Narrative:

I was working a flight into pit. On a base leg for runway 10R, the captain decided to fly 'raw data.' immediately, altitude control was a problem. He got 200 ft high, which I pointed out. I found this decision suspect not because I object to this, but the field conditions were not ideal for 'practice.' intercept of both the localizer and GS were acceptable, not stellar. We were assigned either 190 KTS or 170 KTS to 'starg,' I can't remember which. We were told to call the tower at starg. Just prior to starg, I heard approach report a wind shift to tailwind. I asked the captain if he was 'ok with that.' he agreed, and so did I. Upon reaching starg, I switched to tower. We configured the aircraft and since the tower was congested, I completed the 'before landing checks.' while doing this, 2 things happened: 1) tower issued a windshear alert, and 2) captain got almost full scale high on the GS. I pointed both these out to the captain. He elected to continue. I noticed him high still and descending at only 300 FPM. I pointed it out again. Controller issued another windshear advisory 'loss of 25 KTS.' I asked the captain if he wanted to continue and he said 'yes, add 5 KTS' (referring to a gust factor). Next she (tower controller) issued a takeoff clearance to a flight with the 'loss of 25' and he declined it. This coupled with the fact we were unstable, IMC, very high and now drifting off course, I called 'missed approach.' captain said 'negative, continuing, runway in sight.' I allowed this to continue for about 100 more ft. I thought about everything -- windshear, unstable, high and now full scale off course. Looking outside, I didn't see the runway, I said 'missed approach, get me out of here please!' I began to clean up the aircraft and reported the missed approach. We were assigned 130 degrees, 3000 ft. About 1/2 way through the procedure, I noticed we were full power, flaps 12 degrees, gear up, climbing at 300 FPM, windshear. The controller had already asked for 130 degrees or 140 degrees twice. This time I told her to stand by. The captain was oblivious. He was commanding me to clean the aircraft up, but I was concerned about aircraft control and giving it my full attention further, after we were out of the windshear, the captain still didn't turn. Eventually I got him to comply. I turned his flight director on. We went out and held at ewc. Even going out there the captain was not with it. He, for some reason, thought we were the only ones in the air and wanted to go right out and do it again. (Approach control confirmed microburst.) subsequent approach and landing were uneventful. After landing, captain said 'nice work, I probably should've missed when you first called for it.' captain is not a dictator. If first officer calls for anything, the most conservative course of action should prevail. Low visibility, convective atmosphere -- don't practice instrument flying. I agree standardization is important, however, some pilots will die with their face in a book. In the windshear, I don't care if the flaps don't come up at the right point. I am concerned about keeping the aircraft upright and us alive. After I first called 'missed approach' the captain, as described, opted to continue. He said 'give me standard calls.' again, I was concerned about aircraft control. Therefore, my calls were missing. This should've been his clue to miss because I was not mentally with the airplane. So true, my calls were not standard, but I had more important things to worry about. Also, the fact that the captain never acknowledged the 130 degree heading after the missed approach, it was evident that his self-induced workload was too high. Captain's need to understand that if a crew member calls for something, and they refuse, they are now flying alone. Good luck. I consider myself extremely lucky today. I've never been so scared in an airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: THE PIC OF A DO328 DELAYS THE MISSED APCH IN SPITE OF THE CRM EXHIBITED BY THE FO WHO WAS NOW IN A HEIGHTENED ANXIETY CONDITION ABOUT THE DESTABILIZED APCH WHILE IN A STRONG WINDSHEAR WHILE 300 FT ABOVE THE GND W OF PIT, PA.