Narrative:

With a rushed preflight preparation, due to the gate arrival of aircraft at the gate, preflight duties commenced 25 mins prior to scheduled departure. The crew had already been rushed by dealing with a scheduling irregularity. I had finished 36 mins of talking to reschedule a training trip. At pushback, it appeared all items were completed and the special takeoff at sna was briefed. After engine start and disconnect, I thought we were cleared by ground to 'turn left at taxiway K, taxi across runway 19L&19R and hold short of runway 19R at taxiway B.' the first officer read back 'turn left at taxiway K, cross runway 19L and hold short of runway 19R. (I did not learn this until after the event.) on taxi approaching runway 19R, I noticed a cessna on approximately 4 mi final, but continued across the runway as I thought I was cleared. The first officer was 'heads down' approaching the runway, and didn't notice I was crossing runway 19R until I was on the runway. At that point, the only course of action was to continue across. Reaching taxiway B, the tower gave us a phone number to call, and the problem was obvious. We heard the tower giving the cessna the choice to land or go around -- he went around. In hindsight, it's real clear I let the desire to operate 'on time' pressure me into not taking the time to ensure 'we were cleared across runway 19R.' this is a classic rush scenario. Supplemental information from acn 486810: we arrived to operations at sna on day #2 of an IOE (training) identify on time. However, the lca (captain) spent 30 mins of our briefing/preflight time trying to repair a scheduling change we had just been notified of. As well, the aircraft arrived late to the gate, so our preflight time was compressed. The tempo was set -- rush to get out on time. Better choice, step back, slow down and accept a late departure. Add to this situation my first departure from sna (which is a complex maneuver) in an aircraft which I am unfamiliar. The result -- a break in habit patterns that could have prevented the incident. We pushed just 4 mins late, and then were cleared to 'runway 19R, cross runway 19L at taxiway K, hold short of runway 19R,' which I read back. As we approached runway 19L on taxiway K, I saw a single engine cessna about 4 mi out (I assumed for runway 19L). I went heads down to get new weights, update runway performance data and reset the takeoff airspds. At the same time, we were given a frequency change to tower. As I made the frequency change, I heard the captain say 'final's clear.' I looked up, saw we were entering runway 19R, and the cessna was about 2 1/2 mi out. I said 'I don't think we were cleared to cross this runway' (too late). As we exited runway 19R, tower gave the cessna the choice to land or go around (they were still 1 mi out). They chose to go around. The tower also told us to call them after landing. Had we not been rushed, had we slowed down, had I been more familiar with the airport and the aircraft or had I not been 'heads down' (the proper choice at the time), this incident could have been prevented.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757-200 CREW HAD RWY INCURSION AT SNA.

Narrative: WITH A RUSHED PREFLT PREPARATION, DUE TO THE GATE ARR OF ACFT AT THE GATE, PREFLT DUTIES COMMENCED 25 MINS PRIOR TO SCHEDULED DEP. THE CREW HAD ALREADY BEEN RUSHED BY DEALING WITH A SCHEDULING IRREGULARITY. I HAD FINISHED 36 MINS OF TALKING TO RESCHEDULE A TRAINING TRIP. AT PUSHBACK, IT APPEARED ALL ITEMS WERE COMPLETED AND THE SPECIAL TKOF AT SNA WAS BRIEFED. AFTER ENG START AND DISCONNECT, I THOUGHT WE WERE CLRED BY GND TO 'TURN L AT TXWY K, TAXI ACROSS RWY 19L&19R AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19R AT TXWY B.' THE FO READ BACK 'TURN L AT TXWY K, CROSS RWY 19L AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19R. (I DID NOT LEARN THIS UNTIL AFTER THE EVENT.) ON TAXI APCHING RWY 19R, I NOTICED A CESSNA ON APPROX 4 MI FINAL, BUT CONTINUED ACROSS THE RWY AS I THOUGHT I WAS CLRED. THE FO WAS 'HEADS DOWN' APCHING THE RWY, AND DIDN'T NOTICE I WAS XING RWY 19R UNTIL I WAS ON THE RWY. AT THAT POINT, THE ONLY COURSE OF ACTION WAS TO CONTINUE ACROSS. REACHING TXWY B, THE TWR GAVE US A PHONE NUMBER TO CALL, AND THE PROB WAS OBVIOUS. WE HEARD THE TWR GIVING THE CESSNA THE CHOICE TO LAND OR GO AROUND -- HE WENT AROUND. IN HINDSIGHT, IT'S REAL CLR I LET THE DESIRE TO OPERATE 'ON TIME' PRESSURE ME INTO NOT TAKING THE TIME TO ENSURE 'WE WERE CLRED ACROSS RWY 19R.' THIS IS A CLASSIC RUSH SCENARIO. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 486810: WE ARRIVED TO OPS AT SNA ON DAY #2 OF AN IOE (TRAINING) IDENT ON TIME. HOWEVER, THE LCA (CAPT) SPENT 30 MINS OF OUR BRIEFING/PREFLT TIME TRYING TO REPAIR A SCHEDULING CHANGE WE HAD JUST BEEN NOTIFIED OF. AS WELL, THE ACFT ARRIVED LATE TO THE GATE, SO OUR PREFLT TIME WAS COMPRESSED. THE TEMPO WAS SET -- RUSH TO GET OUT ON TIME. BETTER CHOICE, STEP BACK, SLOW DOWN AND ACCEPT A LATE DEP. ADD TO THIS SIT MY FIRST DEP FROM SNA (WHICH IS A COMPLEX MANEUVER) IN AN ACFT WHICH I AM UNFAMILIAR. THE RESULT -- A BREAK IN HABIT PATTERNS THAT COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE INCIDENT. WE PUSHED JUST 4 MINS LATE, AND THEN WERE CLRED TO 'RWY 19R, CROSS RWY 19L AT TXWY K, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19R,' WHICH I READ BACK. AS WE APCHED RWY 19L ON TXWY K, I SAW A SINGLE ENG CESSNA ABOUT 4 MI OUT (I ASSUMED FOR RWY 19L). I WENT HEADS DOWN TO GET NEW WTS, UPDATE RWY PERFORMANCE DATA AND RESET THE TKOF AIRSPDS. AT THE SAME TIME, WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE TO TWR. AS I MADE THE FREQ CHANGE, I HEARD THE CAPT SAY 'FINAL'S CLR.' I LOOKED UP, SAW WE WERE ENTERING RWY 19R, AND THE CESSNA WAS ABOUT 2 1/2 MI OUT. I SAID 'I DON'T THINK WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS THIS RWY' (TOO LATE). AS WE EXITED RWY 19R, TWR GAVE THE CESSNA THE CHOICE TO LAND OR GO AROUND (THEY WERE STILL 1 MI OUT). THEY CHOSE TO GO AROUND. THE TWR ALSO TOLD US TO CALL THEM AFTER LNDG. HAD WE NOT BEEN RUSHED, HAD WE SLOWED DOWN, HAD I BEEN MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE ARPT AND THE ACFT OR HAD I NOT BEEN 'HEADS DOWN' (THE PROPER CHOICE AT THE TIME), THIS INCIDENT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.