Narrative:

We had pushed back at pdx and had received a taxi clearance to runway 10R via txwys E3, east, B, hold short of runway 21. In the meantime, operations had called saying the computer had just gone down and the weight and balance data would have to be figured manually and that he would call back in a few mins when he had it done. The captain commenced taxi to the assigned runway for departure (runway 10R). The aircraft was still headed in a direction that made it impossible for the captain to see out the right side of the aircraft to the approach end of runway 21. The speed of our aircraft upon approaching the hold short lines was such that I could see the captain wasn't going to hold short. So I stated clearly 'hold short of runway 21' to which he replied (I believe) 'hold short of runway 28.' I restated 'hold short, hold short' and I didn't see significant braking taking place. By this time the aircraft had turned enough that I could see to the threshold and I saw an aircraft either taking off or going around (it was sent around by the tower, we later discovered). When I saw this, I jumped on the brakes and brought the aircraft to a stop. It was an abrupt stop. The flight attendants were somewhat startled, so the captain made a PA to calm the masses. We watched the beech 99, a 135 cargo carrier, continued on the go around. Ground then calls up and states 'cross runway 21, taxi to runway 10R' with no other statements. We acknowledge and proceed. We arrive at and hold short of runway 10R, get the numbers, set the aircraft up for departure, run the checklist, and then contact the tower. Upon initial contact with the tower, we get the 'call this phone number upon landing' routine. This incident can be categorized, I feel, as a human factors problem. No procedure, per southeast, failed. No piece of equipment failed. No checklist failed, there was no checklist for this type of situation. It was entirely human factors. I could have restated to the captain after reading back the taxi clearance that we were to hold short of runway 21. I assumed the captain heard the taxi clearance with the restr from both the controller when he stated it as well as when I read it back to the controller (including the hold short restr). I could have been more assertive or forceful on the 'hold short of runway 21' command as the captain approached the hold short bars. Oddly enough, assertiveness is something I was encouraged by an instructor on my last 'pc' to develop or display more. He could have reverified with me or the controller the hold short instructions. He could have asked me to verify with the controller the hold short instructions. He could have stopped the aircraft and asked me to take a look, if possible, to verify the approach path to the crossing runway was clear. General factors: this flight was a first flight for this crew. The captain and I had never flown together. I have been at this carrier for 15 months and was ZZZ based. He has been here for more than 15 yrs and is XXX based. I have read that accident statistics show that new-crew, first-flight, captain's leg have the highest proportion of incidents and accidents. Of course, one way to reduce the risk is have the first officer fly the first leg. The aircraft still has to be taxied and there is no way to give that to the first officer and have the captain supervise and make decisions. And taxi-for-takeoff can be one of the most confusing and time crunched parts of the flight. (Talking to operations, getting the numbers, setting up the aircraft, determining the taxi routing, not hitting something on the ramp, etc, etc.) distractions. Operations computer went down forcing operations agent to do weight and balance manually causing some additional xmissions back and forth, and delaying set up aircraft power settings, airspeed bugs, pms computer, and as a result the taxi checklist. This threw me off of my normal flow and routine. This leads to: assumptions and taken-for-granteds. I assume that after a guy gets 15 yrs under his belt at a given carrier, he's going to have seen it all and know his way around all the airports in the system intimately. It didn't occur to me that this fellow might not have ben into pdx in a while or not remembered that the runway 2/20 was renamed 3/21 a couple of yrs ago. He later told methat it just didn't ring a bell with him and that's why hold short of runway 21 just didn't sink in. At this carrier, the junior pilots are on reserve, a feeble system at best. One in which the least experienced first officer's are usually fling with the least experienced capts. One in which the reserve pilot may or may not fly enough to stay confident of his abilities either in the aircraft or in certain airports or sits. A system in which a pilot may not know where to or when he is flying until 2 hours prior to the fact. This is not a criticism of the system, just a statement of some factors involved for this first officer on reserve. Other. Airport signage: pdx airport signage is very standard and good quality. Signage sitting seems to be somewhat lacking in this vicinity of the airport.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DISTR, FIRST TIME TOGETHER MD80 FLC CROSSES THE HOLD LINE FOR RWY 21 CREATING A TWR INDUCED ACFT GAR ON RWY 21 AT PDX, OR.

