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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 481321 |
Time | |
Date | 200008 |
Day | Sun |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : hpn.airport |
State Reference | NY |
Altitude | msl single value : 1000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : hpn.tower |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | M-20 F Executive 21 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | descent : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | approach : traffic pattern arrival : vfr |
Flight Plan | None |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : hpn.tower |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | ils localizer & glide slope : 16 |
Route In Use | approach : instrument precision |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : instrument pilot : private |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 40 flight time total : 1200 flight time type : 900 |
ASRS Report | 481321 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : corporate |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
Events | |
Anomaly | conflict : airborne critical non adherence : clearance non adherence : required legal separation other anomaly other other spatial deviation |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance flight crew : exited adverse environment flight crew : took evasive action |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew other |
Miss Distance | vertical : 0 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Facility ATC Human Performance Airspace Structure Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
Approaching hpn from the east. We had ATIS information. Winds 160 degrees at 5 mi, visibility 10 mi, ceiling 12000 ft. Checked in with approach control on 126.4 for sequencing. Told to fly to field for left downwind runway 16. Passed over to tower. Tower asked if runway 11 was acceptable. I declined, asked for runway 16. Tower asked for left 360 degree turn for spacing before continuing downwind. I complied. Tower advised I was #3 for runway 16, following gulfstream traffic on ILS. I asked if tower would call my base. Tower said 'no, you must tell me when you see your traffic.' on downwind, about 1/right mi past arrival end of runway 16, I saw a jet on the ILS, off my left wingtip. I said to tower, 'tower, n-number sees aircraft off my left wing, is that the traffic I am following?' tower said, 'affirmative n-number.' I aid to tower, 'north-number turning base now to follow traffic.' tower did not respond. I turned base and immediately saw another aircraft bearing down on me. I said to tower, 'north-number sees traffic inbound right at us, breaking off.' I immediately configured for full power climb along base leg. Another voice (second controller) on tower frequency said, 'north-number I need you to proceed onto final.' I repeated, 'traffic off my right side, continuing on base.' second controller then said, 'ok n-number, turn right to 340 degrees for an extended now right downwind for runway 16.' I reconfigured for downwind. First controller then said, 'north-number turn to final at once and straight for the numbers, I need you to hurry because you are in the box.' I started to comply, only to see another aircraft dead ahead. I advised tower, 'traffic at 12 O'clock position, turning left (away from field) to avoid.' second controller said, 'north-number, turn to 270 degrees immediately.' I complied. After following 270 degree heading, and calming down, I said to tower, 'north-number will proceed toward tappan zee bridge and re-enter airport area for runway 11.' controller agreed. We landed with no further incident. I misidented traffic on final as the gulfstream I was to be following. This was my error. Turns out the traffic was another turbine business class jet. Had the controller agreed to call my base when sequencing me into complex stream of inbound traffic on ILS, the whole incident would have been avoided. I, like most GA pilots, have trouble positively telling the difference between a g-v and lear and citation at 1 or 2 mi -- especially when busy preparing for landing. I needed help. First controller was not paying attention to my situation. Second controller was not coordinating with first controller. Better coordination could have avoided the second target. And -- where is the box? How should I know what it means or what to do about it? All this language did was add tension to an already tense situation. These hpn controllers work hard, and this was a busy time. However, this was a close call in my view. It could have been avoided by better controller/pilot communication and coordination.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A MOONEY PVT PLT HAS A PROB WITH 2 CTLRS IN AN ESCAPE ACTION AFTER HE GETS TRAPPED BTWN 2 CPR ACFT ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 16 AT HPN, NY.
