Narrative:

At approximately PM45Z, at FL370, between timas and clonn intersection, the flight service manager and a flight attendant reported smoke in the cabin. Both myself and the student captain turned and observed the smoke. I called for the oxygen masks, and a left turn rapid descent off the airway. Simultaneously, I called mayday to monterrey center, which was not initially acknowledged. I then called 121.5 with no luck. I then displayed airports on my map and decided to head toward texas. Given the choice, I selected mcallen international (mfe) as my deviation airport. After 3 mayday calls, monterrey cleared us to FL180 (?) initially, and a heading towards mfe. I then proceeded to initiate the interior fire/smoke checklist, electrical as the flight attendants stated that the smell in the cabin was that of burning wire. We were then handed off to ZHU and cleared to 11000 ft, then 8000 ft. At this point, the fire/smoke checklist was completed. We were then handed off to approach, and cleared to 4000 ft then 2000 ft. Sometime during this phase, the descent/approach checklist was completed. I was advised by the flight attendant that the smoke was dissipating during this phase of descent. I elected to keep the oxygen mask on. I was asked if we wanted the ILS to runway 13 or a visual approach. I was not sure if the source of the smoke was truly extinguished, so I elected the visual. Approach called the airport 11 O'clock position(?) and 10 mi (?), the student captain called for the slats. 10 O'clock position, 4 mi, flaps 11 degrees then 15 degrees. I finally saw the airport, took the airplane and flew towards it. Realizing it was runway 18, I turned towards the west. When I saw runway 13, it was obvious we were out of position to land. I requested and was granted a 270 degree turn to intercept final. During the turn I configured the plane for landing. The student captain took over the plane and landed on runway 13, in the slot. (Note: at the completion of the interior fire/smoke checklist, all the first officer's instruments are either blank or frozen, the student captain had the working instruments.) 1-3 seconds after touchdown, the left main tires blew. Stopped on the runway, and ordered an evacuate/evacuation due to the tower reporting fire/smoke at the left main. I did the evacuate/evacuation checklist and after checking all passenger and crew evacuate/evacuationed, then deplaned with the student captain. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the check captain reported that during his diversion to mcallen-miller international he was thinking of the extreme need to get the aircraft on the ground because of the unknown source of the smoke. It was significant and 'foggy.' the cabin had a full passenger load. The flight attendants had indicated the smoke smelled 'of electrical.' the crew had donned their masks so quickly that they had not had a chance to smell that odor. The landing gear was slow to drop when extended because of the lack of normal AC power. The auxiliary pump took longer to build up sufficient hydraulic pressure. The check captain looked through his QRH for any items that would pertain to the landing procedure. It had an added note that a jammed stabilizer approach might be considered. The aircraft was light in weight so that was not a problem. The tires on the left side blew the first 2-3 seconds on the runway. The aircraft started a left drift so the check captain took over and employed light braking on the right brakes to counter with control inputs as well. The student captain had indeed applied some light brake pressure after touchdown. The electrical fire procedure did disable the anti-skid. This omission in the QRH, checklist, is being corrected by the airline. The maintenance personnel could not, at mfe, find the source. An airline response team flew down to counsel passenger and crew as well as to ferry the aircraft back to the maintenance base. En route, the crew used the engine anti-ice in the clouds and produced smoke in the cabin. At the maintenance base they found that the left engine anti-ice valve seal had split allowing engine oil into the anti-ice ducting, thus creating the smoke in the cabin. Side notes: the crew took a drug test at mfe, the incident now being down graded. 1 passenger hurt her wrist in the evacuate/evacuation. The flight attendants were 'superb' in their execution of the evacuate/evacuation. The airport personnel and airport manager were superb in their support to the passenger and crew. Crew stayed with passenger until the next day and then deadheaded home, escorted by a union team. The company is line checking the reporter but no disciplinary action is being considered after a debrief with the chief pilot.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN MD83 FLC DIVERTS TO MFE, TX, AFTER SMOKE RPTED IN THE CABIN. ACFT SUFFERS BLOWN TIRES ON THE LNDG ROLLOUT. MFE, TX.