Narrative: WE HAD PUSHED BACK AT PDX AND HAD RECEIVED A TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 10R VIA TXWYS E3, E, B, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 21. IN THE MEANTIME, OPS HAD CALLED SAYING THE COMPUTER HAD JUST GONE DOWN AND THE WT AND BAL DATA WOULD HAVE TO BE FIGURED MANUALLY AND THAT HE WOULD CALL BACK IN A FEW MINS WHEN HE HAD IT DONE. THE CAPT COMMENCED TAXI TO THE ASSIGNED RWY FOR DEP (RWY 10R). THE ACFT WAS STILL HEADED IN A DIRECTION THAT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE CAPT TO SEE OUT THE R SIDE OF THE ACFT TO THE APCH END OF RWY 21. THE SPD OF OUR ACFT UPON APCHING THE HOLD SHORT LINES WAS SUCH THAT I COULD SEE THE CAPT WASN'T GOING TO HOLD SHORT. SO I STATED CLRLY 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 21' TO WHICH HE REPLIED (I BELIEVE) 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28.' I RESTATED 'HOLD SHORT, HOLD SHORT' AND I DIDN'T SEE SIGNIFICANT BRAKING TAKING PLACE. BY THIS TIME THE ACFT HAD TURNED ENOUGH THAT I COULD SEE TO THE THRESHOLD AND I SAW AN ACFT EITHER TAKING OFF OR GOING AROUND (IT WAS SENT AROUND BY THE TWR, WE LATER DISCOVERED). WHEN I SAW THIS, I JUMPED ON THE BRAKES AND BROUGHT THE ACFT TO A STOP. IT WAS AN ABRUPT STOP. THE FLT ATTENDANTS WERE SOMEWHAT STARTLED, SO THE CAPT MADE A PA TO CALM THE MASSES. WE WATCHED THE BEECH 99, A 135 CARGO CARRIER, CONTINUED ON THE GO AROUND. GND THEN CALLS UP AND STATES 'CROSS RWY 21, TAXI TO RWY 10R' WITH NO OTHER STATEMENTS. WE ACKNOWLEDGE AND PROCEED. WE ARRIVE AT AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 10R, GET THE NUMBERS, SET THE ACFT UP FOR DEP, RUN THE CHKLIST, AND THEN CONTACT THE TWR. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE TWR, WE GET THE 'CALL THIS PHONE NUMBER UPON LNDG' ROUTINE. THIS INCIDENT CAN BE CATEGORIZED, I FEEL, AS A HUMAN FACTORS PROB. NO PROC, PER SE, FAILED. NO PIECE OF EQUIP FAILED. NO CHKLIST FAILED, THERE WAS NO CHKLIST FOR THIS TYPE OF SIT. IT WAS ENTIRELY HUMAN FACTORS. I COULD HAVE RESTATED TO THE CAPT AFTER READING BACK THE TAXI CLRNC THAT WE WERE TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 21. I ASSUMED THE CAPT HEARD THE TAXI CLRNC WITH THE RESTR FROM BOTH THE CTLR WHEN HE STATED IT AS WELL AS WHEN I READ IT BACK TO THE CTLR (INCLUDING THE HOLD SHORT RESTR). I COULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE OR FORCEFUL ON THE 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 21' COMMAND AS THE CAPT APCHED THE HOLD SHORT BARS. ODDLY ENOUGH, ASSERTIVENESS IS SOMETHING I WAS ENCOURAGED BY AN INSTRUCTOR ON MY