Narrative:

A VFR OH58 helicopter requested a 'bravo' corridor departure from the helicopter pad on the southeast corner of the airport. He was instructed to hold on the pad for a C182 on left base for runway 25. Once the C182 turned final, the OH58 was cleared for takeoff and 'bravo' corridor approved. (The bravo corridor LOA says to remain southeast of the final approach course for runway 25.) the VFR C182 was then turned right to enter a downwind for runway 20 and be sequenced behind a DH8 on a 4 mi final. An IFR C182 checked in from the northeast for a right base entry to runway 25 and was cleared to land. I then continued to work the VFR C182 behind the DH8 and in front of a BE20 practice ILS to runway 16 (a converging runway with runway 20). I had advised the BE20 that I was unable to work with him in the VFR traffic pattern due to volume, and then I heard the OH58 say 'I have the traffic 100 ft off my left.' the IFR C182 to runway 25 never reported the traffic. Other traffic that I had during the situation was: an H60 on a VFR departure from the helicopter pad, an LJ25 IFR departure to the east, an F16 departure to the southeast, and a B737 taxiing on the mid-field txwys to the gate. One major factor was that there were only 2 people in the tower working 4 position. The ground controller was working combined with clearance delivery and controller-in-charge. Scanning the runways and airspace was reduced due to the added duties. Also, due to where the tower is located, I was walking from the east side of the tower to see my strips and write departure times, and back to the west side of the tower to sequence my runway 20 downwind traffic. To prevent this type of situation from happening, staffing needs to be increased at ric. Controllers usually work twice as many aircraft per position than the average controller does at other facilities. The time on position (T.O.P.) per day remains high, as high as any other facility that I know. If it were just a bit hazy (the way it gets during the summer at ric) and the IFR C182 overshot the base leg to runway 25, the outcome could have been much worse.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ATCT LCL CTLR AT RIC LOST SEPARATION BTWN A DEPARTING HELI AND AN ARRIVING IFR C182.

Narrative: A VFR OH58 HELI REQUESTED A 'BRAVO' CORRIDOR DEP FROM THE HELI PAD ON THE SE CORNER OF THE ARPT. HE WAS INSTRUCTED TO HOLD ON THE PAD FOR A C182 ON L BASE FOR RWY 25. ONCE THE C182 TURNED FINAL, THE OH58 WAS CLRED FOR TKOF AND 'BRAVO' CORRIDOR APPROVED. (THE BRAVO CORRIDOR LOA SAYS TO REMAIN SE OF THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR RWY 25.) THE VFR C182 WAS THEN TURNED R TO ENTER A DOWNWIND FOR RWY 20 AND BE SEQUENCED BEHIND A DH8 ON A 4 MI FINAL. AN IFR C182 CHKED IN FROM THE NE FOR A R BASE ENTRY TO RWY 25 AND WAS CLRED TO LAND. I THEN CONTINUED TO WORK THE VFR C182 BEHIND THE DH8 AND IN FRONT OF A BE20 PRACTICE ILS TO RWY 16 (A CONVERGING RWY WITH RWY 20). I HAD ADVISED THE BE20 THAT I WAS UNABLE TO WORK WITH HIM IN THE VFR TFC PATTERN DUE TO VOLUME, AND THEN I HEARD THE OH58 SAY 'I HAVE THE TFC 100 FT OFF MY L.' THE IFR C182 TO RWY 25 NEVER RPTED THE TFC. OTHER TFC THAT I HAD DURING THE SIT WAS: AN H60 ON A VFR DEP FROM THE HELI PAD, AN LJ25 IFR DEP TO THE E, AN F16 DEP TO THE SE, AND A B737 TAXIING ON THE MID-FIELD TXWYS TO THE GATE. ONE MAJOR FACTOR WAS THAT THERE WERE ONLY 2 PEOPLE IN THE TWR WORKING 4 POS. THE GND CTLR WAS WORKING COMBINED WITH CLRNC DELIVERY AND CTLR-IN-CHARGE. SCANNING THE RWYS AND AIRSPACE WAS REDUCED DUE TO THE ADDED DUTIES. ALSO, DUE TO WHERE THE TWR IS LOCATED, I WAS WALKING FROM THE E SIDE OF THE TWR TO SEE MY STRIPS AND WRITE DEP TIMES, AND BACK TO THE W SIDE OF THE TWR TO SEQUENCE MY RWY 20 DOWNWIND TFC. TO PREVENT THIS TYPE OF SIT FROM HAPPENING, STAFFING NEEDS TO BE INCREASED AT RIC. CTLRS USUALLY WORK TWICE AS MANY ACFT PER POS THAN THE AVERAGE CTLR DOES AT OTHER FACILITIES. THE TIME ON POS (T.O.P.) PER DAY REMAINS HIGH, AS HIGH AS ANY OTHER FACILITY THAT I KNOW. IF IT WERE JUST A BIT HAZY (THE WAY IT GETS DURING THE SUMMER AT RIC) AND THE IFR C182 OVERSHOT THE BASE LEG TO RWY 25, THE OUTCOME COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.