Narrative:

The leg was to be flown by the first officer (PF) with the captain acting as PNF. After engine start, the captain obtained a taxi clearance to taxi to runway 16R via taxiway east (northbound), holding for crossing at taxiway 3E. The clearance was read back. Controled by the first officer, the aircraft exited and turned northbound on taxiway east. After initial taxi checks, the captain contacted vny clearance delivery to obtain a VFR departure clearance through the vny/bur class C airspace. The first officer remained in contact with ground on his radio set. Due to frequency congestion, the captain was unable to monitor ground frequency while speaking with clearance delivery. When the aircraft arrived at taxiway 3E for crossing, the ground control advised the first officer to cross runway 16L, hold short of runway 16R. The first officer correctly read back the clearance. The first officer visually cleared north and south before crossing runway 16L, and again visually cleared north and south before beginning to cross runway 16R, as was his and the captain's normal practice (no conflicting traffic observed). At this time the captain rejoined the first officer on ground frequency, and noting their crossing of the hold lines for runway 16R at taxiway 3F, inquired of the first officer if they were cleared for takeoff. The first officer responded 'cross runway 16L, hold short of runway 16R.' at this point the aircraft was already halfway across runway 16R, when the captain recognized the conflict with the clearance. His only choice was to continue crossing to clear the runway. At this time ground advised the crew that they were supposed to hold short of runway 16R, and not to do this again in the future. After crossing runway 16R, and turning northbound, the captain questioned the first officer as to the clearance received, and what had been read back prior to the captain's rejoining the first officer on ground frequency. The captain then asked the first officer what he interpreted the clearance to mean, and the first officer responded to 'cross the runways (both), then hold short of runway 16R for takeoff (as this was where the taxiing jet traffic was all moving to for takeoff).' as the first officer was explaining his understanding of the crossing instructions, he appeared to realize in mid-sentence that such clearance would have included 'cross both runways' and not just 'cross runway 16L,' and thus that he had crossed runway 16R in error. Both the captain and first officer have adopted a policy that no runway xings (active or otherwise) shall be accomplished unless both cockpit crewmen are monitoring the same frequency and both verbalize agreement that crossing of the subject runway has been authority/authorized by ATC. No crossing of an active runway will occur if there is a collision hazard irrespective of ATC instructions to cross. That no runways shall be crossed if there is even the slightest question as to the intent of the clearance received, and should any doubt exist, the aircraft shall come to a stop and hold short of the questioned runway until confirmation to cross is received. Radio congestion permitting, all active runway xings shall be verified with ATC prior to passing the hold lines, even where both crew believe that crossing has been instructed. It is noteworthy that both the captain and first officer were aware of the recent increase in runway incursions, and before this incident, neither believed that they would be a party to such an incursion.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION AT VNY, CA.

Narrative: THE LEG WAS TO BE FLOWN BY THE FO (PF) WITH THE CAPT ACTING AS PNF. AFTER ENG START, THE CAPT OBTAINED A TAXI CLRNC TO TAXI TO RWY 16R VIA TXWY E (NBOUND), HOLDING FOR XING AT TXWY 3E. THE CLRNC WAS READ BACK. CTLED BY THE FO, THE ACFT EXITED AND TURNED NBOUND ON TXWY E. AFTER INITIAL TAXI CHKS, THE CAPT CONTACTED VNY CLRNC DELIVERY TO OBTAIN A VFR DEP CLRNC THROUGH THE VNY/BUR CLASS C AIRSPACE. THE FO REMAINED IN CONTACT WITH GND ON HIS RADIO SET. DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION, THE CAPT WAS UNABLE TO MONITOR GND FREQ WHILE SPEAKING WITH CLRNC DELIVERY. WHEN THE ACFT ARRIVED AT TXWY 3E FOR XING, THE GND CTL ADVISED THE FO TO CROSS RWY 16L, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 16R. THE FO CORRECTLY READ BACK THE CLRNC. THE FO VISUALLY CLRED N AND S BEFORE XING RWY 16L, AND AGAIN VISUALLY CLRED N AND S BEFORE BEGINNING TO CROSS RWY 16R, AS WAS HIS AND THE CAPT'S NORMAL PRACTICE (NO CONFLICTING TFC OBSERVED). AT THIS TIME THE CAPT REJOINED THE FO ON GND FREQ, AND NOTING THEIR XING OF THE HOLD LINES FOR RWY 16R AT TXWY 3F, INQUIRED OF THE FO IF THEY WERE CLRED FOR TKOF. THE FO RESPONDED 'CROSS RWY 16L, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 16R.' AT THIS POINT THE ACFT WAS ALREADY HALFWAY ACROSS RWY 16R, WHEN THE CAPT RECOGNIZED THE CONFLICT WITH THE CLRNC. HIS ONLY CHOICE WAS TO CONTINUE XING TO CLR THE RWY. AT THIS TIME GND ADVISED THE CREW THAT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 16R, AND NOT TO DO THIS AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. AFTER XING RWY 16R, AND TURNING NBOUND, THE CAPT QUESTIONED THE FO AS TO THE CLRNC RECEIVED, AND WHAT HAD BEEN READ BACK PRIOR TO THE CAPT'S REJOINING THE FO ON GND FREQ. THE CAPT THEN ASKED THE FO WHAT HE INTERPRETED THE CLRNC TO MEAN, AND THE FO RESPONDED TO 'CROSS THE RWYS (BOTH), THEN HOLD SHORT OF RWY 16R FOR TKOF (AS THIS WAS WHERE THE TAXIING JET TFC WAS ALL MOVING TO FOR TKOF).' AS THE FO WAS EXPLAINING HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE XING INSTRUCTIONS, HE APPEARED TO REALIZE IN MID-SENTENCE THAT SUCH CLRNC WOULD HAVE INCLUDED 'CROSS BOTH RWYS' AND NOT JUST 'CROSS RWY 16L,' AND THUS THAT HE HAD CROSSED RWY 16R IN ERROR. BOTH THE CAPT AND FO HAVE ADOPTED A POLICY THAT NO RWY XINGS (ACTIVE OR OTHERWISE) SHALL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNLESS BOTH COCKPIT CREWMEN ARE MONITORING THE SAME FREQ AND BOTH VERBALIZE AGREEMENT THAT XING OF THE SUBJECT RWY HAS BEEN AUTH BY ATC. NO XING OF AN ACTIVE RWY WILL OCCUR IF THERE IS A COLLISION HAZARD IRRESPECTIVE OF ATC INSTRUCTIONS TO CROSS. THAT NO RWYS SHALL BE CROSSED IF THERE IS EVEN THE SLIGHTEST QUESTION AS TO THE INTENT OF THE CLRNC RECEIVED, AND SHOULD ANY DOUBT EXIST, THE ACFT SHALL COME TO A STOP AND HOLD SHORT OF THE QUESTIONED RWY UNTIL CONFIRMATION TO CROSS IS RECEIVED. RADIO CONGESTION PERMITTING, ALL ACTIVE RWY XINGS SHALL BE VERIFIED WITH ATC PRIOR TO PASSING THE HOLD LINES, EVEN WHERE BOTH CREW BELIEVE THAT XING HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT BOTH THE CAPT AND FO WERE AWARE OF THE RECENT INCREASE IN RWY INCURSIONS, AND BEFORE THIS INCIDENT, NEITHER BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD BE A PARTY TO SUCH AN INCURSION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.