Narrative:

On dec/sun/99, my student had filed an IFR flight plan direct to ahn direct to wdr direct to lzu round robin. She was a newly rated instrument pilot working toward her MEL rating. Our intent was to shoot the VOR 2 at ahn, go missed, shoot the NDB 27 ahn, go missed, then over to wdr for the localizer 31 and back to lzu for the ILS 25 circle-to-land. The winds were fairly strong (15-20 KTS) from the northeast. Upon approaching ahn we were given an efc of XA20 on the published hold at 4000 ft MSL. This was approximately 10 mins for holding. Conditions were total IMC with light to moderate turbulence. The WX appeared to be getting worse as more traffic was calling in to center to get into athens or winder. Our efc was amended to XA55Z so we continued to hold. During this time I continued to instruct my student on a variety of sits that we were listening to with ATC, beyond just flying a good holding pattern while correcting for wind. We had the opportunity to discuss approach gates (one plane was being vectored and had been turned in too close) and how others were entering the area, so this was delaying our clearance since we were just practicing. There was even an aircraft on the ground at wdr that was trying to pick up an IFR clearance, ended up taking off and remaining VFR while waiting for his clearance. It appeared the controller knew we had been holding for just under an hour now and did tell us it would be just a few more mins. At this point we made a few decisions. First, we would amend our plan to shoot the NDB next and just head back to wdr after the VOR approach since they were getting busy. Second, we should set ourselves up with a pre landing checklist and lower the gear since we were going to have to shoot the approach out of the hold. I felt if we requested the full approach we may have had to hold longer since there appeared to be 2 planes behind us now holding. When we received clearance we were approaching the completion of the inbound leg at an altitude of 4000 ft MSL for an MDA of 1200 ft MSL. We cut our power and began to descend as we turned outbound one more time to lose altitude and get established. The workload was heavy with the VOR being on the field. I was working the radios and monitoring my student's scan. Upon our final inbound leg we were at 2000 ft MSL when we were established. Things were happening fast so I can't quite recall the actual sequence of when we were given our missed approach procedures but it was to fly the missed approach as published and maintain 3000 ft MSL. I reported established and was instructed to switch to tower. At that point, I glanced at my handheld GPS for secondary situational awareness and noticed we were about to cross the VOR again at 2000 ft MSL still in IMC, so at that point I called missed to ATC right there and never switched over to ahn tower. My student began the missed approach procedures and I requested we cancel the NDB approach and head over to wdr when cleared to get out of the area. All this was happening as we were executing the missed approach procedures. The plane was climbing rapidly because as we were executing the turn out to the right, ATC asked our altitude. At that point, we had climbed through our assigned altitude and it took both of us to cut power and push the plane over, but we did this immediately. We were not given any heading changes so we continued to execute the missed and hold down our altitude. Eventually we were cleared with a heading to go back to lzu. As we were en route, center contacted us and told us to call ZTL when we landed about a possible altitude violation. This we did immediately after landing. I feel this was a very eye opening lesson for both the student, but more so for myself as the instructor. There were a lot of contributing factors to the incident. The extended holding time, the solid IMC conditions, the heavy workload, the fact that we had to have been in an updraft due to the amount of force needed to control the plane, and that particular approach with the VOR on the field. It goes back to the very basics of aviate, navigation and then communicate. I increased my own workload by discussing the amendment to our plan before I was certain that we had completed the missed approach. I also discussed with my student that even though shooting the approach out of the hold was the right thing to do, it was our turn and in the future we should take whatever and however much time is needed to execute a safe approach. Supplemental information from acn 458314: while we were communicating with ZTL we were climbing out of our missed approach, still full IMC with light to moderate turbulence. Our altitude climbed rapidly and we went through our assigned altitude. Because of my inexperience in this type of plane I did not realize how fast it climbs. I was focusing too much on my heading and re-reading the missed approach procedure. In the future I need to work on improving my scan.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PA44 TRAINING FLT CLBS 500 FT ABOVE ITS ASSIGNED MISSED APCH ALT OVER THE VOR AT AHN, GA.

