Narrative:

We were on a part 121 flight from rdu to jfk. I was the PF and the autoplt was engaged. While descending on the camrn 3 arrival, we were told to hold as published at camrn at 13000 ft. At that time we were at or near karrs intersection, which is 13 DME from camrn. The first officer's attempt to load the hold in the FMS failed, so with what little distance that was left, we prepared to execute the hold using short range navigation. During this short, but rushed time to reorganize our navigation equipment, center cleared us to descend to 12000 ft. After crossing camrn, and descending in the left turn to the outbound leg, I noticed the altitude selector had not been set for 12000 ft. We were approaching 11000 ft when I realized the error and began to reverse the descent rate. ATC, also aware of the problem, questioned our altitude and advised us of the traffic holding at 11000 ft. After quickly recovering to 12000 ft. The remainder of the flight was routine. Possible contributing factors: CRM -- this was the first time that I had flown with that first officer. I had been advised, in advanced, by other capts that this particular first officer would stray from SOP's and was considered to be quite arrogant. Our training department teaches the PNF to set the altitude selector (in this case, the first officer). On numerous occasions, he would not enter the altitude. Rather than say something to him about it at that time, which may have caused a degraded working relationship, I chose to set the altitude myself (when he would not) and discuss it later. Each time we were assigned an altitude I would give him the opportunity to set the selector, but this particular time he did not, and then I forgot. Human performance -- I am new to EFIS and the digital altitude tape that the E145 has. It has occurred to me that the passing of a cardinal (whole) altitude, which would be the eye-catching sweep of a hand past the 12 O'clock position on a normal altimeter, is relatively unnoticeable on the digital tape. Had the passing of 12000 ft 'caught my eye,' I might have realized what was happening. ATC -- we received our holding clearance about 15 mi from the holding fix. At descending turbojet speeds, that afforded us with much less time than I would prefer under the given circumstances. Equipment -- the aircraft we were in had the TCASII deferred. Had it been operating, we would have been aware of the aircraft holding below us, and may have been able to correct the situation with little or no resulting deviation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB145 FLC OVERSHOOTS THEIR ASSIGNED ALT DURING A HURRY UP RECONFIGN OF THEIR FMS WHEN RECEIVING A LATE CLRNC FOR A HOLD AT CAMRN INTXN, NJ.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A PART 121 FLT FROM RDU TO JFK. I WAS THE PF AND THE AUTOPLT WAS ENGAGED. WHILE DSNDING ON THE CAMRN 3 ARR, WE WERE TOLD TO HOLD AS PUBLISHED AT CAMRN AT 13000 FT. AT THAT TIME WE WERE AT OR NEAR KARRS INTXN, WHICH IS 13 DME FROM CAMRN. THE FO'S ATTEMPT TO LOAD THE HOLD IN THE FMS FAILED, SO WITH WHAT LITTLE DISTANCE THAT WAS LEFT, WE PREPARED TO EXECUTE THE HOLD USING SHORT RANGE NAV. DURING THIS SHORT, BUT RUSHED TIME TO REORGANIZE OUR NAV EQUIP, CTR CLRED US TO DSND TO 12000 FT. AFTER XING CAMRN, AND DSNDING IN THE L TURN TO THE OUTBOUND LEG, I NOTICED THE ALT SELECTOR HAD NOT BEEN SET FOR 12000 FT. WE WERE APCHING 11000 FT WHEN I REALIZED THE ERROR AND BEGAN TO REVERSE THE DSCNT RATE. ATC, ALSO AWARE OF THE PROB, QUESTIONED OUR ALT AND ADVISED US OF THE TFC HOLDING AT 11000 FT. AFTER QUICKLY RECOVERING TO 12000 FT. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS ROUTINE. POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: CRM -- THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT I HAD FLOWN WITH THAT FO. I HAD BEEN ADVISED, IN ADVANCED, BY OTHER CAPTS THAT THIS PARTICULAR FO WOULD STRAY FROM SOP'S AND WAS CONSIDERED TO BE QUITE ARROGANT. OUR TRAINING DEPT TEACHES THE PNF TO SET THE ALT SELECTOR (IN THIS CASE, THE FO). ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, HE WOULD NOT ENTER THE ALT. RATHER THAN SAY SOMETHING TO HIM ABOUT IT AT THAT TIME, WHICH MAY HAVE CAUSED A DEGRADED WORKING RELATIONSHIP, I CHOSE TO SET THE ALT MYSELF (WHEN HE WOULD NOT) AND DISCUSS IT LATER. EACH TIME WE WERE ASSIGNED AN ALT I WOULD GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO SET THE SELECTOR, BUT THIS PARTICULAR TIME HE DID NOT, AND THEN I FORGOT. HUMAN PERFORMANCE -- I AM NEW TO EFIS AND THE DIGITAL ALT TAPE THAT THE E145 HAS. IT HAS OCCURRED TO ME THAT THE PASSING OF A CARDINAL (WHOLE) ALT, WHICH WOULD BE THE EYE-CATCHING SWEEP OF A HAND PAST THE 12 O'CLOCK POS ON A NORMAL ALTIMETER, IS RELATIVELY UNNOTICEABLE ON THE DIGITAL TAPE. HAD THE PASSING OF 12000 FT 'CAUGHT MY EYE,' I MIGHT HAVE REALIZED WHAT WAS HAPPENING. ATC -- WE RECEIVED OUR HOLDING CLRNC ABOUT 15 MI FROM THE HOLDING FIX. AT DSNDING TURBOJET SPDS, THAT AFFORDED US WITH MUCH LESS TIME THAN I WOULD PREFER UNDER THE GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES. EQUIP -- THE ACFT WE WERE IN HAD THE TCASII DEFERRED. HAD IT BEEN OPERATING, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE ACFT HOLDING BELOW US, AND MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CORRECT THE SIT WITH LITTLE OR NO RESULTING DEV.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.