Narrative:

On preflight, noticed that left forward fuel boost pump when turned on, did not extinguish left fuel low pressure light on overhead annunciator panel. To differentiate between a pump failure and a pressure switch for the annunciator light, I opened the xfeed and was able to both extinguish the ri fuel pressure low light with the left forward pump and also extinguish the left fuel pressure light with the right fuel pumps. Both the left forward pump and the left fuel pressure low light were operable but there was still something wrong. I had not yet written anything in the logbook. A mechanic came up and, without talking to me, wrote a discrepancy in the logbook and deferred the operable pump. I tried to address this with him, but he would not talk to me and basically told me to.... I called maintenance on the radio and henceforth along comes contentious mechanic #2. Without listening to a word from me he told me in no uncertain terms that I should get in my jet and not pursue it any further. After 5 mins of pointless debate and a brief staring contest, I was able to convince him to look in the cockpit and see for himself what I was talking about. Once he actually saw the problem, he went to get contentious mechanic #3. #3 indicated that we had no problem and should be on our way, and also chastised me for not putting anything in the book. My write-up was to be entered after a discussion of the problem -- a discussion which did not initially have a chance with mechanic #1. I entered a second discrepancy indicating the symptoms of the fuel system and not simply stating we had an inoperative pump. Mechanic #3, without any further corrective action or analysis, signed off my discrepancy. I flew the flight. However, an inoperative boost pump requires notification to dispatch and an additional 600 pounds of fuel. We were already weight restr and the 600 pounds needed to either come from our holding contingency fuel or we might have offloaded 600 pounds of payload and added 600 pounds of fuel. As it happens, I did have an airborne hold outside of chicago and landed with only reserve plus alternate fuel. 2 points: 1) these sits should never become pissing contests. It is not personal. These mechanics had no business making it so. I left the gate in a somewhat agitated state and overlooked the fuel consideration. If the mechanics had just worked more cooperatively with me, then we probably would have left the gate on time and minimized the inconvenience to our passenger. In addition, upon conferring with dispatch on arrival at ord, I was advised that maintenance had not put the deferred item in the system and he was unaware of its existence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD80 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH A FUEL BOOST PUMP IRREGULARITY NOT CORRECTED NOR PROPERLY DEFERRED DUE TO TECHNICIAN MISCONDUCT.

Narrative: ON PREFLT, NOTICED THAT L FORWARD FUEL BOOST PUMP WHEN TURNED ON, DID NOT EXTINGUISH L FUEL LOW PRESSURE LIGHT ON OVERHEAD ANNUNCIATOR PANEL. TO DIFFERENTIATE BTWN A PUMP FAILURE AND A PRESSURE SWITCH FOR THE ANNUNCIATOR LIGHT, I OPENED THE XFEED AND WAS ABLE TO BOTH EXTINGUISH THE RI FUEL PRESSURE LOW LIGHT WITH THE L FORWARD PUMP AND ALSO EXTINGUISH THE L FUEL PRESSURE LIGHT WITH THE R FUEL PUMPS. BOTH THE L FORWARD PUMP AND THE L FUEL PRESSURE LOW LIGHT WERE OPERABLE BUT THERE WAS STILL SOMETHING WRONG. I HAD NOT YET WRITTEN ANYTHING IN THE LOGBOOK. A MECH CAME UP AND, WITHOUT TALKING TO ME, WROTE A DISCREPANCY IN THE LOGBOOK AND DEFERRED THE OPERABLE PUMP. I TRIED TO ADDRESS THIS WITH HIM, BUT HE WOULD NOT TALK TO ME AND BASICALLY TOLD ME TO.... I CALLED MAINT ON THE RADIO AND HENCEFORTH ALONG COMES CONTENTIOUS MECH #2. WITHOUT LISTENING TO A WORD FROM ME HE TOLD ME IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT I SHOULD GET IN MY JET AND NOT PURSUE IT ANY FURTHER. AFTER 5 MINS OF POINTLESS DEBATE AND A BRIEF STARING CONTEST, I WAS ABLE TO CONVINCE HIM TO LOOK IN THE COCKPIT AND SEE FOR HIMSELF WHAT I WAS TALKING ABOUT. ONCE HE ACTUALLY SAW THE PROB, HE WENT TO GET CONTENTIOUS MECH #3. #3 INDICATED THAT WE HAD NO PROB AND SHOULD BE ON OUR WAY, AND ALSO CHASTISED ME FOR NOT PUTTING ANYTHING IN THE BOOK. MY WRITE-UP WAS TO BE ENTERED AFTER A DISCUSSION OF THE PROB -- A DISCUSSION WHICH DID NOT INITIALLY HAVE A CHANCE WITH MECH #1. I ENTERED A SECOND DISCREPANCY INDICATING THE SYMPTOMS OF THE FUEL SYS AND NOT SIMPLY STATING WE HAD AN INOP PUMP. MECH #3, WITHOUT ANY FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION OR ANALYSIS, SIGNED OFF MY DISCREPANCY. I FLEW THE FLT. HOWEVER, AN INOP BOOST PUMP REQUIRES NOTIFICATION TO DISPATCH AND AN ADDITIONAL 600 LBS OF FUEL. WE WERE ALREADY WT RESTR AND THE 600 LBS NEEDED TO EITHER COME FROM OUR HOLDING CONTINGENCY FUEL OR WE MIGHT HAVE OFFLOADED 600 LBS OF PAYLOAD AND ADDED 600 LBS OF FUEL. AS IT HAPPENS, I DID HAVE AN AIRBORNE HOLD OUTSIDE OF CHICAGO AND LANDED WITH ONLY RESERVE PLUS ALTERNATE FUEL. 2 POINTS: 1) THESE SITS SHOULD NEVER BECOME PISSING CONTESTS. IT IS NOT PERSONAL. THESE MECHS HAD NO BUSINESS MAKING IT SO. I LEFT THE GATE IN A SOMEWHAT AGITATED STATE AND OVERLOOKED THE FUEL CONSIDERATION. IF THE MECHS HAD JUST WORKED MORE COOPERATIVELY WITH ME, THEN WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE LEFT THE GATE ON TIME AND MINIMIZED THE INCONVENIENCE TO OUR PAX. IN ADDITION, UPON CONFERRING WITH DISPATCH ON ARR AT ORD, I WAS ADVISED THAT MAINT HAD NOT PUT THE DEFERRED ITEM IN THE SYS AND HE WAS UNAWARE OF ITS EXISTENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.