Narrative:

When preflting aircraft flight xx (B767ER) in ZZZ, first officer, for a departure to jfk, it was noted that there were 2 pertinent mco's in the logbook. One was a 'right engine electronic engine control status message' and the other was a 'tmc autothrottle inoperative.' the mechanic entered the cockpit and stated that he had just cleared the related problems while down in the lower electronics compartment. He suggested keeping the mco's in the logbook as this had happened on a previous flight and that it should probably be flight checked. The MEL was checked and the aircraft was suitable for ETOPS flight whether the mco's were cleared or not. An FAA air carrier inspector arrived and was given the jump seat for the flight. We departed on time and during climb out got the EICAS messages stating that the 'right engine electronic engine control' was inoperative and the autothrottle had disconnected. We completed the appropriate checklists and continued the flight which still allowed for ETOPS. When the FAA inspector reviewed the mco's in the logbook and MEL, it was discovered that the electronic engine control discrepancy previously written up should have been an 'electronic engine control supervisory' write-up and not an 'electronic engine control status message.' corrective procedures were similar for either problem. However, the write-up was incorrect. In review, the mco numbers should have been more closely xrefed in the MEL, with the mechanic stating that everything was cleared. Our attention was then focused on an on-time departure (slot time). The proper action for takeoff should have been to either turn off both electronic engine controls or remove the mco's from the logbook as the indications of a problem had been cleared by the mechanic.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767-300ER WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE WRONG MEL REF FOR AN INOP ELECTRONIC ENG CTL AND TECHNICIAN ASSURANCE THAT ITEM WAS FIXED BUT NEEDS CHK IN AIR.

Narrative: WHEN PREFLTING ACFT FLT XX (B767ER) IN ZZZ, FO, FOR A DEP TO JFK, IT WAS NOTED THAT THERE WERE 2 PERTINENT MCO'S IN THE LOGBOOK. ONE WAS A 'R ENG ELECTRONIC ENG CTL STATUS MESSAGE' AND THE OTHER WAS A 'TMC AUTOTHROTTLE INOP.' THE MECH ENTERED THE COCKPIT AND STATED THAT HE HAD JUST CLRED THE RELATED PROBS WHILE DOWN IN THE LOWER ELECTRONICS COMPARTMENT. HE SUGGESTED KEEPING THE MCO'S IN THE LOGBOOK AS THIS HAD HAPPENED ON A PREVIOUS FLT AND THAT IT SHOULD PROBABLY BE FLT CHKED. THE MEL WAS CHKED AND THE ACFT WAS SUITABLE FOR ETOPS FLT WHETHER THE MCO'S WERE CLRED OR NOT. AN FAA ACR INSPECTOR ARRIVED AND WAS GIVEN THE JUMP SEAT FOR THE FLT. WE DEPARTED ON TIME AND DURING CLBOUT GOT THE EICAS MESSAGES STATING THAT THE 'R ENG ELECTRONIC ENG CTL' WAS INOP AND THE AUTOTHROTTLE HAD DISCONNECTED. WE COMPLETED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS AND CONTINUED THE FLT WHICH STILL ALLOWED FOR ETOPS. WHEN THE FAA INSPECTOR REVIEWED THE MCO'S IN THE LOGBOOK AND MEL, IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE ELECTRONIC ENG CTL DISCREPANCY PREVIOUSLY WRITTEN UP SHOULD HAVE BEEN AN 'ELECTRONIC ENG CTL SUPERVISORY' WRITE-UP AND NOT AN 'ELECTRONIC ENG CTL STATUS MESSAGE.' CORRECTIVE PROCS WERE SIMILAR FOR EITHER PROB. HOWEVER, THE WRITE-UP WAS INCORRECT. IN REVIEW, THE MCO NUMBERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE CLOSELY XREFED IN THE MEL, WITH THE MECH STATING THAT EVERYTHING WAS CLRED. OUR ATTN WAS THEN FOCUSED ON AN ON-TIME DEP (SLOT TIME). THE PROPER ACTION FOR TKOF SHOULD HAVE BEEN TO EITHER TURN OFF BOTH ELECTRONIC ENG CTLS OR REMOVE THE MCO'S FROM THE LOGBOOK AS THE INDICATIONS OF A PROB HAD BEEN CLRED BY THE MECH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.