Narrative:

I was working sector 2 at ZBW. There were more than 20 aircraft in the sector, thunderstorms in the vicinity of ene VORTAC, WX rertes for atl, clt, and ewr, along with in trail restrs for these and other airports. At approximately XA05Z my supervisor advised that the next sector would not take any additional aircraft. I began issuing vectors, altitude changes, to keep aircraft in my airspace, and set up holding. Air carrier X was one of 4 aircraft in trail for jfk and approaching the sector boundary. I issued all 4 aircraft radar vectors heading 180 degrees into an adjoining sector that was not as busy as directed by my supervisor. Automated handoff had been initiated to the first sector, so I reinitiated the handoffs for all 4 aircraft to the adjoining sector. The computer input for air carrier X was unsuccessful and continued to 'flash' to the original sector. I did not notice this error. Subsequently, the original sector unexplainably accepted the handoff on air carrier X. I thought that I had reinitiated the handoff to the adjacent sector successfully, and that, therefore, he had accepted the handoff. The radar associate controller dropped the data block from my display prior to my issuing a frequency change to the aircraft, and I failed to notice and correct the situation. The aircraft flew for 8-10 mins through the next sector, with only a limited data block displayed, which the next controller never noticed. The next controller vectored another aircraft into air carrier X. At XA15Z air carrier X reported a TCASII climb on my frequency. I determined the aircraft's position, that separation had been re-established, then changed the aircraft to the proper frequency. The problem was caused by the failure to reinitiate the handoff to the correct sector. This was affected by very high traffic volume and complexity. Other associated system problems that occurred affecting the outcome: poor flow control, no warning of a 'red sector,' supervisor not assigning a handoff controller as extra help, unexplained action of the controller accepting the handoff after stating they would take no more aircraft and then not saying or doing anything when the aircraft flew around his sector, failure of the controller and supervisor to notice a limited data block for 8-10 mins in his airspace and take appropriate action. Thankfully, TCASII works. Supplemental information from acn 472329: on may/xa/00 I was assigned to the radar associate position at sector 2. Traffic management unit had WX rertes in for atl and ewr sending both rtes over bos. This, in addition to the jfk arrs, phl and southern east coast bound aircraft that are over bos. We were issuing the rertes and providing 20 mi in trail to atl, iad, all traffic rted over cmk and in trail for jfk. In effect, traffic management unit had everything funneling down to 1 spot to go east around an eastbound WX system. When the WX closed in, the door got slammed and sector 46, over bos, shut us off with no notice. We had 20 some aircraft with no place to go. The radar controller began vectoring to contain the aircraft north our sector. I began working to try to find a place to put them. The sector to our southeast, sector 17, volunteered to offload the jfk traffic. The radar controller turned the first 4 aircraft to 180 degree headings. The first 3 were flashed to sector 17, the last was still flashing to sector 46. As sector 17 took the first 3, they were switched. Sector 46 accepted the handoff on the 4TH air carrier X, although he was now headed into sector 17. The radar controller was now issuing holding to aircraft and I was updating the database to offload the ewr aircraft to the low sector. Neither one of us noticed that air carrier X was handed off to the wrong sector and had not been frequency changed. 7 mins later, the air carrier X reported climbing on a TCASII resolution. The air carrier X, whom was not displayed on sector 17, had crossed back over air carrier Y. Even at that point we xferred communications and did not realize we had entered sector 17 without a handoff. Traffic management did nothing to assist us as the traffic situation deteriorated. They put everyone down one route, but because each restr was issued separately they failed to see that they were overloading one sector. Even after the sector overload software alerted them they failed to monitor the situation and take action. The neighboring sectors and our supvrswere able to keep the situation from becoming even worse than it did.