Narrative:

On apr/xa/00, after completing the air work and lndgs portion of a cap form 5 check ride in a C182RG with a cap check pilot (a cfii) including several practice instrument approachs, we were level at 3000 ft MSL and heading back to home base, (hanscom field, bedford, ma-bed) for a practice ILS approach and final landing. Approximately 28 mi from bed, the check pilot pulled the power and announced we had an engine failure, and asked what I should do. With power retarded, the gear down horn immediately began sounding and continued to sound throughout the remainder of the flight. I recited to him the failed-engine-in-flight emergency procedure and he instructed me to proceed to execute the procedure. After establishing best glide, (and omitting engine restart attempts and engine and fuel shutdown because this was a simulation), I located a landing site (fitchburg airport-fit) approximately 3-4 mi at 10 O'clock position. I turned towards fit and began a gear-up flaps-up controled descent to the airport with the gear horn warning sounding throughout the descent. I descended to a point approximately 1/4 mi off the extended centerline of runway 32, turned final to the runway and set up to land approximately 1000 ft down the runway, to assure I would not land short. When I was certain I had the runway made, I added flaps, descended to the runway, flared and landed gear up. The aircraft slid straight and level to a stop. The time of the incident was approximately XA30Z. Having listened to the gear warning horn sounding during the entire descent from 3000 ft, I did not heed its warning during the descent to touchdown. Twice earlier in the day, we had practiced crosswind and touch-and-go lndgs at fit with 3-4 aircraft in the pattern. During these lndgs the wind was variable and the runway changed from runway 34 to runway 20 to runway 14 such that during the approach to landing when the gear-up occurred, I was somewhat preoccupied looking for other traffic and the possibility that another aircraft might land at the intersecting runway 02/20. In retrospect, I believe there are measures I could have implemented to prevent this incident. Having made more than 1900 lndgs in 14 yrs of flying, the majority of which were in retractable aircraft, I had established a procedure for conventional landing which has served me well up to now. Under the pressure of a flight test, the simulated emergency landing and the other distractions noted above, however, in this instance it failed me. To compensate for the potential distractions that could result from any non-standard landing I plan to institute what I hope to be a fail-safe procedure to be used for all future lndgs. This procedure will require me to check, that I have confirmed visually and orally, 'gear down and locked' at each increment of change of flap setting, and finally, when I decide I have the runway made (the point where I normally add the last 10 degrees of flaps), I will again confirm, visually, orally, and by touch that the gear is down and locked.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EXPERIENCED PLT, TAKING A CHK RIDE FOR THE CIVIL AIR PATROL, LANDED GEAR UP.

Narrative: ON APR/XA/00, AFTER COMPLETING THE AIR WORK AND LNDGS PORTION OF A CAP FORM 5 CHK RIDE IN A C182RG WITH A CAP CHK PLT (A CFII) INCLUDING SEVERAL PRACTICE INST APCHS, WE WERE LEVEL AT 3000 FT MSL AND HEADING BACK TO HOME BASE, (HANSCOM FIELD, BEDFORD, MA-BED) FOR A PRACTICE ILS APCH AND FINAL LNDG. APPROX 28 MI FROM BED, THE CHK PLT PULLED THE PWR AND ANNOUNCED WE HAD AN ENG FAILURE, AND ASKED WHAT I SHOULD DO. WITH PWR RETARDED, THE GEAR DOWN HORN IMMEDIATELY BEGAN SOUNDING AND CONTINUED TO SOUND THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. I RECITED TO HIM THE FAILED-ENG-INFLT EMER PROC AND HE INSTRUCTED ME TO PROCEED TO EXECUTE THE PROC. AFTER ESTABLISHING BEST GLIDE, (AND OMITTING ENG RESTART ATTEMPTS AND ENG AND FUEL SHUTDOWN BECAUSE THIS WAS A SIMULATION), I LOCATED A LNDG SITE (FITCHBURG ARPT-FIT) APPROX 3-4 MI AT 10 O'CLOCK POS. I TURNED TOWARDS FIT AND BEGAN A GEAR-UP FLAPS-UP CTLED DSCNT TO THE ARPT WITH THE GEAR HORN WARNING SOUNDING THROUGHOUT THE DSCNT. I DSNDED TO A POINT APPROX 1/4 MI OFF THE EXTENDED CTRLINE OF RWY 32, TURNED FINAL TO THE RWY AND SET UP TO LAND APPROX 1000 FT DOWN THE RWY, TO ASSURE I WOULD NOT LAND SHORT. WHEN I WAS CERTAIN I HAD THE RWY MADE, I ADDED FLAPS, DSNDED TO THE RWY, FLARED AND LANDED GEAR UP. THE ACFT SLID STRAIGHT AND LEVEL TO A STOP. THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WAS APPROX XA30Z. HAVING LISTENED TO THE GEAR WARNING HORN SOUNDING DURING THE ENTIRE DSCNT FROM 3000 FT, I DID NOT HEED ITS WARNING DURING THE DSCNT TO TOUCHDOWN. TWICE EARLIER IN THE DAY, WE HAD PRACTICED XWIND AND TOUCH-AND-GO LNDGS AT FIT WITH 3-4 ACFT IN THE PATTERN. DURING THESE LNDGS THE WIND WAS VARIABLE AND THE RWY CHANGED FROM RWY 34 TO RWY 20 TO RWY 14 SUCH THAT DURING THE APCH TO LNDG WHEN THE GEAR-UP OCCURRED, I WAS SOMEWHAT PREOCCUPIED LOOKING FOR OTHER TFC AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT ANOTHER ACFT MIGHT LAND AT THE INTERSECTING RWY 02/20. IN RETROSPECT, I BELIEVE THERE ARE MEASURES I COULD HAVE IMPLEMENTED TO PREVENT THIS INCIDENT. HAVING MADE MORE THAN 1900 LNDGS IN 14 YRS OF FLYING, THE MAJORITY OF WHICH WERE IN RETRACTABLE ACFT, I HAD ESTABLISHED A PROC FOR CONVENTIONAL LNDG WHICH HAS SERVED ME WELL UP TO NOW. UNDER THE PRESSURE OF A FLT TEST, THE SIMULATED EMER LNDG AND THE OTHER DISTRACTIONS NOTED ABOVE, HOWEVER, IN THIS INSTANCE IT FAILED ME. TO COMPENSATE FOR THE POTENTIAL DISTRACTIONS THAT COULD RESULT FROM ANY NON-STANDARD LNDG I PLAN TO INSTITUTE WHAT I HOPE TO BE A FAIL-SAFE PROC TO BE USED FOR ALL FUTURE LNDGS. THIS PROC WILL REQUIRE ME TO CHK, THAT I HAVE CONFIRMED VISUALLY AND ORALLY, 'GEAR DOWN AND LOCKED' AT EACH INCREMENT OF CHANGE OF FLAP SETTING, AND FINALLY, WHEN I DECIDE I HAVE THE RWY MADE (THE POINT WHERE I NORMALLY ADD THE LAST 10 DEGS OF FLAPS), I WILL AGAIN CONFIRM, VISUALLY, ORALLY, AND BY TOUCH THAT THE GEAR IS DOWN AND LOCKED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.