Narrative:

A taxi up to and hold short clearance was issued at the approach end of runway 26. While moving up to the hold line, I noticed a 'speed' warning flag appear on the ADI and attempted to arm the autothrottles in preparation for takeoff. The autothrottles would not arm and I briefed the first officer that we would manually position the throttles for takeoff, climb and cruise. I then called for the 'before takeoff checklist.' I visually cleared the final prior to entering the runway and saw an aircraft on about a 10 mi final, which reinforced my belief that I had received clearance onto the active runway. As I approached the point on the runway where the aircraft was being turned for runway alignment, the controller informed me that I had been instructed to hold short. He then cleared me for an immediate takeoff and right turn. A normal takeoff was executed and the aircraft on final was not required to go around and was able to land without incident. Contributing to my distraction was the fact that I had to use external air to start 1 engine at the gate (an abnormal procedure). Our taxi to the runway had been extra busy due to having inoperative APU pneumatics which required accomplishing additional checklists for the second engine start and extra vigilance and effort to execute the xbleed start and delayed engine start procedures while taxiing. Additionally, the automatic pressurization controller was inoperative, which required accomplishing yet another checklist and abnormal procedure, while taxiing, for using the controller in the stand-by mode, causing some confusion for the first officer which I also had to address. Being so busy due to these multiple abnormal conditions plus the unexpected autothrottle failure at the runway were enough distraction to cause me to mistakenly believe I had received clearance onto the active runway. I am not trying to claim that these multiple distrs were an acceptable reason for this incident, but no doubt they were contributing factors. I plan to redouble my efforts to remain more aware of my situation in the future. Supplemental information from acn 458135: the airplane we had had 3 MEL's on it and 1 for APU pneumatics inoperative. The tower controller told us we would be next for departure. So the captain called for the before takeoff checklist and I began to do it as he taxied the aircraft to the runway. As I tried to solve it, apparently the captain was also looking at the problem. Both pilots have to be disciplined in their duties. The captain's is to taxi at that point, and first officer do checklists and try to help with directions. If a problem arises, both people cannot be 'solving it' -- they both have to do their jobs.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 FLC PERFORMS A RWY INCURSION WHILE FIXATED ON EQUIP PROBS AT IAH, TX.

Narrative: A TAXI UP TO AND HOLD SHORT CLRNC WAS ISSUED AT THE APCH END OF RWY 26. WHILE MOVING UP TO THE HOLD LINE, I NOTICED A 'SPD' WARNING FLAG APPEAR ON THE ADI AND ATTEMPTED TO ARM THE AUTOTHROTTLES IN PREPARATION FOR TKOF. THE AUTOTHROTTLES WOULD NOT ARM AND I BRIEFED THE FO THAT WE WOULD MANUALLY POS THE THROTTLES FOR TKOF, CLB AND CRUISE. I THEN CALLED FOR THE 'BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST.' I VISUALLY CLRED THE FINAL PRIOR TO ENTERING THE RWY AND SAW AN ACFT ON ABOUT A 10 MI FINAL, WHICH REINFORCED MY BELIEF THAT I HAD RECEIVED CLRNC ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY. AS I APCHED THE POINT ON THE RWY WHERE THE ACFT WAS BEING TURNED FOR RWY ALIGNMENT, THE CTLR INFORMED ME THAT I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO HOLD SHORT. HE THEN CLRED ME FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF AND R TURN. A NORMAL TKOF WAS EXECUTED AND THE ACFT ON FINAL WAS NOT REQUIRED TO GO AROUND AND WAS ABLE TO LAND WITHOUT INCIDENT. CONTRIBUTING TO MY DISTR WAS THE FACT THAT I HAD TO USE EXTERNAL AIR TO START 1 ENG AT THE GATE (AN ABNORMAL PROC). OUR TAXI TO THE RWY HAD BEEN EXTRA BUSY DUE TO HAVING INOP APU PNEUMATICS WHICH REQUIRED ACCOMPLISHING ADDITIONAL CHKLISTS FOR THE SECOND ENG START AND EXTRA VIGILANCE AND EFFORT TO EXECUTE THE XBLEED START AND DELAYED ENG START PROCS WHILE TAXIING. ADDITIONALLY, THE AUTOMATIC PRESSURIZATION CONTROLLER WAS INOP, WHICH REQUIRED ACCOMPLISHING YET ANOTHER CHKLIST AND ABNORMAL PROC, WHILE TAXIING, FOR USING THE CONTROLLER IN THE STAND-BY MODE, CAUSING SOME CONFUSION FOR THE FO WHICH I ALSO HAD TO ADDRESS. BEING SO BUSY DUE TO THESE MULTIPLE ABNORMAL CONDITIONS PLUS THE UNEXPECTED AUTOTHROTTLE FAILURE AT THE RWY WERE ENOUGH DISTR TO CAUSE ME TO MISTAKENLY BELIEVE I HAD RECEIVED CLRNC ONTO THE ACTIVE RWY. I AM NOT TRYING TO CLAIM THAT THESE MULTIPLE DISTRS WERE AN ACCEPTABLE REASON FOR THIS INCIDENT, BUT NO DOUBT THEY WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS. I PLAN TO REDOUBLE MY EFFORTS TO REMAIN MORE AWARE OF MY SIT IN THE FUTURE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 458135: THE AIRPLANE WE HAD HAD 3 MEL'S ON IT AND 1 FOR APU PNEUMATICS INOP. THE TWR CTLR TOLD US WE WOULD BE NEXT FOR DEP. SO THE CAPT CALLED FOR THE BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST AND I BEGAN TO DO IT AS HE TAXIED THE ACFT TO THE RWY. AS I TRIED TO SOLVE IT, APPARENTLY THE CAPT WAS ALSO LOOKING AT THE PROB. BOTH PLTS HAVE TO BE DISCIPLINED IN THEIR DUTIES. THE CAPT'S IS TO TAXI AT THAT POINT, AND FO DO CHKLISTS AND TRY TO HELP WITH DIRECTIONS. IF A PROB ARISES, BOTH PEOPLE CANNOT BE 'SOLVING IT' -- THEY BOTH HAVE TO DO THEIR JOBS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.