Narrative:

I called grant county (moses lake, wa) ground control on 121.9 requesting 'south departure to redmond, or, at or below 6500 ft.' the tower/ground controller, being the same voice, responded with 'stand by.' he called back approximately 2 mins later asking what I wanted. I again asked for a 'south departure from the customs ramp.' controller responded, 'squawk XXXX, departure frequency 126.4, contact tower on uh...12...stand by...are you ready to go now?...stand by...tower 118.25.' I was unable to read back these instructions for I heard the same controller on 118.25 directing traffic on both runway 18 and runway 32R in between the 'standbys.' there appeared to be 3 or 4 heavy boeing airliners working runway 32R, 2 military C5 or 117's and other light training aircraft on runway 18. I was monitoring both ground and tower on both VHF radios. I hover taxied north away from the customs box and turned left, started my takeoff to the southwest. I called 'aircraft X on the go.' tower: 'where are you?' pilot: 'on the go from the southwest ramp climbing through 300 ft sbound.' controller: 'traffic is a beech craft touch-and-goes runway 18.' pilot of X: 'I have the traffic, thanks.' did I miss something? I saw the beechcraft trainer at my 5 O'clock position, same altitude, 400 ft AGL, approximately 500 ft or less horizontal. Had the tower controller not pointed out the traffic, I feel that this could have resulted in a midair collision. I leveled at 400 ft AGL, turned slightly left to avoid traffic. I believe that the beechcraft was totally unaware of my position. He appeared to continued his climb. I continued at approximately 400 ft AGL for several mi, asked the controller the position of the beechcraft, being unable to see him behind me after I turned left and leveled off. I was told he was in the pattern of runway 18 for touch-and-goes, contact departure on 126.4. I was soon turned over to chinook approach on 128.75. Wow, why a close encounter with a beechcraft? Problems: ground controller was working both ground control, giving clrncs, working the west tower frequency with 7 or more aircraft. It is my impression that the controller was not able to give me clear departure instructions. I was not able to read back these instructions when given. I did attempt to 'read back' on our third or forth go around. And then I felt rushed by the comment 'are you ready to go now?' on the ground frequency. 1) were instructions clearly given by controller? Pilot: no. 2) was my aircraft given proper and equal attention as the heavy boeing jets and other trainers doing touch-and-goes on runway 32R and runway 18? Pilot: no. 3) did pilot of helicopter feel pressured for an immediate takeoff from controller: pilot: yes. Being a dual rated pilot in both airplanes and helicopters, I have experienced that many controllers (including the one mentioned above) may view helicopters with discontent and in many instances will not allow 'us,' helicopter pilots, the same consideration as fixed wing aircraft. I felt that this attitude was prevalent on this date and led me to a state of frustration and distraction. This was a major contributing factor to this possible midair collision. Factors: pilots feeling on not receiving equal attention from controller. Pilots frustration with controller leading to impatience and distraction from takeoff instructions. Possible controller being overtasked in running both ground control, issuing clrncs, and tower control with many aircraft requesting attention at the same time. Controller not insisting on a 'readback' on takeoff instructions. Ambiguous question 'are you ready now?' on ground control. Pilots feeling of pressure to take off now. Pilot not stepping back, taking a breath, and saying 'wait a min, I will not go until I am good and ready for takeoff.' not having a separate ground/clearance delivery controller (free from tower control responsibilities) that can give full clearance and/or ground control instructions with proper readbacks from pilots. What worked: pilot called: 'call sign on the go sbound.' controller: 'where are you call sign?' pilot: 'on the go southwest ramp climbing through 300 ft.' controller: 'traffic is a beechcraft touch-and-goes runway 18.' (had he not mentioned this I hate to think of the possibilities.) although I fault the controller on some issues, he was quick to take charge and point out traffic at just the right time. The FARS allow helicopter pilots much latitude in approaching and departing airports. This works very well most of the time except when there are noise abatement issues and when the traffic pattern is congested. This (congestion) raises the stakes considerable. It is then up to the helicopter pilot to access the risks of 'avoid the flow of fixed wing' and mix when it is in the best interest of all involved. Yes, that may mean creating more workload for the controller, but consider the risks.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BELL 212 COMMERCIAL PLT HAS AN NMAC WITH A TRAINING BEECHCRAFT WHILE PERFORMING AN UNAUTH UNCOORD TKOF NEAR THE DEP END OF RWY 18 AT MWH, WA.