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZBW ARTCC CTLR INADVERTENTLY HANDED TFC OFF TO THE WRONG SECTOR RESULTING IN AN OPDEV.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING SECTOR 2 AT ZBW. THERE WERE MORE THAN 20 ACFT IN THE SECTOR, TSTMS IN THE VICINITY OF ENE VORTAC, WX RERTES FOR ATL, CLT, AND EWR, ALONG WITH IN TRAIL RESTRS FOR THESE AND OTHER ARPTS. AT APPROX XA05Z MY SUPVR ADVISED THAT THE NEXT SECTOR WOULD NOT TAKE ANY ADDITIONAL ACFT. I BEGAN ISSUING VECTORS, ALT CHANGES, TO KEEP ACFT IN MY AIRSPACE, AND SET UP HOLDING. ACR X WAS ONE OF 4 ACFT IN TRAIL FOR JFK AND APCHING THE SECTOR BOUNDARY. I ISSUED ALL 4 ACFT RADAR VECTORS HDG 180 DEGS INTO AN ADJOINING SECTOR THAT WAS NOT AS BUSY AS DIRECTED BY MY SUPVR. AUTOMATED HDOF HAD BEEN INITIATED TO THE FIRST SECTOR, SO I REINITIATED THE HDOFS FOR ALL 4 ACFT TO THE ADJOINING SECTOR. THE COMPUTER INPUT FOR ACR X WAS UNSUCCESSFUL AND CONTINUED TO 'FLASH' TO THE ORIGINAL SECTOR. I DID NOT NOTICE THIS ERROR. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ORIGINAL SECTOR UNEXPLAINABLY ACCEPTED THE HDOF ON ACR X. I THOUGHT THAT I HAD REINITIATED THE HDOF TO THE ADJACENT SECTOR SUCCESSFULLY, AND THAT, THEREFORE, HE HAD ACCEPTED THE HDOF. THE RADAR ASSOCIATE CTLR DROPPED THE DATA BLOCK FROM MY DISPLAY PRIOR TO MY ISSUING A FREQ CHANGE TO THE ACFT, AND I FAILED TO NOTICE AND CORRECT THE SIT. THE ACFT FLEW FOR 8-10 MINS THROUGH THE NEXT SECTOR, WITH ONLY A LIMITED DATA BLOCK DISPLAYED, WHICH THE NEXT CTLR NEVER NOTICED. THE NEXT CTLR VECTORED ANOTHER ACFT INTO ACR X. AT XA15Z ACR X RPTED A TCASII CLB ON MY FREQ. I DETERMINED THE ACFT'S POS, THAT SEPARATION HAD BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED, THEN CHANGED THE ACFT TO THE PROPER FREQ. THE PROB WAS CAUSED BY THE FAILURE TO REINITIATE THE HDOF TO THE CORRECT SECTOR. THIS WAS AFFECTED BY VERY HIGH TFC VOLUME AND COMPLEXITY. OTHER ASSOCIATED SYS PROBS THAT OCCURRED AFFECTING THE OUTCOME: POOR FLOW CTL, NO WARNING OF A 'RED SECTOR,' SUPVR NOT ASSIGNING A HDOF CTLR AS EXTRA HELP, UNEXPLAINED ACTION OF THE CTLR ACCEPTING THE HDOF AFTER STATING THEY WOULD TAKE NO MORE ACFT AND THEN NOT SAYING OR DOING ANYTHING WHEN THE ACFT FLEW AROUND HIS SECTOR, FAILURE OF THE CTLR AND SUPVR TO NOTICE A LIMITED DATA BLOCK FOR 8-10 MINS IN HIS AIRSPACE AND TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION. THANKFULLY, TCASII WORKS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 472329: ON MAY/XA/00 I WAS ASSIGNED TO THE RADAR ASSOCIATE POS AT SECTOR 2. TFC MGMNT UNIT HAD WX RERTES IN FOR ATL AND EWR SENDING BOTH RTES OVER BOS. THIS, IN ADDITION TO THE JFK ARRS, PHL AND SOUTHERN EAST COAST BOUND ACFT THAT ARE OVER BOS. WE WERE ISSUING THE RERTES AND PROVIDING 20 MI IN TRAIL TO ATL, IAD, ALL TFC RTED OVER CMK AND IN TRAIL FOR JFK. IN EFFECT, TFC MGMNT UNIT HAD EVERYTHING FUNNELING DOWN TO 1 SPOT TO GO E AROUND AN EBOUND WX SYS. WHEN THE WX CLOSED IN, THE DOOR GOT SLAMMED AND SECTOR 46, OVER BOS, SHUT US OFF WITH NO NOTICE. WE HAD 20 SOME ACFT WITH NO PLACE TO GO. THE RADAR CTLR BEGAN VECTORING TO CONTAIN THE ACFT N OUR SECTOR. I BEGAN WORKING TO TRY TO FIND A PLACE TO PUT THEM. THE SECTOR TO OUR SE, SECTOR 17, VOLUNTEERED TO OFFLOAD THE JFK TFC. THE RADAR CTLR TURNED THE FIRST 4 ACFT TO 180 DEG HDGS. THE FIRST 3 WERE FLASHED TO SECTOR 17, THE LAST WAS STILL FLASHING TO SECTOR 46. AS SECTOR 17 TOOK THE FIRST 3, THEY WERE SWITCHED. SECTOR 46 ACCEPTED THE HDOF ON THE 4TH ACR X, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOW HEADED INTO SECTOR 17. THE RADAR CTLR WAS NOW ISSUING HOLDING TO ACFT AND I WAS UPDATING THE DATABASE TO OFFLOAD THE EWR ACFT TO THE LOW SECTOR. NEITHER ONE OF US NOTICED THAT ACR X WAS HANDED OFF TO THE WRONG SECTOR AND HAD NOT BEEN FREQ CHANGED. 7 MINS LATER, THE ACR X RPTED CLBING ON A TCASII RESOLUTION. THE ACR X, WHOM WAS NOT DISPLAYED ON SECTOR 17, HAD CROSSED BACK OVER ACR Y. EVEN AT THAT POINT WE XFERRED COMS AND DID NOT REALIZE WE HAD ENTERED SECTOR 17 WITHOUT A HDOF. TFC MGMNT DID NOTHING TO ASSIST US AS THE TFC SIT DETERIORATED. THEY PUT EVERYONE DOWN ONE RTE, BUT BECAUSE EACH RESTR WAS ISSUED SEPARATELY THEY FAILED TO SEE THAT THEY WERE OVERLOADING ONE SECTOR. EVEN AFTER THE SECTOR OVERLOAD SOFTWARE ALERTED THEM THEY FAILED TO MONITOR THE SIT AND TAKE ACTION. THE NEIGHBORING SECTORS AND OUR SUPVRSWERE ABLE TO KEEP THE SIT FROM BECOMING EVEN WORSE THAN IT DID.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.