Narrative: ON DEC/SUN/99, MY STUDENT HAD FILED AN IFR FLT PLAN DIRECT TO AHN DIRECT TO WDR DIRECT TO LZU ROUND ROBIN. SHE WAS A NEWLY RATED INST PLT WORKING TOWARD HER MEL RATING. OUR INTENT WAS TO SHOOT THE VOR 2 AT AHN, GO MISSED, SHOOT THE NDB 27 AHN, GO MISSED, THEN OVER TO WDR FOR THE LOC 31 AND BACK TO LZU FOR THE ILS 25 CIRCLE-TO-LAND. THE WINDS WERE FAIRLY STRONG (15-20 KTS) FROM THE NE. UPON APCHING AHN WE WERE GIVEN AN EFC OF XA20 ON THE PUBLISHED HOLD AT 4000 FT MSL. THIS WAS APPROX 10 MINS FOR HOLDING. CONDITIONS WERE TOTAL IMC WITH LIGHT TO MODERATE TURB. THE WX APPEARED TO BE GETTING WORSE AS MORE TFC WAS CALLING IN TO CTR TO GET INTO ATHENS OR WINDER. OUR EFC WAS AMENDED TO XA55Z SO WE CONTINUED TO HOLD. DURING THIS TIME I CONTINUED TO INSTRUCT MY STUDENT ON A VARIETY OF SITS THAT WE WERE LISTENING TO WITH ATC, BEYOND JUST FLYING A GOOD HOLDING PATTERN WHILE CORRECTING FOR WIND. WE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS APCH GATES (ONE PLANE WAS BEING VECTORED AND HAD BEEN TURNED IN TOO CLOSE) AND HOW OTHERS WERE ENTERING THE AREA, SO THIS WAS DELAYING OUR CLRNC SINCE WE WERE JUST PRACTICING. THERE WAS EVEN AN ACFT ON THE GND AT WDR THAT WAS TRYING TO PICK UP AN IFR CLRNC, ENDED UP TAKING OFF AND REMAINING VFR WHILE WAITING FOR HIS CLRNC. IT APPEARED THE CTLR KNEW WE HAD BEEN HOLDING FOR JUST UNDER AN HR NOW AND DID TELL US IT WOULD BE JUST A FEW MORE MINS. AT THIS POINT WE MADE A FEW DECISIONS. FIRST, WE WOULD AMEND OUR PLAN TO SHOOT THE NDB NEXT AND JUST HEAD BACK TO WDR AFTER THE VOR APCH SINCE THEY WERE GETTING BUSY. SECOND, WE SHOULD SET OURSELVES UP WITH A PRE LNDG CHKLIST AND LOWER THE GEAR SINCE WE WERE GOING TO HAVE TO SHOOT THE APCH OUT OF THE HOLD. I FELT IF WE REQUESTED THE FULL APCH WE MAY HAVE HAD TO HOLD LONGER SINCE THERE APPEARED TO BE 2 PLANES BEHIND US NOW HOLDING. WHEN WE RECEIVED CLRNC WE WERE APCHING THE COMPLETION OF THE INBOUND LEG AT AN ALT OF 4000 FT MSL FOR AN MDA OF 1200 FT MSL. WE CUT OUR PWR AND BEGAN TO DSND AS WE TURNED OUTBOUND ONE MORE TIME TO LOSE ALT AND GET ESTABLISHED. THE WORKLOAD WAS HVY WITH THE VOR BEING ON THE FIELD. I WAS WORKING THE RADIOS AND MONITORING MY STUDENT'S SCAN. UPON OUR FINAL INBOUND LEG WE WERE AT 2000 FT MSL WHEN WE WERE ESTABLISHED. THINGS WERE HAPPENING FAST SO I CAN'T QUITE RECALL THE ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF WHEN WE WERE GIVEN OUR MISSED APCH PROCS BUT IT WAS TO FLY THE MISSED APCH AS PUBLISHED AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT MSL. I RPTED ESTABLISHED AND WAS INSTRUCTED TO SWITCH TO TWR. AT THAT POINT, I GLANCED AT MY HANDHELD GPS FOR SECONDARY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND NOTICED WE WERE ABOUT TO CROSS THE VOR AGAIN AT 2000 FT MSL STILL IN IMC, SO AT THAT POINT I CALLED MISSED TO ATC RIGHT THERE AND NEVER SWITCHED OVER TO AHN TWR. MY STUDENT BEGAN THE MISSED APCH PROCS AND I REQUESTED WE CANCEL THE NDB APCH AND HEAD OVER TO WDR WHEN CLRED TO GET OUT OF THE AREA. ALL THIS WAS HAPPENING AS WE WERE EXECUTING THE MISSED APCH PROCS. THE PLANE WAS CLBING RAPIDLY BECAUSE AS WE WERE EXECUTING THE TURN OUT TO THE R, ATC ASKED OUR ALT. AT THAT POINT, WE HAD CLBED THROUGH OUR ASSIGNED ALT AND IT TOOK BOTH OF US TO CUT PWR AND PUSH THE PLANE OVER, BUT WE DID THIS IMMEDIATELY. WE WERE NOT GIVEN ANY HDG CHANGES SO WE CONTINUED TO EXECUTE THE MISSED AND HOLD DOWN OUR ALT. EVENTUALLY WE WERE CLRED WITH A HDG TO GO BACK TO LZU. AS WE WERE ENRTE, CTR CONTACTED US AND TOLD US TO CALL ZTL WHEN WE LANDED ABOUT A POSSIBLE ALT VIOLATION. THIS WE DID IMMEDIATELY AFTER LNDG. I FEEL THIS WAS A VERY EYE OPENING LESSON FOR BOTH THE STUDENT, BUT MORE SO FOR MYSELF AS THE INSTRUCTOR. THERE WERE A LOT OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE INCIDENT. THE EXTENDED HOLDING TIME, THE SOLID IMC CONDITIONS, THE HVY WORKLOAD, THE FACT THAT WE HAD TO HAVE BEEN IN AN UPDRAFT DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF FORCE NEEDED TO CTL THE PLANE, AND THAT PARTICULAR APCH WITH THE VOR ON THE FIELD. IT GOES BACK TO THE VERY BASICS OF AVIATE, NAV AND THEN COMMUNICATE. I INCREASED MY OWN WORKLOAD BY DISCUSSING THE AMENDMENT TO OUR PLAN BEFORE I WAS CERTAIN THAT WE HAD COMPLETED THE MISSED APCH. I ALSO DISCUSSED WITH MY STUDENT THAT EVEN THOUGH SHOOTING THE APCH OUT OF THE HOLD WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO, IT WAS OUR TURN AND IN THE FUTURE WE SHOULD TAKE WHATEVER AND HOWEVER MUCH TIME IS NEEDED TO EXECUTE A SAFE APCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 458314: WHILE WE WERE COMMUNICATING WITH ZTL WE WERE CLBING OUT OF OUR MISSED APCH, STILL FULL IMC WITH LIGHT TO MODERATE TURB. OUR ALT CLBED RAPIDLY AND WE WENT THROUGH OUR ASSIGNED ALT. BECAUSE OF MY INEXPERIENCE IN THIS TYPE OF PLANE I DID NOT REALIZE HOW FAST IT CLBS. I WAS FOCUSING TOO MUCH ON MY HDG AND RE-READING THE MISSED APCH PROC. IN THE FUTURE I NEED TO WORK ON IMPROVING MY SCAN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.