Narrative: I CALLED GRANT COUNTY (MOSES LAKE, WA) GND CTL ON 121.9 REQUESTING 'S DEP TO REDMOND, OR, AT OR BELOW 6500 FT.' THE TWR/GND CTLR, BEING THE SAME VOICE, RESPONDED WITH 'STAND BY.' HE CALLED BACK APPROX 2 MINS LATER ASKING WHAT I WANTED. I AGAIN ASKED FOR A 'S DEP FROM THE CUSTOMS RAMP.' CTLR RESPONDED, 'SQUAWK XXXX, DEP FREQ 126.4, CONTACT TWR ON UH...12...STAND BY...ARE YOU READY TO GO NOW?...STAND BY...TWR 118.25.' I WAS UNABLE TO READ BACK THESE INSTRUCTIONS FOR I HEARD THE SAME CTLR ON 118.25 DIRECTING TFC ON BOTH RWY 18 AND RWY 32R IN BTWN THE 'STANDBYS.' THERE APPEARED TO BE 3 OR 4 HVY BOEING AIRLINERS WORKING RWY 32R, 2 MIL C5 OR 117'S AND OTHER LIGHT TRAINING ACFT ON RWY 18. I WAS MONITORING BOTH GND AND TWR ON BOTH VHF RADIOS. I HOVER TAXIED N AWAY FROM THE CUSTOMS BOX AND TURNED L, STARTED MY TKOF TO THE SW. I CALLED 'ACFT X ON THE GO.' TWR: 'WHERE ARE YOU?' PLT: 'ON THE GO FROM THE SW RAMP CLBING THROUGH 300 FT SBOUND.' CTLR: 'TFC IS A BEECH CRAFT TOUCH-AND-GOES RWY 18.' PLT OF X: 'I HAVE THE TFC, THANKS.' DID I MISS SOMETHING? I SAW THE BEECHCRAFT TRAINER AT MY 5 O'CLOCK POS, SAME ALT, 400 FT AGL, APPROX 500 FT OR LESS HORIZ. HAD THE TWR CTLR NOT POINTED OUT THE TFC, I FEEL THAT THIS COULD HAVE RESULTED IN A MIDAIR COLLISION. I LEVELED AT 400 FT AGL, TURNED SLIGHTLY L TO AVOID TFC. I BELIEVE THAT THE BEECHCRAFT WAS TOTALLY UNAWARE OF MY POS. HE APPEARED TO CONTINUED HIS CLB. I CONTINUED AT APPROX 400 FT AGL FOR SEVERAL MI, ASKED THE CTLR THE POS OF THE BEECHCRAFT, BEING UNABLE TO SEE HIM BEHIND ME AFTER I TURNED L AND LEVELED OFF. I WAS TOLD HE WAS IN THE PATTERN OF RWY 18 FOR TOUCH-AND-GOES, CONTACT DEP ON 126.4. I WAS SOON TURNED OVER TO CHINOOK APCH ON 128.75. WOW, WHY A CLOSE ENCOUNTER WITH A BEECHCRAFT? PROBS: GND CTLR WAS WORKING BOTH GND CTL, GIVING CLRNCS, WORKING THE W TWR FREQ WITH 7 OR MORE ACFT. IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT THE CTLR WAS NOT ABLE TO GIVE ME CLR DEP INSTRUCTIONS. I WAS NOT ABLE TO READ BACK THESE INSTRUCTIONS WHEN GIVEN. I DID ATTEMPT TO 'READ BACK' ON OUR THIRD OR FORTH GAR. AND THEN I FELT RUSHED BY THE COMMENT 'ARE YOU READY TO GO NOW?' ON THE GND FREQ. 1) WERE INSTRUCTIONS CLRLY GIVEN BY CTLR? PLT: NO. 2) WAS MY ACFT GIVEN PROPER AND EQUAL ATTN AS