Narrative:

Tower ordered a go around due to aircraft on runway. I started the go around. I called for 'set power' and 'flaps 5 degrees.' tower asked if we could stay in pattern for right downwind behind a B727 on 2 mi final. Captain accepted the clearance but in hindsight, we should have asked for vector for a second approach (airline procedures call for the descent and approach checklists to be reaccomplished). I did not hear the 'positive rate' call, so I asked for 'gear up.' tower did not assign an altitude, the captain put 1600 ft in the alerter, and then called 'altitude' as we went through 1600 ft for 2000 ft -- the altitude I was planning to fly. I stated 'I am going to 2000 ft.' during this, we were in crosswind and about to turn downwind. As we leveled at 2000 ft, the captain discovered our flaps at 5 degrees and airspeed had climbed to 195 KTS. I continued to reduce power to slow to 148 KTS. Condition levers were still at 1200 RPM. I called for 'condition lever 1050,' then gear down landing checklist. I turned base and final and landed the aircraft. Perceptions: these events happened very quickly. Once the mistake was idented, the captain became judgemental. Communications failed. I believe the captain was concentrating on his check airman duties, he forgot to perform the PNF duties or to just back me up in a stressful event. We had 5 more legs to fly. The next 2 legs this captain line checked me as the PNF and PF, writing me up for 2 items. Very hard to maintain good CRM the rest of the day. Supplemental information from acn 468867: tower called for go around due to aircraft in position on runway. We followed company SOP for go around as far as getting gear up and flaps to initial go around setting. Tower asked us if we could stay in the pattern instead of returning to TRACON. Should have said no, but we said yes. In the ensuing confusion over traffic sequencing, setting pattern altitude in the alerter, and which direction to fly, the rest of the after takeoff (or go around) procedure was delayed -- too long. We overspd the flaps. We reduced speed, completed the after takeoff, descent, approach, and landing checklists and landed without incident. In the future, I will not be suckered into a rushed scenario like that, when an alternative is available. If we had switched back to departure control we would have had enough time to follow proper procedure. Additionally, I must increase my own vigilance in the monitoring (PNF) role.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A GAR ORDERED BY TWR FOLLOWED BY COCKPIT CONFUSION AND ACCEPTANCE OF VISUAL TFC PATTERN LEADS DCH8 CREW TO OVERSPD THE FLAPS. A CHK RIDE WAS IN PROGRESS.

Narrative: TWR ORDERED A GAR DUE TO ACFT ON RWY. I STARTED THE GAR. I CALLED FOR 'SET PWR' AND 'FLAPS 5 DEGS.' TWR ASKED IF WE COULD STAY IN PATTERN FOR R DOWNWIND BEHIND A B727 ON 2 MI FINAL. CAPT ACCEPTED THE CLRNC BUT IN HINDSIGHT, WE SHOULD HAVE ASKED FOR VECTOR FOR A SECOND APCH (AIRLINE PROCS CALL FOR THE DSCNT AND APCH CHKLISTS TO BE REACCOMPLISHED). I DID NOT HEAR THE 'POSITIVE RATE' CALL, SO I ASKED FOR 'GEAR UP.' TWR DID NOT ASSIGN AN ALT, THE CAPT PUT 1600 FT IN THE ALERTER, AND THEN CALLED 'ALT' AS WE WENT THROUGH 1600 FT FOR 2000 FT -- THE ALT I WAS PLANNING TO FLY. I STATED 'I AM GOING TO 2000 FT.' DURING THIS, WE WERE IN XWIND AND ABOUT TO TURN DOWNWIND. AS WE LEVELED AT 2000 FT, THE CAPT DISCOVERED OUR FLAPS AT 5 DEGS AND AIRSPD HAD CLBED TO 195 KTS. I CONTINUED TO REDUCE PWR TO SLOW TO 148 KTS. CONDITION LEVERS WERE STILL AT 1200 RPM. I CALLED FOR 'CONDITION LEVER 1050,' THEN GEAR DOWN LNDG CHKLIST. I TURNED BASE AND FINAL AND LANDED THE ACFT. PERCEPTIONS: THESE EVENTS HAPPENED VERY QUICKLY. ONCE THE MISTAKE WAS IDENTED, THE CAPT BECAME JUDGEMENTAL. COMS FAILED. I BELIEVE THE CAPT WAS CONCENTRATING ON HIS CHK AIRMAN DUTIES, HE FORGOT TO PERFORM THE PNF DUTIES OR TO JUST BACK ME UP IN A STRESSFUL EVENT. WE HAD 5 MORE LEGS TO FLY. THE NEXT 2 LEGS THIS CAPT LINE CHKED ME AS THE PNF AND PF, WRITING ME UP FOR 2 ITEMS. VERY HARD TO MAINTAIN GOOD CRM THE REST OF THE DAY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 468867: TWR CALLED FOR GAR DUE TO ACFT IN POS ON RWY. WE FOLLOWED COMPANY SOP FOR GAR AS FAR AS GETTING GEAR UP AND FLAPS TO INITIAL GAR SETTING. TWR ASKED US IF WE COULD STAY IN THE PATTERN INSTEAD OF RETURNING TO TRACON. SHOULD HAVE SAID NO, BUT WE SAID YES. IN THE ENSUING CONFUSION OVER TFC SEQUENCING, SETTING PATTERN ALT IN THE ALERTER, AND WHICH DIRECTION TO FLY, THE REST OF THE AFTER TKOF (OR GAR) PROC WAS DELAYED -- TOO LONG. WE OVERSPD THE FLAPS. WE REDUCED SPD, COMPLETED THE AFTER TKOF, DSCNT, APCH, AND LNDG CHKLISTS AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT. IN THE FUTURE, I WILL NOT BE SUCKERED INTO A RUSHED SCENARIO LIKE THAT, WHEN AN ALTERNATIVE IS AVAILABLE. IF WE HAD SWITCHED BACK TO DEP CTL WE WOULD HAVE HAD ENOUGH TIME TO FOLLOW PROPER PROC. ADDITIONALLY, I MUST INCREASE MY OWN VIGILANCE IN THE MONITORING (PNF) ROLE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.