Narrative:

Apr/xa/00, XA50, just about sunset, though the whole valley where the airport is located was in the shadow of the mountain to the west. Sky clear except for a few cumulus around the mountains, visibility good. Called maui tower to taxi, 'taxi to runway 2 at taxiway F or taxiway east.' my call sign was my reply. I was parked near the departure end of the runway, so I had to taxi downwind which gave me a good view of the approach. I could see no traffic and the radio was quiet. Checklist complete as I approached taxiway F, I knew I could take it safely from there, but as I was in no particular hurry and there wasn't any inbound traffic that might cause an extended ground delay I elected to taxi further down to taxiway east. When taking off single engine over water, one tends to think about such things as altitude when crossing the beach. As I passed taxiway F, a C130 called tower and received clearance to cross runway 2 at taxiway K, near the departure end. A barely perceptible change in the sound and feel of the plane while taxiing caught my attention. The asphalt on this section of taxiway is not in great shape and in some places is coming apart, 'could what I'm sensing be the pavement, or is it the engine?' tuning my senses to the sound of the engine, I noticed a metallic tapping -- the sound of a valve lifter not quite pumped up. It was not the first time, as I've long suspected I'd had a lifter that occasionally goes flat. It makes a noise and vibration that probably would not be noticed by the occasional pilot or passenger, but since I fly this aircraft often, I notice. It has always been a short duration problem, going away shortly after the power is applied for takeoff. Nevertheless, the departure is over water, and I made the decision to go with it as long as I got smooth power on takeoff, otherwise I'd abort. Scan the horizon for aircraft, nothing. Scan the ground, the only thing on the airport that's moving besides me is the C130 crossing downfield. Taxiway east intersects the runway at a 45 degree angle, so that I had to make a 135 degree turn to the right to line up. Satisfied now that what was bothering me was only a noisy lifter and -- there now, it's gone -- the engine's quiet and smooth once again. Suddenly, I asked myself whether I was cleared for takeoff. The answer was no. I then asked myself whether I had been cleared into position. The answer once again was no. My clearance was to taxi to the runway, not taxiway onto the runway. I applied brakes and stopped, facing 45 degrees from the approach end of runway 2. A quick check of my position put me 1/2 way to the centerline of the runway, well past the hold line. I knew that there was no immediate danger from traffic, though I quickly scanned the approach end, found nothing, then turned to look downfield, seeing the C130 as it cleared the runway. I was not in immediate danger, nor was I an immediate hazard to others. 3-4 seconds after I first realized something was amiss, I keyed the microphone and said 'uh, XXX is ready.' there was another 3-4 second delay as the tower controller surveyed the situation and issued his decision, 'cleared for takeoff.' 'cleared for takeoff' was my reply. While the clearance 'taxi to runway...' implies 'hold short,' those words are often not spoken. My mind knows the rules, but unless I make it a point to say to myself 'hold short,' either through hearing the words spoken, a verbal readback, or even through internal dialogue, the limit of my clearance is not set. Without the limit set, it has to be set when the intersection is approached. The paint on the taxiway including the hold line at the echo intersection is old, and while visible, it does not catch the eye, and distraction as I was, I did not see the hold line, though I know it's there. I missed the opportunity to revisit the question of the limit of my clearance until after I'd crossed the line. I ran the virtual stop sign, the hold line that implies 'proceed if you have clearance, stop if you don't.' failure to set the limits of my clearance as it was received was probably the root cause of this incident. My concern for the health of my aircraft and the sanity of what I was about to do demanded my immediate attention as I was taxiing. The lack of traffic and radio chatter may have contributedby allowing my thoughts to stray away from ATC and other aircraft. The lack of cues to remind me to review the limits of my clearance definitely played a part. Perhaps a red-light, green-light system at taxiway intxns would help. Another complicating factor may have included fatigue, and though I'd had a relatively easy day and felt good, it had been 12 hours since I'd landed in maui to start my work as an electrical contractor. My work demands considerable energy, both physical and mental, and I was looking forward to a quiet flight home.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION AT OGG, HI.