Narrative: APCHING HPN FROM THE E. WE HAD ATIS INFO. WINDS 160 DEGS AT 5 MI, VISIBILITY 10 MI, CEILING 12000 FT. CHKED IN WITH APCH CTL ON 126.4 FOR SEQUENCING. TOLD TO FLY TO FIELD FOR L DOWNWIND RWY 16. PASSED OVER TO TWR. TWR ASKED IF RWY 11 WAS ACCEPTABLE. I DECLINED, ASKED FOR RWY 16. TWR ASKED FOR L 360 DEG TURN FOR SPACING BEFORE CONTINUING DOWNWIND. I COMPLIED. TWR ADVISED I WAS #3 FOR RWY 16, FOLLOWING GULFSTREAM TFC ON ILS. I ASKED IF TWR WOULD CALL MY BASE. TWR SAID 'NO, YOU MUST TELL ME WHEN YOU SEE YOUR TFC.' ON DOWNWIND, ABOUT 1/R MI PAST ARR END OF RWY 16, I SAW A JET ON THE ILS, OFF MY L WINGTIP. I SAID TO TWR, 'TWR, N-NUMBER SEES ACFT OFF MY L WING, IS THAT THE TFC I AM FOLLOWING?' TWR SAID, 'AFFIRMATIVE N-NUMBER.' I AID TO TWR, 'N-NUMBER TURNING BASE NOW TO FOLLOW TFC.' TWR DID NOT RESPOND. I TURNED BASE AND IMMEDIATELY SAW ANOTHER ACFT BEARING DOWN ON ME. I SAID TO TWR, 'N-NUMBER SEES TFC INBOUND RIGHT AT US, BREAKING OFF.' I IMMEDIATELY CONFIGURED FOR FULL PWR CLB ALONG BASE LEG. ANOTHER VOICE (SECOND CTLR) ON TWR FREQ SAID, 'N-NUMBER I NEED YOU TO PROCEED ONTO FINAL.' I REPEATED, 'TFC OFF MY R SIDE, CONTINUING ON BASE.' SECOND CTLR THEN SAID, 'OK N-NUMBER, TURN R TO 340 DEGS FOR AN EXTENDED NOW R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 16.' I RECONFIGURED FOR DOWNWIND. FIRST CTLR THEN SAID, 'N-NUMBER TURN TO FINAL AT ONCE AND STRAIGHT FOR THE NUMBERS, I NEED YOU TO HURRY BECAUSE YOU ARE IN THE BOX.' I STARTED TO COMPLY, ONLY TO SEE ANOTHER ACFT DEAD AHEAD. I ADVISED TWR, 'TFC AT 12 O'CLOCK POS, TURNING L (AWAY FROM FIELD) TO AVOID.' SECOND CTLR SAID, 'N-NUMBER, TURN TO 270 DEGS IMMEDIATELY.' I COMPLIED. AFTER FOLLOWING 270 DEG HDG, AND CALMING DOWN, I SAID TO TWR, 'N-NUMBER WILL PROCEED TOWARD TAPPAN ZEE BRIDGE AND RE-ENTER ARPT AREA FOR RWY 11.' CTLR AGREED. WE LANDED WITH NO FURTHER INCIDENT. I MISIDENTED TFC ON FINAL AS THE GULFSTREAM I WAS TO BE FOLLOWING. THIS WAS MY ERROR. TURNS OUT THE TFC WAS ANOTHER TURBINE BUSINESS CLASS JET. HAD THE CTLR AGREED TO CALL MY BASE WHEN SEQUENCING ME INTO COMPLEX STREAM OF INBOUND TFC ON ILS, THE WHOLE INCIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. I, LIKE MOST GA PLTS, HAVE TROUBLE POSITIVELY TELLING THE DIFFERENCE BTWN A G-V AND LEAR AND CITATION AT 1 OR 2 MI -- ESPECIALLY WHEN BUSY PREPARING FOR LNDG. I NEEDED HELP. FIRST CTLR WAS NOT PAYING ATTN TO MY SIT. SECOND CTLR WAS NOT COORDINATING WITH FIRST CTLR. BETTER COORD COULD HAVE AVOIDED THE SECOND TARGET. AND -- WHERE IS THE BOX? HOW SHOULD I KNOW WHAT IT MEANS OR WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT? ALL THIS LANGUAGE DID WAS ADD TENSION TO AN ALREADY TENSE SIT. THESE HPN CTLRS WORK HARD, AND THIS WAS A BUSY TIME. HOWEVER, THIS WAS A CLOSE CALL IN MY VIEW. IT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY BETTER CTLR/PLT COM AND COORD.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.