Narrative:

ATIS broadcast river visuals to runway 19. I thoroughly briefed captain for approach including the use of rosslyn lda instead of the river as lateral guidance and the GS instead of recommended altitudes to 4 DME. Captain returned standard brief for him of 'look out the window, land the airplane.' I knew his head wasn't in the game as he went 250 KTS away from the airport on downwind. He said to 'call the river' and I did. The way he briefed me, I figured he was going on the rosslyn lda. He started following the river. No big deal -- yet. He then asked for recommended altitudes to be set. I pointed at the GS. Then I saw him go heads down on the approach. He was reading the plate. He had not prepared for or listened to my brief and he was starting from square 1 on the approach! We were assigned 170 KTS until 5 DME. At 6.5 DME, he was slowing through 150 KTS. I told him about it, but he hadn't heard it because he was reading his approach plates. Next I noticed him drifting to the northeast side of the river, right where P56 comes all the way to the river. Just as I was about to say something, he said 'I've still got water under me. Not much, but I do.' well, my thought was -- move over! We didn't go into P56, but this whole sequence of events started with my brief. I wish I had noticed that he didn't pay attention to the original brief. Especially in a place like dca, you cannot afford to be anything less than a 'crew.' this is impossible with one pilot reading a plate and the other trying to figure out what he is doing. Notice, neither are flying!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DO-328 FO RPT ON THE FAILURE OF HIS CAPT TO FOLLOW THE APCH PROC AS BRIEFED DURING AN ATTEMPT TO PERFORM A RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 19 AT DCA, DC.

Narrative: ATIS BROADCAST RIVER VISUALS TO RWY 19. I THOROUGHLY BRIEFED CAPT FOR APCH INCLUDING THE USE OF ROSSLYN LDA INSTEAD OF THE RIVER AS LATERAL GUIDANCE AND THE GS INSTEAD OF RECOMMENDED ALTS TO 4 DME. CAPT RETURNED STANDARD BRIEF FOR HIM OF 'LOOK OUT THE WINDOW, LAND THE AIRPLANE.' I KNEW HIS HEAD WASN'T IN THE GAME AS HE WENT 250 KTS AWAY FROM THE ARPT ON DOWNWIND. HE SAID TO 'CALL THE RIVER' AND I DID. THE WAY HE BRIEFED ME, I FIGURED HE WAS GOING ON THE ROSSLYN LDA. HE STARTED FOLLOWING THE RIVER. NO BIG DEAL -- YET. HE THEN ASKED FOR RECOMMENDED ALTS TO BE SET. I POINTED AT THE GS. THEN I SAW HIM GO HEADS DOWN ON THE APCH. HE WAS READING THE PLATE. HE HAD NOT PREPARED FOR OR LISTENED TO MY BRIEF AND HE WAS STARTING FROM SQUARE 1 ON THE APCH! WE WERE ASSIGNED 170 KTS UNTIL 5 DME. AT 6.5 DME, HE WAS SLOWING THROUGH 150 KTS. I TOLD HIM ABOUT IT, BUT HE HADN'T HEARD IT BECAUSE HE WAS READING HIS APCH PLATES. NEXT I NOTICED HIM DRIFTING TO THE NE SIDE OF THE RIVER, RIGHT WHERE P56 COMES ALL THE WAY TO THE RIVER. JUST AS I WAS ABOUT TO SAY SOMETHING, HE SAID 'I'VE STILL GOT WATER UNDER ME. NOT MUCH, BUT I DO.' WELL, MY THOUGHT WAS -- MOVE OVER! WE DIDN'T GO INTO P56, BUT THIS WHOLE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS STARTED WITH MY BRIEF. I WISH I HAD NOTICED THAT HE DIDN'T PAY ATTN TO THE ORIGINAL BRIEF. ESPECIALLY IN A PLACE LIKE DCA, YOU CANNOT AFFORD TO BE ANYTHING LESS THAN A 'CREW.' THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE WITH ONE PLT READING A PLATE AND THE OTHER TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT HE IS DOING. NOTICE, NEITHER ARE FLYING!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.