Narrative:

As the international relief officer on a round trip from guam to hkg, we were on the final leg of our trip on the way to guam. I had relieved the captain for crew rest en route and he returned to the cockpit about 200 mi out of guam. Just prior to his return, center had requested us to slow 30 KTS for sequencing, which I did. The first officer then suggested that we request the right runway which would allow us to maintain our speed (as they had done the previous night in accordance with the captain's desire). After this was relayed to center, we resumed our speed and the captain relieved me at the controls. From this time on, the other aircraft involved was in sight off our left side, starting at about 20 mi separation (same type aircraft). There was communication between aircraft and center regarding sequencing and separation. The other aircraft was concerned about too close to us -- referencing a similar situation from a previous night. After being cleared for descent and expecting a visual approach to runway 6L to follow the other flight, the captain of our aircraft maintained speed in descent (possibly in VNAV autoplt) and at one point received a speed 'clacker' warning. At this point I observed that he hand flew the aircraft out of the speed warning regime. With the discussions between aircraft, controllers, and trying to maintain visual contact with the other aircraft in VMC, our aircraft did not slow below 250 KTS within 12 mi and 10000 ft. This all may have been part of a 'hurry-up competitiveness' on the part of the captain. Prior to turning final, our captain executed a r-hand 360 degree turn to obtain more landing separation from the other aircraft. As a third crew member on this flight, I thought most of the aircraft-to-aircraft communication was a friendly 'competitiveness' until I found out later that there was a real concern for clearance on the part of the other crew. The captain of our flight did not use good judgement in his descent and approach, the first officer went along with it as it was the 'captain's nature,' and the international relief officer did not speak up to interrupt the flow of events, not thinking it was a safety issue, and also knowing the captain's personality. All this led to a conflict which could have been easily avoided by not being in such a hurry to get home, using CRM and sticking to standard procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RELIEF PLT MONITORING ARR TO GUAM HAS CONCERNS ABOUT THE CREW'S OP AS LED BY THE CAPT.

Narrative: AS THE IRO ON A ROUND TRIP FROM GUAM TO HKG, WE WERE ON THE FINAL LEG OF OUR TRIP ON THE WAY TO GUAM. I HAD RELIEVED THE CAPT FOR CREW REST ENRTE AND HE RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT ABOUT 200 MI OUT OF GUAM. JUST PRIOR TO HIS RETURN, CTR HAD REQUESTED US TO SLOW 30 KTS FOR SEQUENCING, WHICH I DID. THE FO THEN SUGGESTED THAT WE REQUEST THE R RWY WHICH WOULD ALLOW US TO MAINTAIN OUR SPD (AS THEY HAD DONE THE PREVIOUS NIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CAPT'S DESIRE). AFTER THIS WAS RELAYED TO CTR, WE RESUMED OUR SPD AND THE CAPT RELIEVED ME AT THE CTLS. FROM THIS TIME ON, THE OTHER ACFT INVOLVED WAS IN SIGHT OFF OUR L SIDE, STARTING AT ABOUT 20 MI SEPARATION (SAME TYPE ACFT). THERE WAS COM BTWN ACFT AND CTR REGARDING SEQUENCING AND SEPARATION. THE OTHER ACFT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT TOO CLOSE TO US -- REFING A SIMILAR SIT FROM A PREVIOUS NIGHT. AFTER BEING CLRED FOR DSCNT AND EXPECTING A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 6L TO FOLLOW THE OTHER FLT, THE CAPT OF OUR ACFT MAINTAINED SPD IN DSCNT (POSSIBLY IN VNAV AUTOPLT) AND AT ONE POINT RECEIVED A SPD 'CLACKER' WARNING. AT THIS POINT I OBSERVED THAT HE HAND FLEW THE ACFT OUT OF THE SPD WARNING REGIME. WITH THE DISCUSSIONS BTWN ACFT, CTLRS, AND TRYING TO MAINTAIN VISUAL CONTACT WITH THE OTHER ACFT IN VMC, OUR ACFT DID NOT SLOW BELOW 250 KTS WITHIN 12 MI AND 10000 FT. THIS ALL MAY HAVE BEEN PART OF A 'HURRY-UP COMPETITIVENESS' ON THE PART OF THE CAPT. PRIOR TO TURNING FINAL, OUR CAPT EXECUTED A R-HAND 360 DEG TURN TO OBTAIN MORE LNDG SEPARATION FROM THE OTHER ACFT. AS A THIRD CREW MEMBER ON THIS FLT, I THOUGHT MOST OF THE ACFT-TO-ACFT COM WAS A FRIENDLY 'COMPETITIVENESS' UNTIL I FOUND OUT LATER THAT THERE WAS A REAL CONCERN FOR CLRNC ON THE PART OF THE OTHER CREW. THE CAPT OF OUR FLT DID NOT USE GOOD JUDGEMENT IN HIS DSCNT AND APCH, THE FO WENT ALONG WITH IT AS IT WAS THE 'CAPT'S NATURE,' AND THE IRO DID NOT SPEAK UP TO INTERRUPT THE FLOW OF EVENTS, NOT THINKING IT WAS A SAFETY ISSUE, AND ALSO KNOWING THE CAPT'S PERSONALITY. ALL THIS LED TO A CONFLICT WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN EASILY AVOIDED BY NOT BEING IN SUCH A HURRY TO GET HOME, USING CRM AND STICKING TO STANDARD PROCS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.