THE HVY BOEING JETS AND OTHER TRAINERS DOING TOUCH-AND-GOES ON RWY 32R AND RWY 18? PLT: NO. 3) DID PLT OF HELI FEEL PRESSURED FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF FROM CTLR: PLT: YES. BEING A DUAL RATED PLT IN BOTH AIRPLANES AND HELIS, I HAVE EXPERIENCED THAT MANY CTLRS (INCLUDING THE ONE MENTIONED ABOVE) MAY VIEW HELIS WITH DISCONTENT AND IN MANY INSTANCES WILL NOT ALLOW 'US,' HELI PLTS, THE SAME CONSIDERATION AS FIXED WING ACFT. I FELT THAT THIS ATTITUDE WAS PREVALENT ON THIS DATE AND LED ME TO A STATE OF FRUSTRATION AND DISTR. THIS WAS A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS POSSIBLE MIDAIR COLLISION. FACTORS: PLTS FEELING ON NOT RECEIVING EQUAL ATTN FROM CTLR. PLTS FRUSTRATION WITH CTLR LEADING TO IMPATIENCE AND DISTR FROM TKOF INSTRUCTIONS. POSSIBLE CTLR BEING OVERTASKED IN RUNNING BOTH GND CTL, ISSUING CLRNCS, AND TWR CTL WITH MANY ACFT REQUESTING ATTN AT THE SAME TIME. CTLR NOT INSISTING ON A 'READBACK' ON TKOF INSTRUCTIONS. AMBIGUOUS QUESTION 'ARE YOU READY NOW?' ON GND CTL. PLTS FEELING OF PRESSURE TO TAKE OFF NOW. PLT NOT STEPPING BACK, TAKING A BREATH, AND SAYING 'WAIT A MIN, I WILL NOT GO UNTIL I AM GOOD AND READY FOR TKOF.' NOT HAVING A SEPARATE GND/CLRNC DELIVERY CTLR (FREE FROM TWR CTL RESPONSIBILITIES) THAT CAN GIVE FULL CLRNC AND/OR GND CTL INSTRUCTIONS WITH PROPER READBACKS FROM PLTS. WHAT WORKED: PLT CALLED: 'CALL SIGN ON THE GO SBOUND.' CTLR: 'WHERE ARE YOU CALL SIGN?' PLT: 'ON THE GO SW RAMP CLBING THROUGH 300 FT.' CTLR: 'TFC IS A BEECHCRAFT TOUCH-AND-GOES RWY 18.' (HAD HE NOT MENTIONED THIS I HATE TO THINK OF THE POSSIBILITIES.) ALTHOUGH I FAULT THE CTLR ON SOME ISSUES, HE WAS QUICK TO TAKE CHARGE AND POINT OUT TFC AT JUST THE RIGHT TIME. THE FARS ALLOW HELI PLTS MUCH LATITUDE IN APCHING AND DEPARTING ARPTS. THIS WORKS VERY WELL MOST OF THE TIME EXCEPT WHEN THERE ARE NOISE ABATEMENT ISSUES AND WHEN THE TFC PATTERN IS CONGESTED. THIS (CONGESTION) RAISES THE STAKES CONSIDERABLE. IT IS THEN UP TO THE HELI PLT TO ACCESS THE RISKS OF 'AVOID THE FLOW OF FIXED WING' AND MIX WHEN IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF ALL INVOLVED. YES, THAT MAY MEAN CREATING MORE WORKLOAD FOR THE CTLR, BUT CONSIDER THE RISKS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.