Narrative: AT APPROX PM45Z, AT FL370, BTWN TIMAS AND CLONN INTXN, THE FLT SVC MGR AND A FLT ATTENDANT RPTED SMOKE IN THE CABIN. BOTH MYSELF AND THE STUDENT CAPT TURNED AND OBSERVED THE SMOKE. I CALLED FOR THE OXYGEN MASKS, AND A L TURN RAPID DSCNT OFF THE AIRWAY. SIMULTANEOUSLY, I CALLED MAYDAY TO MONTERREY CTR, WHICH WAS NOT INITIALLY ACKNOWLEDGED. I THEN CALLED 121.5 WITH NO LUCK. I THEN DISPLAYED ARPTS ON MY MAP AND DECIDED TO HEAD TOWARD TEXAS. GIVEN THE CHOICE, I SELECTED MCALLEN INTL (MFE) AS MY DEV ARPT. AFTER 3 MAYDAY CALLS, MONTERREY CLRED US TO FL180 (?) INITIALLY, AND A HEADING TOWARDS MFE. I THEN PROCEEDED TO INITIATE THE INTERIOR FIRE/SMOKE CHKLIST, ELECTRICAL AS THE FLT ATTENDANTS STATED THAT THE SMELL IN THE CABIN WAS THAT OF BURNING WIRE. WE WERE THEN HANDED OFF TO ZHU AND CLRED TO 11000 FT, THEN 8000 FT. AT THIS POINT, THE FIRE/SMOKE CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. WE WERE THEN HANDED OFF TO APCH, AND CLRED TO 4000 FT THEN 2000 FT. SOMETIME DURING THIS PHASE, THE DSCNT/APCH CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED. I WAS ADVISED BY THE FLT ATTENDANT THAT THE SMOKE WAS DISSIPATING DURING THIS PHASE OF DSCNT. I ELECTED TO KEEP THE OXYGEN MASK ON. I WAS ASKED IF WE WANTED THE ILS TO RWY 13 OR A VISUAL APCH. I WAS NOT SURE IF THE SOURCE OF THE SMOKE WAS TRULY EXTINGUISHED, SO I ELECTED THE VISUAL. APCH CALLED THE ARPT 11 O'CLOCK POS(?) AND 10 MI (?), THE STUDENT CAPT CALLED FOR THE SLATS. 10 O'CLOCK POS, 4 MI, FLAPS 11 DEGS THEN 15 DEGS. I FINALLY SAW THE ARPT, TOOK THE AIRPLANE AND FLEW TOWARDS IT. REALIZING IT WAS RWY 18, I TURNED TOWARDS THE W. WHEN I SAW RWY 13, IT WAS OBVIOUS WE WERE OUT OF POS TO LAND. I REQUESTED AND WAS GRANTED A 270 DEG TURN TO INTERCEPT FINAL. DURING THE TURN I CONFIGURED THE PLANE FOR LNDG. THE STUDENT CAPT TOOK OVER THE PLANE AND LANDED ON RWY 13, IN THE SLOT. (NOTE: AT THE COMPLETION OF THE INTERIOR FIRE/SMOKE CHKLIST, ALL THE FO'S INSTS ARE EITHER BLANK OR FROZEN, THE STUDENT CAPT HAD THE WORKING INSTS.) 1-3 SECONDS AFTER TOUCHDOWN, THE L MAIN TIRES BLEW. STOPPED ON THE RWY, AND ORDERED AN EVAC DUE TO THE TWR RPTING FIRE/SMOKE AT THE L MAIN. I DID THE EVAC CHKLIST AND AFTER CHKING ALL PAX AND CREW EVACED, THEN DEPLANED WITH THE STUDENT CAPT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CHK CAPT RPTED THAT DURING HIS DIVERSION TO MCALLEN-MILLER INTL HE WAS THINKING OF THE EXTREME NEED TO GET THE ACFT ON THE GND BECAUSE OF THE UNKNOWN SOURCE OF THE SMOKE. IT WAS SIGNIFICANT AND 'FOGGY.' THE CABIN HAD A FULL PAX LOAD. THE FLT ATTENDANTS HAD INDICATED THE SMOKE SMELLED 'OF ELECTRICAL.' THE CREW HAD DONNED THEIR MASKS SO QUICKLY THAT THEY HAD NOT HAD A CHANCE TO SMELL THAT ODOR. THE LNDG GEAR WAS SLOW TO DROP WHEN EXTENDED BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF NORMAL AC PWR. THE AUX PUMP TOOK LONGER TO BUILD UP SUFFICIENT HYD PRESSURE. THE CHK CAPT LOOKED THROUGH HIS QRH FOR ANY ITEMS THAT WOULD PERTAIN TO THE LNDG PROC. IT HAD AN ADDED NOTE THAT A JAMMED STABILIZER APCH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED. THE ACFT WAS LIGHT IN WT SO THAT WAS NOT A PROB. THE TIRES ON THE L SIDE BLEW THE FIRST 2-3 SECONDS ON THE RWY. THE ACFT STARTED A L DRIFT SO THE CHK CAPT TOOK OVER AND EMPLOYED LIGHT BRAKING ON THE R BRAKES TO COUNTER WITH CTL INPUTS AS WELL. THE STUDENT CAPT HAD INDEED APPLIED SOME LIGHT BRAKE PRESSURE AFTER TOUCHDOWN. THE ELECTRICAL FIRE PROC DID DISABLE THE ANTI-SKID. THIS OMISSION IN THE QRH, CHKLIST, IS BEING CORRECTED BY THE AIRLINE. THE MAINT PERSONNEL COULD NOT, AT MFE, FIND THE SOURCE. AN AIRLINE RESPONSE TEAM FLEW DOWN TO COUNSEL PAX AND CREW AS WELL AS TO FERRY THE ACFT BACK TO THE MAINT BASE. ENRTE, THE CREW USED THE ENG ANTI-ICE IN THE CLOUDS AND PRODUCED SMOKE IN THE CABIN. AT THE MAINT BASE THEY FOUND THAT THE L ENG ANTI-ICE VALVE SEAL HAD SPLIT ALLOWING ENG OIL INTO THE ANTI-ICE DUCTING, THUS CREATING THE SMOKE IN THE CABIN. SIDE NOTES: THE CREW TOOK A DRUG TEST AT MFE, THE INCIDENT NOW BEING DOWN GRADED. 1 PAX HURT HER WRIST IN THE EVAC. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE 'SUPERB' IN THEIR EXECUTION OF THE EVAC. THE ARPT PERSONNEL AND ARPT MGR WERE SUPERB IN THEIR SUPPORT TO THE PAX AND CREW. CREW STAYED WITH PAX UNTIL THE NEXT DAY AND THEN DEADHEADED HOME, ESCORTED BY A UNION TEAM. THE COMPANY IS LINE CHKING THE RPTR BUT NO DISCIPLINARY ACTION IS BEING CONSIDERED AFTER A DEBRIEF WITH THE CHIEF PLT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.