Narrative: APR/XA/00, XA50, JUST ABOUT SUNSET, THOUGH THE WHOLE VALLEY WHERE THE ARPT IS LOCATED WAS IN THE SHADOW OF THE MOUNTAIN TO THE W. SKY CLR EXCEPT FOR A FEW CUMULUS AROUND THE MOUNTAINS, VISIBILITY GOOD. CALLED MAUI TWR TO TAXI, 'TAXI TO RWY 2 AT TXWY F OR TXWY E.' MY CALL SIGN WAS MY REPLY. I WAS PARKED NEAR THE DEP END OF THE RWY, SO I HAD TO TAXI DOWNWIND WHICH GAVE ME A GOOD VIEW OF THE APCH. I COULD SEE NO TFC AND THE RADIO WAS QUIET. CHKLIST COMPLETE AS I APCHED TXWY F, I KNEW I COULD TAKE IT SAFELY FROM THERE, BUT AS I WAS IN NO PARTICULAR HURRY AND THERE WASN'T ANY INBOUND TFC THAT MIGHT CAUSE AN EXTENDED GND DELAY I ELECTED TO TAXI FURTHER DOWN TO TXWY E. WHEN TAKING OFF SINGLE ENG OVER WATER, ONE TENDS TO THINK ABOUT SUCH THINGS AS ALT WHEN XING THE BEACH. AS I PASSED TXWY F, A C130 CALLED TWR AND RECEIVED CLRNC TO CROSS RWY 2 AT TXWY K, NEAR THE DEP END. A BARELY PERCEPTIBLE CHANGE IN THE SOUND AND FEEL OF THE PLANE WHILE TAXIING CAUGHT MY ATTN. THE ASPHALT ON THIS SECTION OF TXWY IS NOT IN GREAT SHAPE AND IN SOME PLACES IS COMING APART, 'COULD WHAT I'M SENSING BE THE PAVEMENT, OR IS IT THE ENG?' TUNING MY SENSES TO THE SOUND OF THE ENG, I NOTICED A METALLIC TAPPING -- THE SOUND OF A VALVE LIFTER NOT QUITE PUMPED UP. IT WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME, AS I'VE LONG SUSPECTED I'D HAD A LIFTER THAT OCCASIONALLY GOES FLAT. IT MAKES A NOISE AND VIBRATION THAT PROBABLY WOULD NOT BE NOTICED BY THE OCCASIONAL PLT OR PAX, BUT SINCE I FLY THIS ACFT OFTEN, I NOTICE. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A SHORT DURATION PROB, GOING AWAY SHORTLY AFTER THE PWR IS APPLIED FOR TKOF. NEVERTHELESS, THE DEP IS OVER WATER, AND I MADE THE DECISION TO GO WITH IT AS LONG AS I GOT SMOOTH PWR ON TKOF, OTHERWISE I'D ABORT. SCAN THE HORIZON FOR ACFT, NOTHING. SCAN THE GND, THE ONLY THING ON THE ARPT THAT'S MOVING BESIDES ME IS THE C130 XING DOWNFIELD. TXWY E INTERSECTS THE RWY AT A 45 DEG ANGLE, SO THAT I HAD TO MAKE A 135 DEG TURN TO THE R TO LINE UP. SATISFIED NOW THAT WHAT WAS BOTHERING ME WAS ONLY A NOISY LIFTER AND -- THERE NOW, IT'S GONE -- THE ENG'S QUIET AND SMOOTH ONCE AGAIN. SUDDENLY, I ASKED MYSELF WHETHER I WAS CLRED FOR TKOF. THE ANSWER WAS NO. I THEN ASKED MYSELF WHETHER I HAD BEEN CLRED INTO POS. THE ANSWER ONCE AGAIN WAS NO. MY CLRNC WAS TO TAXI TO THE RWY, NOT TXWY ONTO THE RWY. I APPLIED BRAKES AND