LAST 'PC' TO DEVELOP OR DISPLAY MORE. HE COULD HAVE REVERIFIED WITH ME OR THE CTLR THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. HE COULD HAVE ASKED ME TO VERIFY WITH THE CTLR THE HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS. HE COULD HAVE STOPPED THE ACFT AND ASKED ME TO TAKE A LOOK, IF POSSIBLE, TO VERIFY THE APCH PATH TO THE XING RWY WAS CLR. GENERAL FACTORS: THIS FLT WAS A FIRST FLT FOR THIS CREW. THE CAPT AND I HAD NEVER FLOWN TOGETHER. I HAVE BEEN AT THIS CARRIER FOR 15 MONTHS AND WAS ZZZ BASED. HE HAS BEEN HERE FOR MORE THAN 15 YRS AND IS XXX BASED. I HAVE READ THAT ACCIDENT STATISTICS SHOW THAT NEW-CREW, FIRST-FLT, CAPT'S LEG HAVE THE HIGHEST PROPORTION OF INCIDENTS AND ACCIDENTS. OF COURSE, ONE WAY TO REDUCE THE RISK IS HAVE THE FO FLY THE FIRST LEG. THE ACFT STILL HAS TO BE TAXIED AND THERE IS NO WAY TO GIVE THAT TO THE FO AND HAVE THE CAPT SUPERVISE AND MAKE DECISIONS. AND TAXI-FOR-TKOF CAN BE ONE OF THE MOST CONFUSING AND TIME CRUNCHED PARTS OF THE FLT. (TALKING TO OPS, GETTING THE NUMBERS, SETTING UP THE ACFT, DETERMINING THE TAXI ROUTING, NOT HITTING SOMETHING ON THE RAMP, ETC, ETC.) DISTRACTIONS. OPS COMPUTER WENT DOWN FORCING OPS AGENT TO DO WT AND BAL MANUALLY CAUSING SOME ADDITIONAL XMISSIONS BACK AND FORTH, AND DELAYING SET UP ACFT PWR SETTINGS, AIRSPD BUGS, PMS COMPUTER, AND AS A RESULT THE TAXI CHKLIST. THIS THREW ME OFF OF MY NORMAL FLOW AND ROUTINE. THIS LEADS TO: ASSUMPTIONS AND TAKEN-FOR-GRANTEDS. I ASSUME THAT AFTER A GUY GETS 15 YRS UNDER HIS BELT AT A GIVEN CARRIER, HE'S GOING TO HAVE SEEN IT ALL AND KNOW HIS WAY AROUND ALL THE ARPTS IN THE SYS INTIMATELY. IT DIDN'T OCCUR TO ME THAT THIS FELLOW MIGHT NOT HAVE BEN INTO PDX IN A WHILE OR NOT REMEMBERED THAT THE RWY 2/20 WAS RENAMED 3/21 A COUPLE OF YRS AGO. HE LATER TOLD METHAT IT JUST DIDN'T RING A BELL WITH HIM AND THAT'S WHY HOLD SHORT OF RWY 21 JUST DIDN'T SINK IN. AT THIS CARRIER, THE JUNIOR PLTS ARE ON RESERVE, A FEEBLE SYS AT BEST. ONE IN WHICH THE LEAST EXPERIENCED FO'S ARE USUALLY FLING WITH THE LEAST EXPERIENCED CAPTS. ONE IN WHICH THE RESERVE PLT MAY OR MAY NOT FLY ENOUGH TO STAY CONFIDENT OF HIS ABILITIES EITHER IN THE ACFT OR IN CERTAIN ARPTS OR SITS. A SYS IN WHICH A PLT MAY NOT KNOW WHERE TO OR WHEN HE IS FLYING UNTIL 2 HRS PRIOR TO THE FACT. THIS IS NOT A CRITICISM OF THE SYS, JUST A STATEMENT OF SOME FACTORS INVOLVED FOR THIS FO ON RESERVE. OTHER. ARPT SIGNAGE: PDX ARPT SIGNAGE IS VERY STANDARD AND GOOD QUALITY. SIGNAGE SITTING SEEMS TO BE SOMEWHAT LACKING IN THIS VICINITY OF THE ARPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.