37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 461122 |
Time | |
Date | 200001 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : msy.airport |
State Reference | LA |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Weather Elements | Rain |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : msy.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | ground : takeoff roll |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 280 flight time total : 13000 flight time type : 9000 |
ASRS Report | 461122 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 4800 flight time type : 767 |
ASRS Report | 461297 |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : ground less severe incursion : runway non adherence : far non adherence : clearance |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : took precautionary avoidance action other |
Consequence | Other |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 9000 vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
Departure ATIS at msy said 'departing runway 19.' while we were still in the chocks, we heard ground control offer runway 28 to another aircraft. Since that is a much shorter taxi for us, we did our preliminary takeoff data based on runway 28. After pushback, another aircraft asked for runway 28 and was denied. Thunderstorms had moved too close in that direction. So, I fully expected our taxi instruction to be 'taxi to runway 19.' when we called for taxi, sure enough, I heard 'taxi to runway 19.' at that point, I must have shut down my internal receiver, for there was an added phrase which I completely missed: 'hold short of runway 10.' the first officer heard and read back the hold short instruction (I missed it again), and he then began recalculating our takeoff data for runway 19. The recalculation caused the first officer to be head down during my approach to the hold short point. For my part, as soon as I 'heard' what I expected to hear, I switched my attention to 3 other things. As I taxied, I began turning the radar and formulating a WX escape plan. I simultaneously discussed with the first officer bleed air and flap configns for our heavy aircraft on a fairly short wet runway. I was also preparing a rough mental draft of a pre takeoff announcement to warn the passenger about the impending turbulence and to keep the flight attendants seated during the climb out. As I approached runway 10, I saw an aircraft in position at the other end. I assumed he was in position and hold, since I 'had' clearance to cross. To my horror, as I crossed, I saw the other aircraft start rolling. I added power and got quickly out of the way. In the past, I have always said aloud any hold short instruction just to reinforce it to myself. From now on, I will ask my first officer's to ensure I repeat the hold short instruction. Additionally, I will be much more sensitive to the problem of 'hearing what you expect to hear.'
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CAPT OF A B737 FAILED TO HOLD SHORT OF AN ACTIVE RWY DURING TAXI OUT AS INSTRUCTED. WHEN HE OBSERVED ANOTHER ACFT AT THE DEP END OF THE RWY HAD STARTED A TKOF ROLL, HE ACCELERATED CLRING THE RWY.
Narrative: DEP ATIS AT MSY SAID 'DEPARTING RWY 19.' WHILE WE WERE STILL IN THE CHOCKS, WE HEARD GND CTL OFFER RWY 28 TO ANOTHER ACFT. SINCE THAT IS A MUCH SHORTER TAXI FOR US, WE DID OUR PRELIMINARY TKOF DATA BASED ON RWY 28. AFTER PUSHBACK, ANOTHER ACFT ASKED FOR RWY 28 AND WAS DENIED. TSTMS HAD MOVED TOO CLOSE IN THAT DIRECTION. SO, I FULLY EXPECTED OUR TAXI INSTRUCTION TO BE 'TAXI TO RWY 19.' WHEN WE CALLED FOR TAXI, SURE ENOUGH, I HEARD 'TAXI TO RWY 19.' AT THAT POINT, I MUST HAVE SHUT DOWN MY INTERNAL RECEIVER, FOR THERE WAS AN ADDED PHRASE WHICH I COMPLETELY MISSED: 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 10.' THE FO HEARD AND READ BACK THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION (I MISSED IT AGAIN), AND HE THEN BEGAN RECALCULATING OUR TKOF DATA FOR RWY 19. THE RECALCULATION CAUSED THE FO TO BE HEAD DOWN DURING MY APCH TO THE HOLD SHORT POINT. FOR MY PART, AS SOON AS I 'HEARD' WHAT I EXPECTED TO HEAR, I SWITCHED MY ATTN TO 3 OTHER THINGS. AS I TAXIED, I BEGAN TURNING THE RADAR AND FORMULATING A WX ESCAPE PLAN. I SIMULTANEOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH THE FO BLEED AIR AND FLAP CONFIGNS FOR OUR HVY ACFT ON A FAIRLY SHORT WET RWY. I WAS ALSO PREPARING A ROUGH MENTAL DRAFT OF A PRE TKOF ANNOUNCEMENT TO WARN THE PAX ABOUT THE IMPENDING TURB AND TO KEEP THE FLT ATTENDANTS SEATED DURING THE CLBOUT. AS I APCHED RWY 10, I SAW AN ACFT IN POS AT THE OTHER END. I ASSUMED HE WAS IN POS AND HOLD, SINCE I 'HAD' CLRNC TO CROSS. TO MY HORROR, AS I CROSSED, I SAW THE OTHER ACFT START ROLLING. I ADDED PWR AND GOT QUICKLY OUT OF THE WAY. IN THE PAST, I HAVE ALWAYS SAID ALOUD ANY HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION JUST TO REINFORCE IT TO MYSELF. FROM NOW ON, I WILL ASK MY FO'S TO ENSURE I REPEAT THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTION. ADDITIONALLY, I WILL BE MUCH MORE SENSITIVE TO THE PROB OF 'HEARING WHAT YOU EXPECT TO HEAR.'
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.