STOPPED, FACING 45 DEGS FROM THE APCH END OF RWY 2. A QUICK CHK OF MY POS PUT ME 1/2 WAY TO THE CTRLINE OF THE RWY, WELL PAST THE HOLD LINE. I KNEW THAT THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE DANGER FROM TFC, THOUGH I QUICKLY SCANNED THE APCH END, FOUND NOTHING, THEN TURNED TO LOOK DOWNFIELD, SEEING THE C130 AS IT CLRED THE RWY. I WAS NOT IN IMMEDIATE DANGER, NOR WAS I AN IMMEDIATE HAZARD TO OTHERS. 3-4 SECONDS AFTER I FIRST REALIZED SOMETHING WAS AMISS, I KEYED THE MIKE AND SAID 'UH, XXX IS READY.' THERE WAS ANOTHER 3-4 SECOND DELAY AS THE TWR CTLR SURVEYED THE SIT AND ISSUED HIS DECISION, 'CLRED FOR TKOF.' 'CLRED FOR TKOF' WAS MY REPLY. WHILE THE CLRNC 'TAXI TO RWY...' IMPLIES 'HOLD SHORT,' THOSE WORDS ARE OFTEN NOT SPOKEN. MY MIND KNOWS THE RULES, BUT UNLESS I MAKE IT A POINT TO SAY TO MYSELF 'HOLD SHORT,' EITHER THROUGH HEARING THE WORDS SPOKEN, A VERBAL READBACK, OR EVEN THROUGH INTERNAL DIALOGUE, THE LIMIT OF MY CLRNC IS NOT SET. WITHOUT THE LIMIT SET, IT HAS TO BE SET WHEN THE INTXN IS APCHED. THE PAINT ON THE TXWY INCLUDING THE HOLD LINE AT THE ECHO INTXN IS OLD, AND WHILE VISIBLE, IT DOES NOT CATCH THE EYE, AND DISTR AS I WAS, I DID NOT SEE THE HOLD LINE, THOUGH I KNOW IT'S THERE. I MISSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVISIT THE QUESTION OF THE LIMIT OF MY CLRNC UNTIL AFTER I'D CROSSED THE LINE. I RAN THE VIRTUAL STOP SIGN, THE HOLD LINE THAT IMPLIES 'PROCEED IF YOU HAVE CLRNC, STOP IF YOU DON'T.' FAILURE TO SET THE LIMITS OF MY CLRNC AS IT WAS RECEIVED WAS PROBABLY THE ROOT CAUSE OF THIS INCIDENT. MY CONCERN FOR THE HEALTH OF MY ACFT AND THE SANITY OF WHAT I WAS ABOUT TO DO DEMANDED MY IMMEDIATE ATTN AS I WAS TAXIING. THE LACK OF TFC AND RADIO CHATTER MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTEDBY ALLOWING MY THOUGHTS TO STRAY AWAY FROM ATC AND OTHER ACFT. THE LACK OF CUES TO REMIND ME TO REVIEW THE LIMITS OF MY CLRNC DEFINITELY PLAYED A PART. PERHAPS A RED-LIGHT, GREEN-LIGHT SYS AT TXWY INTXNS WOULD HELP. ANOTHER COMPLICATING FACTOR MAY HAVE INCLUDED FATIGUE, AND THOUGH I'D HAD A RELATIVELY EASY DAY AND FELT GOOD, IT HAD BEEN 12 HRS SINCE I'D LANDED IN MAUI TO START MY WORK AS AN ELECTRICAL CONTRACTOR. MY WORK DEMANDS CONSIDERABLE ENERGY, BOTH PHYSICAL AND MENTAL, AND I WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO A QUIET FLT HOME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.