we were moving until I felt a small jolt and jerked my head up to see what happened. We had rolled forward and struck the tow bar. I asked the captain what happened and he said he heard the word 'taxi' and released the parking brake as part of his normal habit pattern. Unfortunately, the ground crew had not completely cleared yet and we rolled forward enough to strike the tow bar. The captain reapplied the brakes quickly but not in time to avoid impact. It all happened so quickly that neither the so, jump seat instructor, nor I had time to react and make a call to stop. There were no injuries, but the left nosewheel had to be replaced. The flight then continued on to destination without incident. The procedures for clearance at gjt have been previously idented as troublesome. In this case, it was an added distraction that didn't cause, but contributed to, the incident. Clearance should be available prior to push to avoid causing a distraction and, thus, allowing crews to focus all attention to the task at hand.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727-200 FO RPTED THAT GJT HAS NON STANDARD CLRNC PROCS WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO INATTENTIVENESS BY THE CREW DURING A TASK SATURATED SERIES OF EVENTS. THE CAPT INADVERTENTLY RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND ALLOWED THE ACFT TO ROLL FORWARD INTO THE TOW BAR.

Narrative: I CALLED FOR CLRNC ABOUT 10-15 MINS PRIOR TO PUSHBACK AT GJT. GND CTL SAID 'CLRNC ON REQUEST, ADVISE WHEN READY TO TAXI.' THE CAPT REFED OUR ARPT PAGE FOR GJT AND SAID GJT REQUIRES A REQUEST FOR CLRNC 10 MINS PRIOR TO TAXI SO THEY CAN COORDINATE WITH ZDV. I THEN TOLD THE CAPT I WOULD GET OUR CLRNC ONCE WE PUSHED BACK. WE PUSHED BACK AND STARTED ENGS NORMALLY. ALL ENGS WERE RUNNING BY THE TIME THE PUSHBACK WAS COMPLETE AND THE CAPT SET THE PARKING BRAKE WHEN DIRECTED TO DO SO BY THE GND CREW. AT THIS POINT I PICKED UP THE RELEASE AND TOLD THE CAPT I WAS GOING TO GET THE CLRNC. I THEN TOLD GND CTL WE WERE READY TO TAXI AND COULD WE GET OUR CLRNC. GND CTL STARTED TO GIVE A CLRNC THAT WAS LENGTHY AND VERY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE ON OUR RELEASE AND I WENT HEADS DOWN TO COPY THE CLRNC. I DID NOT REALIZE WE WERE MOVING UNTIL I FELT A SMALL JOLT AND JERKED MY HEAD UP TO SEE WHAT HAPPENED. WE HAD ROLLED FORWARD AND STRUCK THE TOW BAR. I ASKED THE CAPT WHAT HAPPENED AND HE SAID HE HEARD THE WORD 'TAXI' AND RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AS PART OF HIS NORMAL HABIT PATTERN. UNFORTUNATELY, THE GND CREW HAD NOT COMPLETELY CLRED YET AND WE ROLLED FORWARD ENOUGH TO STRIKE THE TOW BAR. THE CAPT REAPPLIED THE BRAKES QUICKLY BUT NOT IN TIME TO AVOID IMPACT. IT ALL HAPPENED SO QUICKLY THAT NEITHER THE SO, JUMP SEAT INSTRUCTOR, NOR I HAD TIME TO REACT AND MAKE A CALL TO STOP. THERE WERE NO INJURIES, BUT THE L NOSEWHEEL HAD TO BE REPLACED. THE FLT THEN CONTINUED ON TO DEST WITHOUT INCIDENT. THE PROCS FOR CLRNC AT GJT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY IDENTED AS TROUBLESOME. IN THIS CASE, IT WAS AN ADDED DISTR THAT DIDN'T CAUSE, BUT CONTRIBUTED TO, THE INCIDENT. CLRNC SHOULD BE AVAILABLE PRIOR TO PUSH TO AVOID CAUSING A DISTR AND, THUS, ALLOWING CREWS TO FOCUS ALL ATTN TO THE TASK AT HAND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A B727-200 first officer reported that gjt has non standard clearance procedures which contributed to inattentiveness by the crew during a task saturated series of events. The captain inadvertently released the parking brake and allowed the aircraft to roll forward into the tow bar.