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING A FLT INTO PIT. ON A BASE LEG FOR RWY 10R, THE CAPT DECIDED TO FLY 'RAW DATA.' IMMEDIATELY, ALT CTL WAS A PROB. HE GOT 200 FT HIGH, WHICH I POINTED OUT. I FOUND THIS DECISION SUSPECT NOT BECAUSE I OBJECT TO THIS, BUT THE FIELD CONDITIONS WERE NOT IDEAL FOR 'PRACTICE.' INTERCEPT OF BOTH THE LOC AND GS WERE ACCEPTABLE, NOT STELLAR. WE WERE ASSIGNED EITHER 190 KTS OR 170 KTS TO 'STARG,' I CAN'T REMEMBER WHICH. WE WERE TOLD TO CALL THE TWR AT STARG. JUST PRIOR TO STARG, I HEARD APCH RPT A WIND SHIFT TO TAILWIND. I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WAS 'OK WITH THAT.' HE AGREED, AND SO DID I. UPON REACHING STARG, I SWITCHED TO TWR. WE CONFIGURED THE ACFT AND SINCE THE TWR WAS CONGESTED, I COMPLETED THE 'BEFORE LNDG CHKS.' WHILE DOING THIS, 2 THINGS HAPPENED: 1) TWR ISSUED A WINDSHEAR ALERT, AND 2) CAPT GOT ALMOST FULL SCALE HIGH ON THE GS. I POINTED BOTH THESE OUT TO THE CAPT. HE ELECTED TO CONTINUE. I NOTICED HIM HIGH STILL AND DSNDING AT ONLY 300 FPM. I POINTED IT OUT AGAIN. CTLR ISSUED ANOTHER WINDSHEAR ADVISORY 'LOSS OF 25 KTS.' I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WANTED TO CONTINUE AND HE SAID 'YES, ADD 5 KTS' (REFERRING TO A GUST FACTOR). NEXT SHE (TWR CTLR) ISSUED A TKOF CLRNC TO A FLT WITH THE 'LOSS OF 25' AND HE DECLINED IT. THIS COUPLED WITH THE FACT WE WERE UNSTABLE, IMC, VERY HIGH AND NOW DRIFTING OFF COURSE, I CALLED 'MISSED APCH.' CAPT SAID 'NEGATIVE, CONTINUING, RWY IN SIGHT.' I ALLOWED THIS TO CONTINUE FOR ABOUT 100 MORE FT. I THOUGHT ABOUT EVERYTHING -- WINDSHEAR, UNSTABLE, HIGH AND NOW FULL SCALE OFF COURSE. LOOKING OUTSIDE, I DIDN'T SEE THE RWY, I SAID 'MISSED APCH, GET ME OUT OF HERE PLEASE!' I BEGAN TO CLEAN UP THE ACFT AND RPTED THE MISSED APCH. WE WERE ASSIGNED 130 DEGS, 3000 FT. ABOUT 1/2 WAY THROUGH THE PROC, I NOTICED WE WERE FULL PWR, FLAPS 12 DEGS, GEAR UP, CLBING AT 300 FPM, WINDSHEAR. THE CTLR HAD ALREADY ASKED FOR 130 DEGS OR 140 DEGS TWICE. THIS TIME I TOLD HER TO STAND BY. THE CAPT WAS OBLIVIOUS. HE WAS COMMANDING ME TO CLEAN THE ACFT UP, BUT I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ACFT CTL AND GIVING IT MY FULL ATTN FURTHER, AFTER WE WERE OUT OF THE WINDSHEAR, THE CAPT STILL DIDN'T TURN. EVENTUALLY I GOT HIM TO COMPLY. I TURNED HIS FLT DIRECTOR ON. WE WENT OUT AND HELD AT EWC. EVEN GOING OUT THERE THE CAPT WAS NOT WITH IT. HE, FOR SOME REASON, THOUGHT WE WERE THE ONLY ONES IN THE AIR AND WANTED TO GO RIGHT OUT AND DO IT AGAIN. (APCH CTL CONFIRMED MICROBURST.) SUBSEQUENT APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL. AFTER LNDG, CAPT SAID 'NICE WORK, I PROBABLY SHOULD'VE MISSED WHEN YOU FIRST CALLED FOR IT.' CAPT IS NOT A DICTATOR. IF FO CALLS FOR ANYTHING, THE MOST CONSERVATIVE COURSE OF ACTION SHOULD PREVAIL. LOW VISIBILITY, CONVECTIVE ATMOSPHERE -- DON'T PRACTICE INST FLYING. I AGREE STANDARDIZATION IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, SOME PLTS WILL DIE WITH THEIR FACE IN A BOOK. IN THE WINDSHEAR, I DON'T CARE IF THE FLAPS DON'T COME UP AT THE RIGHT POINT. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT KEEPING THE ACFT UPRIGHT AND US ALIVE. AFTER I FIRST CALLED 'MISSED APCH' THE CAPT, AS DESCRIBED, OPTED TO CONTINUE. HE SAID 'GIVE ME STANDARD CALLS.' AGAIN, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ACFT CTL. THEREFORE, MY CALLS WERE MISSING. THIS SHOULD'VE BEEN HIS CLUE TO MISS BECAUSE I WAS NOT MENTALLY WITH THE AIRPLANE. SO TRUE, MY CALLS WERE NOT STANDARD, BUT I HAD MORE IMPORTANT THINGS TO WORRY ABOUT. ALSO, THE FACT THAT THE CAPT NEVER ACKNOWLEDGED THE 130 DEG HDG AFTER THE MISSED APCH, IT WAS EVIDENT THAT HIS SELF-INDUCED WORKLOAD WAS TOO HIGH. CAPT'S NEED TO UNDERSTAND THAT IF A CREW MEMBER CALLS FOR SOMETHING, AND THEY REFUSE, THEY ARE NOW FLYING ALONE. GOOD LUCK. I CONSIDER MYSELF EXTREMELY LUCKY TODAY. I'VE NEVER BEEN SO SCARED IN AN AIRPLANE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.