Narrative:

On approach to runway 3R at approximately 800 ft AGL the tower asked us if we could make a mid-field turn-off so a B727 (Y) could depart between us and our following traffic. We responded that we would do our best. As the B727 was approaching the hold short line the tower asked them if they would be ready for an immediate takeoff. The B727 responded that they would be ready and then taxied onto the runway in front of us. Tower told them to exit the runway immediately but there was not enough time. The tower told us to go around. A go around was initiated without incident. Non standard verbiage from the tower controller was a factor in confusing the B727 pilot. Supplemental information from acn 478472: we were asked if we could be ready for an immediate takeoff and believed we were cleared into position and hold on runway 3R. We did not feel 'rushed' and the checklists were complete. A DC9 had just landed and another DC9, that we believed had just been told that we were going to be on the runway, was on final. The controller was working both runways 3R and 3C, had a heavy workload, and conveyed a sense of urgency. As we taxied onto runway 3R, the controller told the approaching DC9 it was ok to land on runway 3R that 'the aircraft waiting to depart (us)...will depart after you land.' we took this to mean the DC9 was cleared to land on top of us. Thinking this didn't make any sense we immediately expedited a taxi off runway 3R. Our engines were already spooled up because of the expectation for an immediate takeoff. We tried to contact the tower but received no answer. All 3 crew members were monitoring the tower frequency. We believed that the tower, in trying to sequence us in between 'tight' arriving traffic, had cleared on to hold...on the runway. Again that sense of urgency was present. When we responded to only part of the clearance, the tower controller, not hearing anything regarding 'hold short' instructions, did not reaffirm the 'hold short' or issue a correction. The landing DC9 did execute a missed approach. Supplemental information from acn 478352: after listening to the tower tapes the controller actually told us to 'hold short, will you be ready for an immediate?' for some reason all 3 of us did not hear or perceive the 'short' in that statement, and instead somehow understood that we were cleared into position and hold to be ready for an immediate. Causes: a) flight crew anticipated one instruction yet was given another. We only heard what we wanted to hear. B) controller combined the hold short statement with the...'be ready for an immediate.' C) hold short instructions were not read back, controller did not ask for us to repeat or confirm hold short. Solutions: a) listen, don't anticipate on our part, B) do not combine questions or instructions with critical statements such as 'hold short.' C) make sure all flcs read back hold short instructions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GAR AT DTW, MI, RESULTED FROM CONFUSED CLRNC AND A RWY INCURSION DURING A CLOSELY SPACED DEP ARR OP.

Narrative: ON APCH TO RWY 3R AT APPROX 800 FT AGL THE TWR ASKED US IF WE COULD MAKE A MID-FIELD TURN-OFF SO A B727 (Y) COULD DEPART BTWN US AND OUR FOLLOWING TFC. WE RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD DO OUR BEST. AS THE B727 WAS APCHING THE HOLD SHORT LINE THE TWR ASKED THEM IF THEY WOULD BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. THE B727 RESPONDED THAT THEY WOULD BE READY AND THEN TAXIED ONTO THE RWY IN FRONT OF US. TWR TOLD THEM TO EXIT THE RWY IMMEDIATELY BUT THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME. THE TWR TOLD US TO GO AROUND. A GAR WAS INITIATED WITHOUT INCIDENT. NON STANDARD VERBIAGE FROM THE TWR CTLR WAS A FACTOR IN CONFUSING THE B727 PLT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 478472: WE WERE ASKED IF WE COULD BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF AND BELIEVED WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD ON RWY 3R. WE DID NOT FEEL 'RUSHED' AND THE CHKLISTS WERE COMPLETE. A DC9 HAD JUST LANDED AND ANOTHER DC9, THAT WE BELIEVED HAD JUST BEEN TOLD THAT WE WERE GOING TO BE ON THE RWY, WAS ON FINAL. THE CTLR WAS WORKING BOTH RWYS 3R AND 3C, HAD A HVY WORKLOAD, AND CONVEYED A SENSE OF URGENCY. AS WE TAXIED ONTO RWY 3R, THE CTLR TOLD THE APCHING DC9 IT WAS OK TO LAND ON RWY 3R THAT 'THE ACFT WAITING TO DEPART (US)...WILL DEPART AFTER YOU LAND.' WE TOOK THIS TO MEAN THE DC9 WAS CLRED TO LAND ON TOP OF US. THINKING THIS DIDN'T MAKE ANY SENSE WE IMMEDIATELY EXPEDITED A TAXI OFF RWY 3R. OUR ENGS WERE ALREADY SPOOLED UP BECAUSE OF THE EXPECTATION FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. WE TRIED TO CONTACT THE TWR BUT RECEIVED NO ANSWER. ALL 3 CREW MEMBERS WERE MONITORING THE TWR FREQ. WE BELIEVED THAT THE TWR, IN TRYING TO SEQUENCE US IN BTWN 'TIGHT' ARRIVING TFC, HAD CLRED ON TO HOLD...ON THE RWY. AGAIN THAT SENSE OF URGENCY WAS PRESENT. WHEN WE RESPONDED TO ONLY PART OF THE CLRNC, THE TWR CTLR, NOT HEARING ANYTHING REGARDING 'HOLD SHORT' INSTRUCTIONS, DID NOT REAFFIRM THE 'HOLD SHORT' OR ISSUE A CORRECTION. THE LNDG DC9 DID EXECUTE A MISSED APCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 478352: AFTER LISTENING TO THE TWR TAPES THE CTLR ACTUALLY TOLD US TO 'HOLD SHORT, WILL YOU BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE?' FOR SOME REASON ALL 3 OF US DID NOT HEAR OR PERCEIVE THE 'SHORT' IN THAT STATEMENT, AND INSTEAD SOMEHOW UNDERSTOOD THAT WE WERE CLRED INTO POS AND HOLD TO BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE. CAUSES: A) FLC ANTICIPATED ONE INSTRUCTION YET WAS GIVEN ANOTHER. WE ONLY HEARD WHAT WE WANTED TO HEAR. B) CTLR COMBINED THE HOLD SHORT STATEMENT WITH THE...'BE READY FOR AN IMMEDIATE.' C) HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT READ BACK, CTLR DID NOT ASK FOR US TO REPEAT OR CONFIRM HOLD SHORT. SOLUTIONS: A) LISTEN, DON'T ANTICIPATE ON OUR PART, B) DO NOT COMBINE QUESTIONS OR INSTRUCTIONS WITH CRITICAL STATEMENTS SUCH AS 'HOLD SHORT.' C) MAKE SURE ALL FLCS READ BACK HOLD SHORT INSTRUCTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.